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Abstract  
Youth unemployment is high in South Africa and especially high among black males. The slow absorption of 
young black males into the employment is somewhat surprising given that the descriptive statistics suggest that 
employment mobility in South Africa is high. In the first chapter, I investigate whether the labour market is truly 
as mobile as reported or whether the transition estimate is rather a reflection of misclassification error or 
unobserved individual heterogeneity. Thereafter, in chapter two, I proceed to examine the role of reservation 
wages on unemployment. Unlike previous studies I do not make use of self-reported reservation wages. Instead 
I use a job search model to recover the reservation wages that are consistent with the behaviour we observe in 
the labour market. In the final chapter, I look at the role of education on labour market outcomes. More 
specifically, at whether ability bias is present and whether current estimates are inflated. I do so through a dynamic 
programming model that mimics the schooling decision for forward-looking optimizing agents.  
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Opsomming 
Werkloosheid onder die jeug is hoog in Suid-Afrika en veral hoog onder swart mans. Die stadige 
indiensnamekoers van swart mans is ietwat verrassend gegewe dat konvensionele modelle daarop dui dat die 
mobiliteit van indiensname in Suid-Afrika hoog is. In die eerste hoofstuk, word daar ondersoek of die arbeidsmark 
werklik so mobiel is soos gerapporteer word en of die huidige beraamings van mobiliteit nie liewer ‘n aanduiding 
van metingsfout of heterogeniteit is nie. Daarna, in hoofstuk twee, word daar gekyk na die die rol van reserwelone 
op werkloosheid. Liewer as om gebruik te maak van selfgerapporteerde reserwelone ontwikkel ek  ‘n indiensname-
model om die reserwelone te vind wat ooreenstem met die gedrag in die arbeidsmark. In die laaste hoofstuk, kyk 
ek na die rol van onderwys op arbeidsmark uitkomste. Ek ondersoek of die huidige oprengskoers vir opvoeding 
sydig is wanneer mens versuim om te kontroleer vir die effek van vermoens. Ek gebruik 'n dinamiese 
programmering model wat my in staat stel om die optimale hoeveel opvoeding vir toekomsgerigte individu te 
beraam. 
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Introduction 
Unemployment is notoriously high in South Africa. The current unemployment rate is estimated to be 25% 
according to Statistics South Africa (StatsSA, 2015a). This rate increases to 35% when using the broad 
definition of unemployment, which also includes those who are not actively looking for work. Youth 
unemployment in South Africa is even higher. The narrow unemployment level among the young (between 
the ages of 15 and 34) is estimated at 37%, while the narrow unemployment level for the adult population 
is estimated at 17%. (StatsSA, 2015b). Such high levels of unemployment is clearly an important issue that 
requires attention, both from a research and a policy perspective. 
It is often argued that the increase in unemployment among the youth is due to an oversupply of labour 
relative to demand. Labour force participation has steadily increased since the political transition in 1994. 
Unfortunately, over the same period there has been a decline in the relative demand for unskilled labour 
(Burger & von Fintel, 2009). The surplus of unskilled labour caused by the increased participation has made 
it tougher for young entrants into the labour market to find work, since these individuals are less equipped 
to compete with older workers. (Mlatsheni & Rospabe, 1999; Bhorat & Oosthuizen, 2007). Alternatively, 
the higher levels of unemployment among the young could be due to higher reservation wages. Young 
adults may be financially supported by the rest of their household and therefore be less willing to accept 
low paying jobs (Rankin & Roberts, 2011). According to the job search literature, unemployment can also 
arise through imperfect information. If individuals have imperfect information about vacancies and future 
job offers this will add to the unemployment burden. Similarly, as both employees and employers have 
preferences, young entrants may take time to find a job that is suitable to their skills and tastes (McCall, 
1970).  
In this dissertation I plan to study the movement into and out of employment in order to investigate 
whether the slow absorption into employment among the young is driven by demand or supply side factors. 
I will do so using a mixture of standard reduced form and structural modelling approaches. In the first 
chapter I show that, despite slow absorption rates among new entrants into the labour market, the reported 
mobility levels between surveys are high. In the second chapter I go on to test whether these low absorption 
rates into employment among the young is due to a low job arrival rate or whether it is due to low acceptance 
rates. Finally, in the last chapter I allow for endogenous education by developing a structural model that 
explicitly models the sequential educational enrolment decision faced by students, who need to decide 
whether it would be better to continue their studies or not.  
Throughout the thesis I will contrast the disadvantaged position of young black males relative to that of 
their white and older counterparts and the unfavourable position of the uneducated relative to that of the 
educated. All three chapters also explicitly considers the potentially confounding effect of unobservable 
individual heterogeneity on the behaviour and subsequent labour market outcomes of workers. 
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i. The Contribution of this Thesis to our Knowledge
Economic research has revealed a preference for simpler methods, partly since the results that are obtained 
from these methods are usually easier to convey to an audience, and particularly an audience of non-
specialists. These descriptive statistics or multivariate regressions are often informative in telling us how the 
different variables in our model are correlated. Many economist, however, make the mistake of adding a 
causal interpretation to these estimated correlates or summary statistics. This is problematic since these 
estimates are usually not causal or economically interpretable. The results are usually not causal, since these 
models do not even attempt to address the endogeneity concerns that are inherent to most estimates. The 
results are not economically interpretable since underlying economic theory is required to give meaning to 
the effects one derive (Keane, 2010).   
In this thesis, I contribute to the literature, by choosing three such descriptive results and exposing the 
inconsistencies that undermine their interpretation. In all three chapters, I look at the descriptive estimates, 
discuss why I think they may be biased and then attempt to find more reliable estimates that are better 
equipped in explaining the behavioural outcomes that we observe in the data.  
In chapter one, I show that the employment transitions rates that we derive from transitions matrices are 
too high. If the probably to transition into employment is truly as high as the reported estimates claim, then 
young individuals should be absorbed into employment at a much quicker rate than what we are currently 
observing. It is unclear whether the divergence is driven by misclassification or heterogeneity, but what we 
can say with confidence is that conventional transition rates do not represent an accurate estimate of the 
probability of transiting into employment.   
In chapter two, I show that current reservation wages, which are usually derived from self-reported data, 
are inconsistent with the employment and wage data. Individuals often report reservation wages that are 
higher than their expected earnings and are seen accepting jobs that pay less than their reported reservation 
wages. In our model we look at the employment transitions between periods and the observed wage 
distribution to derive a plausible wage offer distribution and job offer arrival rate.  
In chapter three, I show that the returns to education estimates are not aligned with the educational 
attainment figures. Descriptive results suggest that the returns to education in South Africa are high and 
convex. Yet, most people appear to drop out of school right before the largest payoff would occur. This 
behavior would be difficult to rationalize from the perspective of rational, well-informed agents that are 
not liquidity constrained. In our model we show that a large part of the difference in wages is attributed to 
ability differences. The actual gains to schooling are much lower that descriptive models suggest. Ignoring 
ability bias would lead one to overestimate the returns to education.  
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ii. Why Structural Modelling?
The Mincerian earnings model compares the wages across workers of different ages and levels of schooling. 
The model does well in capturing the underlying correlation between the covariates, but many applications 
of this model overlook two important caveats: that the model was meant to be descriptive and that it 
assumes full employment. The Mincer model may be less applicable to developing countries, like South 
Africa, than to the developed countries for which the model was first developed.  
I hope to contribute to this literature by introducing a set of models that are more suitable to the labour 
landscape of a developing country with a high level of non-employment and a large degree of heterogeneity 
among workers. I develop a structural framework wherein individuals are allowed to be rational, utility-
maximising and forward-looking. By adding microeconomic theory to the model I am able to endogenise 
variables that are usually considered to be determined outside the model (exogenous). Over the span of the 
three chapters, I will be modelling three such choices: the choice of how much education to attain, the 
choice to actively search for work, and the choice to accept or reject a job offer when one is offered.  
Discrete choice structural models build on the static latent variable choice models of the 1960s by 
introducing an inter-temporal framework into the decision making process. This is important, since all three 
decisions I model have both instantaneous and future repercussions that need to be considered. The 
decisions to enrol in schooling and search for jobs require individuals to be dynamic in their considerations, 
since they are required to weight up current costs against delayed future benefits.  
Keane (2010) criticizes non-structural studies for being agnostic about the role of unobservable 
characteristics. In doing so, they ignore the most interesting aspect of the data – since they are unable to 
tell us why seemingly similar people make different choices. In all three chapters I will introduce unobserved 
individual heterogeneity into the models through a finite mixture approach, which allows individuals to 
differ on unobservable traits.  
Theoretical models rarely simplify to linear relationships that are recoverable through conventional ordinary 
least squares regression and other pre-packaged estimators. This is true for all three my models. In all three 
the chapters, the estimates that I am interested in are recovered through customised maximum likelihood 
rather than simpler, linear techniques. A maximum likelihood model was used in the first chapter, since it 
allowed us to fit the transition estimates on additional moments and not just the naive 1-period transition 
rates. The maximum likelihood approach enables us to explicitly test for the presence of misclassification 
and heterogeneity. In the second and third chapters, I model the decision making process faced by forward-
looking utility-maximisers. The complexities involved in modelling the decisions of a forward-looking 
individual under uncertainty again requires making use of non-linear estimation techniques. In both cases 
the models are able to recover the set of parameters that were most likely to have produced the data that is 
observed, given the behavioural assumption about how optimizing individuals should behave.  
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iii. Why the Focus on Black Males?
The dissertation will predominantly focus on the labour market outcomes of black males. The black 
population was chosen since it is the largest and historically most disadvantaged population group, and 
hence the most interesting and important from a public policy perspective. The focus on males is 
convenient since it does not require one to model the simultaneous fertility and labour supply decisions. 
Lastly, given the very different problems and opportunities experienced by members of the different race 
groups, it may be over-ambitious to attempt to find an explanation for the behaviour and labour market 
outcomes for members of all the population groups. For this reason I decided to restrict the analysis a 
single race and gender. 
iv. States, Decisions and Exogenous Transitions
The following three figures give a schematic representation of the underlying states that I am modelling in 
each chapter. Solid lines indicate exogenously determined transition probabilities, while the dashed lines 
indicate endogenous decisions.  
In chapter one I model the transition between employment and non-employment. The chapter is 
descriptive in nature and void of any causal interpretation. Unlike the descriptive models that merely look 
at the transitioning in and out of employment between two successive periods, I here adopt a more 
comprehensive model that allows me to fit on a richer set of empirical moments. Most importantly the 
model attempts to reconcile the high short term transition rates with the low absorption rates among new 
labour market entrants. The added structure that the additional data and assumptions imposes on the model 
allow me to test for the presence of misclassification and unobserved heterogeneity in current transition 
estimates. 





In chapter two I expand the model that was introduced in chapter one, by introducing an active search 
decision and by adding microeconomic theory to the decision making process. In this chapter, the transition 
out of employment is still assumed to be exogenously determined, but the employment decision 
(conditional on being offered a job) and the job-search decision are assumed to be made by the individual. 
By modelling the process I hope to be able to uncover the extent of which the slow absorption rates among 
the young is actually a choice – whether unemployment is driven by low job arrival rates or low acceptance 
rates. Some of the recent literate argues that it is the latter. The methods used in the South African literature, 
however, rely on self-reported reservation wages that are prone to over-optimism. Job search theory 
provides an alternative. Rather than asking individuals what they think their reservation wages are, the 
chapter attempts to uncover reservation wages that are consistent with labour market behaviour.   
In chapter three the focus shifts to the pre-labour market schooling decision, allowing individuals to use 
their knowledge of the labour market and the expected future payoffs of education to pick the level of 
education that they believe will maximise their expected discounted utility. Here, the educational attainment 
process is modelled as a sequential schooling decision, allowing individuals to use the information they 
gained about themselves at the end of each year to influence their decisions to remain in school or not. In 
modelling the schooling process I hope to develop a structural model that is capable of addressing the 
ability bias that confounds conventional wage regressions. Theory suggests that the returns will be 
overestimated if education is possibly correlated to motivation, family background or ability. Very few 
empirical models have, however, been able to recover lower education estimates. I develop a structural 
model that explicitly models the sequential educational attainment faced by young black males, whom I 











Chapter 1:  
Employment Mobility in South Africa:     
A Reconsideration 
 
The unemployment rate among the young is high in South Africa. In this chapter we attempt to 
uncover whether the high level of unemployment is a temporary state experienced by many individuals 
or a relatively permanent state experienced by only a few. Most of the current literature on South 
African labour market mobility suggests that it is the former – that the South African labour 
market is mobile.   
We use panel data to investigate how individuals transition in and out of employment over time. 
Unlike previous studies we do not limit our analyses to simply comparing employment states over 
two successive periods. Instead, a more comprehensive maximum likelihood model that is able to 
also fit the age-employment profile and the multi-wave transition rates is developed. The added 
structure enables us to explicitly incorporate unobservable individual heterogeneity and measurement 
error into our mobility estimates.  
 
1. Introduction 
High unemployment rates among the young, as is experienced in South Africa, can result from either a slow 
inflow into employment or a rapid inflow which is offset by an equally rapid outflow. These two labour 
markets could produce the same aggregate level of non-employment, but would necessitate different policy 
interventions. In this paper we will argue that classic estimates overestimate the true level of mobility in the 
market. Most black males face a much lower entry and exit rate than was previously believed. According to 
our results, employment mobility may be up to 5 times lower than what conventional descriptive estimates 
would suggest.  
In order to model the transitions between employment and non-employment we will be using the panel 
dimension of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) data that follow individuals over 6 waves. Unlike previous 
authors we will not be limiting our analysis to the transitions between successive periods. Instead, we 
develop a more comprehensive maximum likelihood model that allows us to exploit the additional waves 





in our data to get a richer set of moments to fit our estimates on. The added structure and richer set of 
moments, have the added bonus of allowing us to incorporate unobservable individual heterogeneity and 
measurement error into our model.  
In the following section we review the South African literature on employment transition. We also draw on 
international literature to show how different authors have dealt with the validity of the Markov assumption, 
the presence of individual level heterogeneity as well as the misclassification of employment. The data is 
introduced in section 3. In section 4 we look at some descriptives, comparing the mobility in employment 
of white and black males across some covariates. In section 5 we formally estimate the classic transition 
estimates using the conventional approach that is commonly adopted in the literature. In section 6 we 
develop and implement our own model that is capable of addressing misclassification and unobserved 
heterogeneity. Section 7 concludes.  
2. Previous Work  
Longitudinal labour data has only recently become available in South Africa. The first such dataset was the 
KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS). Cichello et al. (2005) and Dinkelman (2004) use the first 
two waves of the panel to study the transition between labour market status in 1993 and 1998 among the 
black working-aged. While the data is not nationally representative it does provide researchers with an 
interesting first glimpse into the level of mobility that could be expected nationally. Similarly, Lam et al. 
(2008) use the Cape Area Panel Study to track the transition from education to employment among a group 
of young school-leavers in the Cape Town metropolitan area. As with KIDS, this data is not nationally 
representative. The first nationally representative longitudinal labour data was that of the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS), which has a rotating panel dimension between 2001 and 2004. Both Banerjee et al. (2006) 
and Ranchhod and Dinkelman (2008) look at the level of mobility within the data. More recently, Cichello 
et al (2014) make use of the National Income Dynamics Survey (NIDS).  
2.1. Transitioning out of Employment 
Dinkelman (2008) looks at the transition probabilities for a group of black males between the ages of 16 
and 64. According to her study, the likelihood of still being employed in 1998 if a person was employed in 
1993 was 71%. More recently, Cichello et al. (2014) predict that the probability of remaining employed over 
a two year period for males is 77.5%.  
Most of the South African literature we have surveyed distinguishes between the formally and informally 
employed. Generally the formally employed are less likely to transition out of employment than the 
informally employed. Cichello et al. (2005) show that the formally employed had a 76% probability of 
remaining employed, while the informally employed had a 59% probability of still being employed in 5 
years’ time. Using the LFS data, Banerjee et al. (2006) find that the probability of remaining employed over 





a 6 month period for black males is 88% if they were formally employed in the initial period and 63% if 
they were informally employed in the initial period. According to Ranchod and Dinkelman (2008) the 
probability of remaining employed over a six month period for a black male is 89% if he is formally 
employed and 68% if he is informally employed. The probability to remain employed is lower among the 
younger cohort of black males. Among the younger group the probability of remaining employed is 62% if 
formally employed and 35% if informally employed. 
2.2. Transitioning into Employment 
In most of the South African transition literature the non-employed are disaggregated into different groups. 
Of the five papers reviewed, Cichello et al. (2005) were the only to treat the non-employed as a single group. 
All four of the other papers distinguish between the unemployed and the not economically active; three of 
these papers further distinguish between the unemployed who were actively seeking and the unemployed 
who were discouraged.  
Using the initial KIDS study, Cichello et al. (2005) find that the non-employed have a 40% probability of 
moving into employment. Using the same data Dinkelman (2004) shows that the probability of transitioning 
into employment differs slightly depending on whether an individual was classified as unemployed or not 
economically active. The unemployed have a 44% probability of transitioning into employment in 5 years’ 
time. Individuals who were not-economically active have a 29% probability of becoming employed.  
According to the results of Banerjee et al. (2006) there is a small ‘advantage’ to searching. Among the 
unemployed those who were actively seeking employment have a 17% probability of being employed 6 
months later, while those who were not searching only have a 14% probability of being employed 6 months 
later. Only 5% of black males who were not economically active transitioned into employment over the 
same period. Although they used the same data, the results of Ranchod and Dinkelman (2008) differ slightly 
from those of Banerjee et al. (2006)1. Ranchod and Dinkelman (2008) find that black males who were 
actively seeking employment are more likely to transition into employment than those who do not actively 
seek employment. The following job entry probabilities are obtained: 25% for the actively seeking 
unemployed, 20% for the discouraged unemployed, and 14% for the not economically active. There appears 
to be hardly any advantage to searching among the young. The respective entry rates among the youth are 
as follows: 12% if an individual was actively seeking, 11% if an individual was discouraged, and 3% if an 
individual was not economically active.  
Most recently, Cichello et al. (2014) show that individuals who are discouraged are more likely to transition 
into employment than individuals who are actively seeking employment. Using the first two waves of NIDS 
                                                            
1 The results differ for two reasons. Firstly, Ranchod and Dinkelman (2008) pooled all the transition periods together 
and looked at the average 6 month transition rates across all 6 periods, rather than merely looking at one transition 
period. Secondly, while Banerjee et al. (2006) sample all the working aged black males collectively, Ranchhod and 
Dinkelman (2008) looked at the youth and adults separately. 





they show that the probability of becoming employed in two years’ time is 39% if an individual is actively 
seeking employment, 44% if an individual is discouraged, and 29% if an individual is not economically 
active. It is unclear whether these differences are statistically significant. Simple back-of-the-envelope 
calculations show that the average probability of transitioning from non-employment (the group as a whole) 
to employment is roughly 35%.  
Lam et al. (2008) use the Cape Area Panel Study to track the transition from education to employment (or 
non-employment) among a group of young school-leavers in the Cape Town metropolitan area. They find 
a large racial difference in the likelihood of transitioning into employment. The authors’ show 35% of 
coloured men were employed within one month from leaving school and 50% were employed after six 
months. Comparatively, only about 10% of black males reported being employed after one month, and 
only 25% of black males reported being employed after a year.  
2.3. Validity of Markov Assumption 
To our knowledge, Porteba and Summer (1986) and Magnac and Robin (1994) are the authors that have 
attempted to test whether the classic transition estimates conform to other moments in the data. Using US 
data, Porteba and Summer (1986) apply iterative proportion fitting or “raking” to adjust transition estimates 
to conform to the aggregate level estimates. Their unraked and raked results differ greatly, raising doubts 
over the validity of these assumptions, most notably the assumption that individuals are homogenous and 
that employment is correctly captured. Magnac and Robin (1994) follow a similar approach. They argue 
that if the Markov assumption is valid, then classic transition parameters should produce employment and 
non-employment spells that should be traceable over time. Unlike us they tested the validity of the Markov 
assumption using tenure data from the French Labour Force Survey rather than using repeated waves. Like 
us they, however, found that the Markov property fails in the absence of any misclassification or unobserved 
individual heterogeneity.  
2.4. Misclassification 
Employment status is reported with error. According to Meyer (1988) the misclassification in employment 
is much more detrimental to employment transition estimates than it is for employment estimates, since 
most of the misclassification cancels out in cross-sectional employment estimates, whereas in panel 
estimates the errors gets exacerbated. Misclassification errors will bias the employment transition estimates 
upward (Singh & Rao, 1995). 
The most common approach in dealing with the bias that can arise out of misclassification is to make use 
of an auxiliary source of information that allows one to approximate the misclassification rate. In studies 
by Chua and Fuller (1987), Poterba and Summer (1986) and Magnac and Visser (1999) the auxiliary source 
came in the form of a “re-interview” that was conducted shortly after the actual survey. In the re-interview 
respondents were asked about their employment status a week before – when the actual survey was 





conducted. If the answers conflicted with previous responses, respondents were triggered further until the 
researchers were confident that they had uncovered what their true employment status was a week before. 
Chau and Fuller (1987) look at the level of misclassification between three categories: the employed, 
unemployed and not in the labour force. They found that in the US the employed had a 2% probability of 
being misclassified non-employed. The unemployed had a 6% chance of wrongly being categorized as 
employed while the not economically active only had a 2% chance of being classified as employed. 
Porteba and Summers (1986) use information from the Current Population Survey between 1977 and 1982 
as well as the re-interview survey which followed the survey to calculate the degree of misclassification in 
the US. The authors discover monthly employment mobility rates that are far lower than conventional 
estimates would suggest. When the authors correct for reporting errors they find that the probability to 
leave employment drops from 5.0% to 1.9%, while the probability to transition into employment drops 
from 7.0% to 2.6%.   
Biemer and Bushery (2000) also use the Current Population Survey to estimate the extent of 
misclassification. Using the three waves between 1993 and 1996 as well as the re-interview data, the authors 
compare the misclassification rates from using the three waves alone (without the re-interview data) to the 
estimated misclassification estimates from the more classical method that uses the re-interview data. They 
find that the results they derive using the two different methods are comparable. The probability of being 
misclassified if employed ranges between 0.4% and 1.3%. Interestingly, the probability of being 
misclassified as employed differs greatly depending on whether individuals are considered to be not 
economically active or unemployed. Among the not-economically active the probability to be incorrectly 
classified as employed ranges between 1.1% and 2.6%, while the probability to be incorrectly classified as 
employed among the unemployed ranges between 4.6% and 11%.  
Using the Canadian Labour Force Survey of the 1989, Sing and Roa (1995) show that among the subsample 
of individuals that were re-interviewed the probability to have been wrongly classified as employed if non-
employed was only 0.8%, while the probability to be wrongly classified as non-employed if employed was 
0.9%.  
2.4. Heterogeneity 
Following a sample of inner city black youths in the United States, Ballen and Freeman (1986) find a high 
degree of state-dependence. Those individuals that have worked before and worked more recently were 
more likely to transition back into employment. Clark and Summers (1979) find that the bulk of 
unemployment is due to an important minority of workers who are unable to find and hold onto steady 
employment. These few individuals experience prolonged periods of non-employment. These findings lead 
the authors to question the validity of the Markov condition that stipulates that everyone has the same 
probability of transitioning into and out of employment. 





3. The Data 
The Labour Force Survey was collected bi-annually by Statistics South Africa between 2000 and 2007. In 
this paper we will be exploiting the panel portion of the survey to look at the transitions in and out of 
employment among black males. Although most of the individuals were matched using administrative 
records, Statistics South Africa (2006) also matched some of the individuals within household using 
information on age and gender. The panel runs for 6 waves, spanning from September 2001 to March 2004. 
A rotating panel was used with 20% of respondents being rotated out of the panel at each wave.  
According to Statistics South Africa (2006), some of the variables were cleaned to make them consistent 
between the waves. The data appeared reliable, although we found some discrepancies between the reported 
tenure and time out of work values, not only with regard to other tenure and time out of work values, but 
also with the lagged employment values. Since our model relies on tenure and time out of work to trace out 
the employment history of individuals a cleaning algorithm was designed and implemented to ensure the 
accuracy of these variables2. 
For most of this paper we will be limiting our analysis to working-aged black males. The size of this 
subsample of black males ranges between 13,602 and 15,490. The subsample of working-aged white males 
that will act as a comparison group during our initial analysis is much smaller, ranging between 1,643 and 
1,855. Table 1.A.1 and table 1.A.2 in the appendix 1.A show the exact sample sizes for each of these groups. 
The table also shows the level of attrition between waves.  
 
The level of attrition is high and unlikely to be random. In the LFS no attempt was made to track individuals 
who moved. This is likely to bias our sample if individuals who moved in our out of employment are more 
likely to also relocate. Tentative evidence from Ranchod and Dinkelman (2008) supports this claim. The 
authors found that of all the groups, those individuals who were not-economically active were most likely 
to be matched over time in the LFS panel. The level of employment mobility among the subsample of 
individuals in our panel is therefore likely to be lower than the actual level of employment mobility of the 
larger population.  
Fortunately, a large proportion of those individuals who were initially lost to follow-up are observed in later 
waves. Unlike Ranchod and Dinkelman (2008) and Banerjee et al. (2006) we do not restrict our analysis to 
those individuals that were observed in consecutive waves. In our analysis we retain individuals who were 
only observed once and individuals that dropped out of the sample but returned later. The structural 
method we employ uses the information of individuals that are observed only once to help fit derive the 
                                                            
2 See Appendix 1.B for a complete discussion on how these variables were cleaned. 





aggregate employment-age profile. Similarly, our model is able extract longitudinal information those 
individuals that leave the sample but return later, since we also fit on multiple period transition rates.  
4. Descriptive analysis 
4.1. Patterns of Employment 
The age-employment profile is well understood and frequently reported. It shows how the probability of 
employment varies over the current pool of working-aged individuals. The following figure was derived 
using the larger pooled LFS dataset. It shows how the probability of employment varies by age for white 
and black males.   
 
          
Figure 1.1:  Probability of Employment among working-aged males. 
 
The level of employment to which the two race groups converge differs greatly. For white males the stable 
level of employment is around 95%, while for black males it is around 70%. The speed of convergence also 
differs between the two race groups. White males reach their ‘steady state’ of employment much earlier 
than black males. The level of employment for white males plateaus around the age of 25, while the 
employment level for black males only plateaus around the age of 35.  
This slow absorption into the labour market is the main driving force behind the high incidence of youth 
unemployment among black males. In appendix 1.F we show that the probability of being enrolled in 
education conditional on age is almost identical for black and white males. The slow absorption rates among 
black males, therefore, cannot be due to different drop-out rates.  
4.2. Entry and Exit Rates 
Entry and exit rates vary between individuals. In this section we show how the reported average transition 



























4.2.1. Variation in Entry and Exit Rates by Age 
First we compare how the probability to enter and exit employment over a six month period differ by age. 
 Figure 1.2:  Job Entry by Age and Race     Figure 1.3:  Job Exit by Age and Race 
 
On average, white males are roughly two times more likely to transition into employment than black males. 
From figure 1.2 we can see that at age 20 white males have a 20% probability of becoming employed and 
black males have a 5% probability of becoming employed. For both groups the likelihood of obtaining 
work increases between the ages of 20 and 30. By age 30 white males have a 50% probability of moving 
into employment within the next 6 months. At the same age black males only have a 25% probability of 
transitioning into employment. From age 30 onwards we see a drop in the relative probability of becoming 
employed for white males, while for black males the probability of becoming employed remains stable3.  
Figure 1.3 shows how the job exit rates vary over one’s working age. The probability of exiting employment 
is highest among the youth. At age 20, employed black males have a 60% probability of becoming non-
employed over the next 6 months, while white males have a 20% probability of exiting employment. The 
exit rates drop as workers become older. At age 30, black males have a 15% probability of becoming non-
employed. At the same age white males only have a 3% probability of transitioning out of employment. 
From age 30 onwards these probabilities remain fairly constant.   
Using longitudinal employee-employer data for over a million individuals in the US, Topel and Ward (1992) 
find that for the first ten years of labour force participation, job mobility was higher than the following 
                                                            
3 The confidence interval is largest where the sample is smallest. For the job entry rates the confidence intervals around 
the conditional point estimates widens at higher ages where the proportion of the sample who is non-employed is 
smallest, while for the job exit model the confidence intervals are widest at the younger ages, where only a small 
portion of the sample is employed. 





phase where employment appeared to be relatively stable. These results are consistent with a heterogeneous 
model where employees keep searching for work until they find an appropriate match. Ballen and Freeman 
(1986) argue that at early ages workers are still searching for employment that fits their talents and 
preferences; thereafter individuals hold down jobs for longer and mobility decreases. Since finding the 
correct match may take a while, one would expect the proportion of individuals who are in a “good match” 
to increase with age.  
4.2.2. Variation in Entry and Exit Rates by Recent Employment History 
In the data we have some information on how long people have been in their current position. The 
employed were asked how long they have worked for their present employer while the non-employed were 
asked how long it has been since they were last employed. Throughout we will refer to the time spent with 
current employer as ‘tenure’ and the time since last employed as the ‘time gap’. Using this information the 
employed and non-employed are decomposed into three groups. The employed are split into those who 
have been employed for less than a year, those who have been employed in a specific position for between 
1 and 3 years, and those who have been employed for more than 3 years. Analogously, the non-employed 
are split into those who have been non-employed for less than a year, those who have been out of work 
for between 1 and 3 years, and those who have not been employed during the last 3 years4. 
The following two graphs show how the distribution of the time out of work among the non-employed 
and the distribution of tenure among the employed vary over a group of working-aged black males5. 
 
Figure 1.4:  Time Out of Work by Age 
                                                            
4 In the graph below we distinguish between those who have not worked in the last 3 years and those who have never 
worked. Throughout the rest of the paper we group these two responses together. 
5 Both graphs were drawn using a larger pooled LFS that runs from 2000 to 2007.   
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Figure 1.4 shows how the time out of work varies for non-employed black males over their working age. 
95% of 20 year olds in our sample who are not employed have never worked before. The proportion of 
the non-employed who have never been employed decreases to 30% at age 50. This equates to roughly 
10% of all 50 year-old black males, given that roughly two thirds of the cohort are employed at that age.  
Figure 1.5 shows that the average level of tenure increases with age. Most of the difference in the 
distribution of tenure is between the ages of 20 and 30. The difference in tenure thereafter is less dramatic. 
A disproportionate number of the youth have low tenure. The probability of having tenure of less than one 
year drops from 60% at age 20 to 20% at age 30 and finally to around 10% at age 50.  
Next the predicted transition rates are compared across the ‘time gap’ and ‘tenure’ states.   
 
       Figure 1.6:  Entry Rate by Time Gap        Figure 1.7:  Exit Rate by Tenure 
 
Figure 1.6 shows that those individuals who are furthest removed from the labour market (those who have 
either never worked or worked more than 3 years ago) are least likely to transition into employment. This 
holds regardless of age. Conversely, those individuals who are closest to the labour market (who have been 
out of employment for less than a year) are most likely to transition back into employment. Predictably, the 
transition rates for those who have been non-employed for between one year and three years lie wedged 
between the two other groups.  
In the US, Ballen and Freeman (1986) find that a poor work history lessens the likelihood that one will find 
employment in the near future, while a good work history increases the probability that one will find future 
employment. This path-dependency of employment may help explain how some individuals get stuck in 
“vicious” non-employment cycles. 





Figure 1.7 depicts the relationship between tenure and the probability of transitioning out of employment 
over age. Those individuals who have been in a job for less than a year are most likely to transition out of 
employment, while those who have been in their job for more than 3 years are least likely to transition out 
of employment. The probability of moving out of employment decreases with age, but the effect of having 
tenure remains positive throughout. Again, the transition rates for those who have been employed for 
between a year and three years lie wedged between the two other groups. The curves are far flatter than 
before (see figure 3). A large portion of the sharp initial decline in exit rate is driven by low tenure rather 
than age.   
It is unclear through which channel tenure and time gap are affecting transition rates. One common 
interpretation regarding tenure is that it acts as a proxy for the job-specific experience that someone might 
have accrued in their current position. If so, workers who have been in a specific position for a while would 
be more costly to let go of. Conversely, the negative correlation between tenure and the exit rates could be 
driven by heterogeneity in employee-employer matching. According to Topel and Ward (1992) neither of 
these theories is likely to be completely accurate.  
4.2.3. Variation in Entry and Exit Rates by Education Level 
Education plays a central role in early labour market outcomes. Among the youth, that Lam et al. (2008), 
followed, those who had finished matric were 16 percentage points more likely to transition into 
employment during the first 4 years after school than those students who left school with less than grade 
10. The effect drops off slightly to 10 percentage points when they control for the effect of ability by adding 
an earlier test-score to their regression.  
The following two figures compare the likelihood of job entry and exit by age for individuals with less than 
matric, matric and more than matric using the constructed Labour Force Survey panel of before.  





               Figure 1.8:  Entry Rate by Education Level                      Figure 1.9:  Exit Rate by Education Level 
 
Generally speaking, workers with matric are more likely to transition into employment and less likely to 
transition out of employment. However, the difference in exit rates between these two groups is negligible 
at some ages. Having a post matric qualification increases the probability of moving into employment and 
decreases the probability of moving out of employment.  
5. Classic Transition Estimates 
In the following section we analyse the transition between employment and non-employment.  
5.1. Justification for Only Having Two Groups 
In our analysis we only distinguish between the employed and non-employed. This simple distinction is 
common in the international literature, but at odds with most of the previous work on South African labour 
mobility. Most of the South African literature disaggregates the non-employed into the unemployed who 
are searching, the unemployed who are discouraged and the not economically active.  
While the distinction between the searching unemployed, discouraged and not economically active is clearly 
defined in the theoretical literature, the distinction is less conclusive in practice. Clark and Summers (1979) 
find that there is no meaningful distinction between being unemployed and not economically active. Most 
of the unemployment spells, in their data, end when individuals transitioned out of the labour force rather 
than back into employment. Many of these individuals who transitioned from unemployed to not 
economically active, re-emerged as unemployed within a month’s time again.  





Cichello et al. (2014) find that the differences in the job entry rates among the three different categories 
were not that sizeable: 22% for the not economically active, 28% for the discouraged and 32% for the 
actively searching. The level of churning between these 3 groups between the two periods was also high. 
Banerjee et al (2006) find that only about a third of those who were classified as discouraged were still 
classified as discouraged 6 months later. Similarly, roughly 25% of the not economically active remained in 
that category. Most moved to either discouraged or seeking.  
Lastly, having more groups makes the model even more susceptible to measurement error, especially if the 
distinction between the groups is subjective. Chua & Fuller (1987) find that roughly 10% of unemployed 
misclassified themselves as being not economically active. Using more recent data, Biemer and Bushery 
(2000) estimate that the proportion of the unemployed who erroneously report to be not economically 
active ranges between 11% and 28%.  
5.2. Classic Estimates  
A transition matrix is constructed for black and white males. The matrices show how many individuals 
transitioned in and out of employment between two waves.  
 




The elements on the diagonal denote the probability of staying in the same employment state, while the 
elements off the diagonal denote the probability of transitioning in or out of employment. For both tables 
the transition probabilities were averaged over individuals and across time6.    
 
Black males face an average six month job entry rate of 17.4% and an average six month job exit rate of 
14.1%. White males, on the other hand, have a 35.6% probability of transitioning into employment and 
only a 3.7% probability of transitioning out of employment once employed. These results suggest that white 
males are not only quicker to be absorbed into the labour market, but are far less likely to transition out of 
employment once they find work.     
 
The descriptive results that we discussed in the previous section suggest that the transition probabilities are 
not uniform. The entry and exit rates appear to differ among individuals and even among the same 
individuals over time. The easiest way to incorporate the observable heterogeneity would be through a 
linear probability model (LPM). In section 1.C of the appendix we show how linear probability models can 
be used to allow the transition probabilities to vary by age, working history and education.7  
                                                            
6 Issues regarding heterogeneity and misclassification were ignored. 
7 Two LPM regressions were run: a job entry and a job exit model.  
 Black Males    White Males   
From To  From To  
  Non-Empl Empl     Non-Empl Empl   
Non-Empl 82.6% 17.4%   Non-Empl 64.4% 35.6%   
Empl 14.1% 85.9%   Empl 3.7% 96.3%   





5.3. Concerns with Classic Estimates 
If we are willing to assume that the matrices are Markovian (that the probability of switching states depends 
on an individual’s current status and nothing else) then we are able to estimate the steady state of 
employment to which the population should converge.  
 ܧ݉݌݈ௌௌ ൌ థ೙೐థ೙೐ାథ೐೙ where  ߶௡௘ denotes the job entry rate and ߶௘௡ denotes the job exit rate 
The predicted steady state is derived by substituting the transition probabilities from table 1 into the above 
equation. The average spell lengths is also reported8.  




If these entry and exit rates are correct, black males will converge to an employment rate of roughly 55%. 
This is far lower than the steady state employment we observed from the cross-sectional data in figure 1.1, 
where the steady state was estimated at almost 70%. In table 1.A.5 (in the appendix) we show that the entry 
rate, the exit rate and the implied steady state of employment differ by age cohort.   
The figure below shows the rate of convergence that is implied by the classic transition model and the 
actual rates of employment over different ages for black males9.  
                                                            
8 The transition probability estimates suggest that the average non-employment spell will last for roughly 2.9 years for 
black males and roughly 1.4 years for white males. Conversely, the average employment spell for a black male is 3.5 
years, while the average employment spell for a white male is around 13 years. 
9 The initial state assumption which determines the starting point of the curve is discussed in more depth in the next 
section and in section 1.F of the appendix. 
   Black Males White Males 
 Entry Rate  17.4% 35.6% 
 Exit Rate 14.1% 3.7% 
    Implied Steady State Employment Rate 55.2% 90.6% 
    Implied Average Employment Spell 3.5 years 12.7 years 
    Implied Average Non-Employment Spell 2.9 years 1.4 years 






Figure 1.10:  The Predicted and Reported Employment Rate by Age 
 
The classic transition estimates not only converge to the wrong employment level, they also converge at 
the wrong rate. The implied rate of convergence of the classic model is much faster than the actual rate of 
convergence found in the data. In the appendix we provide further evidence against the validity of the 
unconditional Markov assumption. While the 6 month transition estimates are fairly comparable over time, 
the multiple period estimates implied by these 6 month transition periods are far larger than the actual 
multiple period estimates. In the next section we will test whether we are able to recover more agreeable 
results when we allow the entry and exit rates to vary by correlates.  
 
To our knowledge, Porteba and Summer (1986) and Magnac and Robin (1994) are the only other authors 
that have attempted to test whether the classic transition estimates conform to other moments in the data. 
Both articles find that their observed 1-period transition rates are inconsistent with other moments in the 
data. Evidence that the Markov property fails to hold in the absence of any misclassification or unobserved 
individual heterogeneity.  
   





6. Refined Model 
In the previous section we showed that the Markov condition fails to hold when we do not allow for either 
unobserved individual heterogeneity or measurement error. The transition rates we derived from our 
descriptive model suggest that the economy should converge to the steady state of employment more 
quickly than it actually does. It also predicts multiple-wave transition rates that are much higher than the 
ones we observed by simply looking at the transitions rates between two successive periods in our panel. 
In response to these discrepancies, we set out to develop a more comprehensive maximum likelihood 
model. Unlike conventional transition models, that only fit on the naive 1-period transition rates, our model 
incorporates additional empirical moments (the age-employment profile and multiple-period transition 
rates) into the likelihood estimate. The refined model allows us to introduce measurement error and 
heterogeneity into our model.  
Before setting up the model, let us briefly introduce the key identifying assumptions that are required to 
hold for the estimates to be valid10.  
Assumption 1: Stationarity Assumption 
The LFS data we are using spans over 6 waves. In order to use the information more efficiently, we assume 
that the structure of the labour market does not change drastically over those three years. In section D1 in 
the appendix the transition probabilities across each pair of consecutive waves are compared for a group 
of black males. The transition rates between each set of waves is comparable suggesting that the stationarity 
assumption is plausible. 
Assumption 2: Markovian Assumption 
Under the first-order Markov condition the probability of each outcome at time ݐ ൅ 1 is fully described by 
an individual’s outcome at time ݐ. Put simply, the model has no memory. ܲሺܵ௧ାଵ|ܵ௧, ܵ௧ିଵ, … , ଵܵሻ ൌ
ܲሺܵ௧ାଵ|ܵ௧ሻ	. This assumption helps simplify analysis.  
In the previous section we showed that the transition estimates that we derive through the conventional 
technique do not fit all the moments in the data. While this deficiency is sometimes taken as evidence 
against the Markov assumption, Langeheine (1988) argues that the difference between the implied and 
observed multiple period estimates could equally well be a symptom of heterogeneity. If a small subsample 
of individuals face high transition rates, while the rest of the population faces low transition rates it would 
make the multiple period transition more comparable to the classic 1-period estimates. According to Wolfe 
et al. (2003) and Biemer and Bushery (2000) the discord is also consistent with measurement error. If 
                                                            
10 The plausibility of each of these assumptions is discussed in section 1.D, section 1.E and section 1.F of the 
appendix. 





individuals misclassify their employment status it would inflate short term relative to long term transition 
estimates. In our model we plan to explore both these avenues.  
None of the five articles that estimated transition rates on South African labour data make any formal 
mention of their stance on the Markov assumption.  
Assumption 3: Initial State Assumption 
Conventional transition estimates ignore aggregate employment levels. In our model, however, we want to 
fit the data to the age-employment-profile. In order to do so we are required to make an assumption about 
when individuals enter the labour market for the first time. In section 1.F in the appendix it was shown 
that the average age was around 20. For the sake of simplicity the assumption was made that everyone 
enters the labour market at age 20 and that everyone enters the labour market as non-employed.  
We start off by assuming that all individuals are identical (homogeneity) and that employment is measured 
without error (no misclassification), but will relax both these assumption shortly. Under homogeneity all 
workers face the same probability of job entry and exit. Therefore, the probability of being employed in 
period ݐ is assumed to only depend on an individual’s employment status in period ݐ െ 1.  
 
The entry and exit rates can be written as follows: 
ܲሺܵ௧ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ߶௡௘								݂݅					ܵ௧ିଵ ൌ 0. 
ܲሺܵ௧ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ ߶௘௡								݂݅					ܵ௧ିଵ ൌ 1. 
 
The same set of probabilities can also be represented with a transition matrix11 where the off diagonal 
elements represent the entry and exit rates.  
  
 ܶ ൌ ൤߶௡௡ ߶௡௘߶௘௡ ߶௘௘൨ ൌ ൤
1 െ ߶௡௘ ߶௡௘
߶௘௡ 1 െ ߶௘௡൨ 
 
The employment transition model allows for two states. An individual’s state at period ݐ is denoted as ௧ܵ ൌ
ቀܰܧቁ	, where ܵ௧ is a vector that takes the value ሺ1,0ሻ′ if an individual is non-employed in period ݐ, and ሺ0,1ሻ′ 
if an individual is employed. Given a specific entry and exit rate, the likelihood of observing any two 
consecutive employment states for someone of a particular age is 
 
 ܮ௜ሺ߶௡௘, ߶௘௡; ௧ܵ , ௧ܵିଵ, ܣ݃݁ሻ ൌ ܲሺ ௧ܵ, ௧ܵିଵ, ܣ݃݁ሻ 
ܮ௜ሺ߶௡௘, ߶௘௡; ௧ܵ , ௧ܵିଵ, ܣ݃݁ሻ ൌ ܲሺ ௧ܵ, ௧ܵିଵ|ܣ݃݁ሻ            (Age is exogenously determined) 
ܮ௜ሺ߶௡௘, ߶௘௡; ௧ܵ , ௧ܵିଵ, ܣ݃݁ሻ ൌ ܲሺ ௧ܵ| ௧ܵିଵ, ܣ݃݁ሻ ൈ ܲሺ ௧ܵିଵ|ܣ݃݁ሻ     (Markov Property) 
ܮ௜ሺ߶௡௘, ߶௘௡; ௧ܵ , ௧ܵିଵ, ܣ݃݁ሻ ൌ ܲሺ ௧ܵ| ௧ܵିଵሻ ൈ ܲሺ ௧ܵିଵ|ܣ݃݁ሻ                  (Transition rates is constant over all ages) 
 
 
The first term	ܲሺܵ௧|ܵ௧ିଵሻ captures the likelihood of being observed in a particular employment state in six 
months’ time conditional on an individual’s current employment state. These values can be read off the 
transition matrix.  
                                                            
11 The transition matrix is conceptually identical to those shown in table 1.1. 






 ܲሺ ௧ܵ| ௧ܵିଵሻ ൌ ௧ܵିଵ	 ቈ
߶݊݊ ߶݊݁߶݁݊ ߶݁݁቉ ௧ܵ
ᇱ 
 
The second term, ܲሺܵ௧ିଵ|ܣ݃݁ሻ, captures the probability of employment for someone who has not been 
observed before, but for whom we know their age. Assuming everyone enters the labour market at age 20, 
and that employment evolves in a Markovian manner, we are able to trace out the predicted likelihood of 
being in employment at each age. 
 






Combining these two terms, the likelihood function for a homogenous model with no measurement error 
and only two waves can be rewritten as:  
 ܮ௜൫߶௡௘, ߶௘௡; ܵ௧మ, ܵ௧భ, ܣ݃݁൯ ൌ ௧ܵିଵ	 ቈ
߶݊݊ ߶݊݁߶݁݊ ߶݁݁቉ ௧ܵ
ᇱ ൈ ቀ10ቁ ቆቈ
߶݊݊ ߶݊݁߶݁݊ ߶݁݁቉ቇ
2ሺܣ݃݁െ20ሻ
   
 
The model is expanded to allow for multiple waves and missing observations. Letting ܰ  denote the number 
of waves and letting ݀ capture the time lapse between consecutive observations, the likelihood function 
becomes:   
 ܮሺ߶௡௘, ߶௘௡; ܵே, … , ଵܵ, ܣ݃݁ሻ ൌ ∏ܲሺܵ௧|ܵ௧ିௗሻ ൈ ܲሺ ଵܵ|ܣ݃݁ሻ      
  where ܲሺܵ௧|ܵ௧ିௗሻ ൌ ܵ௧ିௗ	 ൤߶௡௡ ߶௡௘߶௘௡ ߶௘௘൨
ௗ
ܵ௧ᇱ and ݀ is the period between observations.  
 
This likelihood function derived above enables us to recover the transition parameters that were most likely 
to have produced the moments we observe in the actual data. As long as individuals are homogenous and 
employment is correctly captured, this would be adequate.  
 
   





6.1. Constant Entry and Exit Rates  
The following table contains the job entry and exit rates that best fit the likelihood function12.  
     Table 3:  Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 (Model 2a) 
Job Entry  
   Constant     0.104*** 
Job Exit  
   Constant     0.094*** 
N 43013 
Log-likelihood -41216 
Allow for Misclassification No 
Allow for Observed Heterogeneity No 
Allow for Unobserved Heterogeneity No 
 
An entry rate of 10.4 % and exit rate of 9.4% were obtained. These estimated transition rates are lower than 
the estimates we obtained in the previous section (17.4% and 14.1%), where we only fitted on transitional 
data. This model comes slightly closer to fitting the slow convergence to the steady state observed in the 
level data than model 1, where we only fitted on transition rates. However, the model does worse in fitting 
the 1-period transition data, since we now fit on other moments as well. 
The current model, which assumes that the entry and exit rates are constant fails to adequately fit all the 
moments in our data. This should not be surprising, since this model still assumes homogeneity and does 
not allow for measurement error13. In the following two sections we expand the set of parameters used in 
our model to fit the moments in the data. The results show that the estimates obtained from fitting on 
subsequent period, fitting on multiple periods and fitting on the employment-age profile become consolable 
if we allow for misclassification or heterogeneity.  
When we allow for misclassification and when we allow for heterogeneity we recover transition rates that 
are far lower than the observed 1-period transition rates which are commonly reported in the literature.  
6.2. Misclassification  
According to Meyer (1988) measurement error is particularly severe in transition data. In measuring the 
aggregate employment rate some of this bias cancels out – some individuals are erroneously classified as 
employed and some individuals are erroneously classified as non-employed. For flow data this is not the 
case; the errors tend to be multiplied. Generally, misclassification will inflate transition estimates 
(Pfeffemann, et al., 1988).  
                                                            
12 Consult table 1.A.6 in the appendix to see the standard errors. 
13 All three these models assume constant entry and exit rates. The only difference between the three models is the 
set of moments to which they are fitted. 





There are a host of reasons why employment could be measured with error. Firstly, employment is not a 
clearly defined dichotomous state. Those on the margin, who are only loosely attached to the labour market, 
may be unsure as to whether they classify as employed or not.14 Secondly, questions are not always answered 
by the respondent themselves, but rather by whoever happened to be home during the survey. If different 
individuals respond differently, it will inflate the degree of misclassification. Lastly, measurement error can 
also be introduced through the way the data is captured, by the survey collectors, by the data coders or 
through the way the panel was merged. 
In our model we allow the probability of misclassification to differ by true employment state, but assume 
that the probability of misclassification is independent of other covariates and time15. Letting ܧ݉݌݈ denote 
the true employment status, and ܧ݉݌݈∗ denote the reported state of employment, the probability of 
misclassification can be denoted as follows:16 
 
 ܲሺܧ݉݌݈∗ ൌ 1|ܧ݉݌݈ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ ߙ଴ 
 
ܲሺܧ݉݌݈∗ ൌ 0|ܧ݉݌݈ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ߙଵ 
The relationship between the reported and actual levels of employment can also be represented in matrix 
notation, where the misclassification model describes a projection of the true state and its corresponding 
probabilities onto the reported state and its corresponding probabilities. 
 ܲ∗ ൌ ܯܲ where  ܲ ൌ ൤ ேܲ
ாܲ
൨ denotes the true proportion of employed and non-employed, 
    ܲ∗ ൌ ൤ ேܲ
∗
ாܲ∗
൨ denotes the reported proportions of employed and non-employed., and  
ܯ ൌ ൤1 െ ߙ଴ ߙ଴ߙଵ 1 െ ߙଵ൨ denotes the misclassification matrix ܯ. 
 
 
Depending on one’s perception of how the `noise’ that leads to misclassification in employment arises, one 
may be willing to make further assumptions about the relationship between ߙ଴ and ߙଵ. Wolfe et al. (2003), 
for instance, assume that ߙ଴ ൌ ߙଵ, in which case the probability of misclassification does not depend on 
one’s actual employment status. Chua and Fuller (1987) show that the only case where the employment 
estimate will not be biased through misclassification would be if the model projects onto itself ሺܲ ൌ ܯܲሻ. 
This will only occur when ாܲߙଵ ൌ ேܲߙ଴.  
                                                            
14 In the Labour Force Survey respondents were asked whether a specific household member had spent more than an 
hour during the last week on any of a list of work-related activities. Individuals were classified as employed if they 
responded ‘yes’ to any of the questions. While the survey was set up in such a manner as to minimise confusion, the 
questions remain open to interpretation and sensitive to when the survey was conducted. Theoretically, someone who 
only works a couple of days a month could in the same month be reported as either employed or non-employed. 
15 In the literature, this independence condition is referred to as the Independent Classification Error (ICE) condition. 
16 Lewbel (2000) also allows the misclassification rates to vary between the two groups.  





In our model we are interested in recovering the transition rates rather than the level estimates. The 
relationship between the reported and true transition flows is denoted as follows: 
  ܶ∗ ൌ ܯܶܯ′ where  ܶ ൌ ൤1 െ ߶௡௘ ߶௡௘߶௘௡ 1 െ ߶௡௘൨ denotes the actual transition matrix, 
ܶ∗ ൌ ൤1 െ ߶௡௘
∗ ߶௡௘∗
߶௘௡∗ 1 െ ߶௡௘∗ ൨ denotes the reported transition matrix, and 
	ܯ ൌ ൤1 െ ߙ଴ ߙ଴ߙଵ 1 െ ߙଵ൨ denotes the misclassification matrix ܯ. 
 
According to the sandwich model above, each reported transition rate is a weighted sum of the four true 
transitions rates. To illustrate the point, let us consider the transition from non-employment to 
employment. There are 4 possible combinations of actual transitions and corresponding misclassifications 
that could be consistent with someone being reported as moving from non-employment into employment. 
߶௡௘∗ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙ଴ሻߙ଴߶௡௡ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙ଴ሻሺ1 െ ߙଵሻ߶௡௘ ൅ ߙଵߙ଴߶௘௡ ൅ ߙଵሺ1 െ ߙଵሻ߶௘௘ 
Intuitively, the probability of being reported as moving into employment should be highest among those 
who actually transitioned into employment. Conversely, the probability should be lowest among those who 
moved out of employment, since they would have to be misclassified in both waves.   
The earlier equation can be transformed so that: 
ܶ ൌ ሺܯെ1ሻ′ܶ∗ሺܯെ1ሻ 
We are interested in recovering ܶ. We know ܶ∗, since we are able to observe the reported transition rates 
directly from the data. In order to recover the true transition, ܶ, we are, however, also required to identify 
the misclassification matrix ܯ.   
The most common approach used for identifying ܯ requires an auxiliary source of information that allows 
one to find out what the actual misclassification rates are. In the case of Chua and Fuller (1987), Poterba 
and Summer (1986), and Magnac and Visser (1999), the auxiliary source comes in the form of a “re-
interview” that was conducted shortly after the actual survey17. According to Dinkelman (2004) these 
methods are of little use to us, since none of the South African panels have any re-interview arms that we 
can exploit. She concludes that we are therefore unable to do much about the misclassification of 
employment in labour market transition data in South Africa.  
We propose a different strategy. The method we use is comparable to the method adopted by Biemer and 
Bushery (2000). Rather than extracting information directly from an auxiliary source, we will use a maximum 
likelihood method that makes use of the repeated waves in the panel to estimate the misclassification rate. 
                                                            
17 In the re-interview respondents were asked about their employment status a week before – when the original survey 
was conducted. If their response differed to their previous response respondents were triggered even further until the 
researchers were confident that they had the true employment status. 





Our method relies on the Markov assumption and stationarity assumption18 to identify the extent of the 
misclassification in our data.  
Under our identifying assumptions the true k-period transition matrix can be rewritten as the sandwich 
estimate of the corresponding k-period reported transition matrix ௞ܶ∗:  
௞ܶ ൌ ሺܯିଵሻᇱ ௞ܶ∗ሺܯିଵሻ   for any value of k between 1 and 5.  
The misclassification matrix ܯ is now entrusted with the role of restoring the Markov assumption – fixing 
the model so that it fits the naïve 1-period transition rates as well as the multiple period-transition rates and 
the age-employment profile. We rerun our earlier models, this time allowing for misclassification19.  
     Table 1.4:  Maximum Likelihood Estimates  
 
 (Model 3a) 
Job Entry  
   Constant     0.041*** 
Job Exit  
   Constant     0.017*** 
Misclassification1     0.067*** 
Misclassification2     0.077*** 
N 43013 
Log-likelihood -39659 
Allow for Misclassification Yes 
Allow for Observed Heterogeneity No 
Allow for Unobserved Heterogeneity No 
 
The results from table 1.4 suggest that much of the transitioning between waves is due to misclassification 
rather than actual movements into or out of employment. If we compare model 3a to model 2a we find 
that once we control for misclassification the probability of transitioning into employment drops from to 
10% to 4% and the probability of transitioning out of employment drops from 9% to 2%. Misclassification 
accounts for roughly two thirds of the variation in employment between waves under this specification. If 
we are willing to assume that all the deviation from the classic Markov assumption is through the 
misclassification alone, then our model predicts that the probability of being falsely classified as employed 
if an individual is non-employed is 7% and the probability of being falsely classified as non-employed if 
employed is 8%. 
These misclassification rates are higher than the misclassification rates that Chau and Fuller (1987) found 
for the US. According to Chau and Fuller (1987) roughly 3% of the non-employed misclassified themselves 
as employed and roughly 2% of the employed misclassified themselves as non-employed.  
                                                            
18 The stationarity assumption (or local independence assumption) requires that the classification errors be 
independent between the 6 waves. Meyers (1988) and Singh and Rao (1995) find this assumption to be reasonable 
over short periods. Some preliminary tests on our data (see section 1.D in the appendix) support this claim. 
19 The complete results are contained in the appendix. 





6.3. Observed Heterogeneity 
In the previous section we showed that the transition rates differ greatly by age, education and employment 
history. We develop a second less stringent version of the Markov assumption. Under this assumption the 
transition probabilities are allowed to vary between individuals and between periods. The state space is 
expanded to capture the progression of tenure and time gap as individuals advance through their respective 
working lives.  








ۍ ݊݋݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀, ݓ݅ݐ݄	ݐ݅݉݁݃ܽ݌ ∈ ሾ3.0,∞ሻ݊݋݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀,ݓ݅ݐ݄	ݐ݅݉݁݃ܽ݌ ∈ ሾ2.5, 3.0ሻ
⋮
݊݋݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀,ݓ݅ݐ݄	ݐ݅݉݁݃ܽ݌ ∈ ሾ0.0, 0.5ሻ
											݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀, ݓ݅ݐ݄	ݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁ ∈ ሾ0.0, 0.5ሻ
											
⋮											
݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀, ݓ݅ݐ݄	ݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁ ∈ ሾ2.5, 3.0ሻ









The state space now contains twelve states. Six employed and six non-employed states. Individuals are 
restricted in how they are able to transition between these different states. From one wave to the next, a 
non-employed individual can either remain non-employed and have their time gap increase by six months 
or they can transition into employment and obtain a tenure of between zero and six months. Similarly, 
employed individuals can either remain employed and have their tenure increase by six months or they can 
become non-employed with a time gap of between zero and six months. The transition probabilities that 
accompany the expanded state-space are allowed to vary by age, education and current state.  
The likelihood of observing a specific sequence of states for someone of a particular age and education 
level given a certain set of state parameters20:  
  ܮሺ߶ത௡௘, ߶ത௘௡; ܵே, … , ଵܵ, ܣ݃݁, ܧ݀ݑܿሻ ൌ ∏ܲሺܵ௧|ܵ௧ିௗሻ ൈ ܲሺ ଵܵ|ܣ݃݁ሻ      




     
  ߶ഥ௡௘,௜௧ ൌ ߛ଴଴ ൅ ߛ଴ଵܣ݃݁20௜௧ ൅ ߛ଴ଶܣ݃݁30௜௧ ൅ ߛ଴ଷܶ݅݉݁ܩܽ݌1௜௧ ൅ ߛ଴ସܶ݅݉݁ܩܽ݌2௜௧ ൅ ߛ଴ସܵ݁ܿ௜ ൅ ߛ଴ସܶ݁ݎ௜ 
  ߶ഥ௘௡,௜௧ ൌ ߛଵ଴ ൅ ߛଵଵܣ݃݁20௜௧ ൅ ߛଵଶܣ݃݁30௜௧ ൅ ߛଵଷܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁1௜௧ ൅ ߛଵସܶ݁݊ݑݎ݁2௜௧ ൅ ߛଵହܵ݁ܿ௜ ൅ ߛଵ଺ܶ݁ݎ௜ 
  ߶ഥ௡௡,௜௧ ൌ 1 െ ߶ഥ௘௡,௜௧ 
  ߶ഥ௘௘,௜௧ ൌ 1 െ ߶ഥ௡௘,௜௧ 
 
We allow the entry and exit rates to vary by age21, education and by recent employment history. The 
following in table 1.5 are obtained using this method22. 
    
 
                                                            
20 ߶ത௡௘ and ߶ത௘௡ now denote vectors.  
21 Two sets of splines were added to the model to capture the non-linearity in age. One spline runs from age 20 to 
30, the other from age 30 to 50. These splines were chose since they are easily interpretable and fit the data well. 
22 The complete results are contained in the appendix. 





     Table 1.5:  Maximum Likelihood Estimates  
 
 (Model 2a) 
Job Entry  
   Constant 0.050*** 
   Age20 0.013*** 
   Age30 0.000*** 
   TimeGap < 1 0.130*** 
   TimeGap =± 2 0.078*** 
   Matric 0.013*** 
   More than Matric 0.072*** 
Job Exit  
   Constant 0.234*** 
   Age20 -0.017*** 
   Age30 0.000*** 
   Tenure < 1 0.254*** 
   Tenure =± 2 0.091*** 
   Matric -0.028*** 
   More than Matric -0.053*** 
N 43013 
Log-likelihood -38573 
Allow for Misclassification No 
Allow for Observed Heterogeneity Yes 
Allow for Unobserved Heterogeneity No 
  
In the table above, entry and exit rate are allowed to vary on observable covariates. The results are consistent 
with descriptive results. Every additional year of age in an individual’s twenties increases the probability of 
finding employment by roughly 1.3 percentage point and reduces the probability of moving out of 
employment by 1.7 percentage points. Beyond 30, the entry or exit remain fairly stable.  
How long ago someone has worked also has a significant effect on finding employment. Compared to 
someone who has worked within the last three years, someone who has worked within the last year would 
be 13 percentage points more likely to transition into employment, while someone who has worked between 
one and three years ago will be 8 percentage points more likely to gain employment.  
How long someone has been in their current position also affects transition probabilities. Compared to 
someone who has been in their position for more than three years, someone who has only been employed 
for a year or less will be 25 percentage points more likely to transition out of employment, while someone 
who has been working for between one and three years will be 9 percentage points more likely to exit 
employment.  
Having matric relative to less than matric increases the probability of finding employment by 1 percentage 
point, while having tertiary education relative to having less than matric increases the probability of finding 
employment by 7 percentage points. Having matric decreases the likelihood of becoming non-employed by 
3 percentage points, while having tertiary education decreases the likelihood of becoming non-employed 
by 5 percentage points.  





6.4. Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Individuals may also differ by unobservable traits (such as motivation, family background or ability) that 
we do not have data on. A finite mixture model (FMM) is constructed, that allows for persistent unobserved 
individual heterogeneity23. In our model we allow the job entry and job exit rates to vary between individuals 
depending on their unobserved latent type.  
The likelihood function of before is modified in two ways: First, the transition probabilities are allowed to 
differ by type. 
  ߶௡௘௞ ൌ ൜	߶௡௘
ଵ 							if	you	are	of	type	1





The overall likelihood becomes the weighted sum of the likelihoods of the two types of individuals. For 
the heterogeneous model the likelihood function becomes  




where each type is assumed to occur with probability ߨ௄. 
 
From the equation above we can see that the set of parameters that needs to be solved has increased. The 
model now has a second set of parameters that allows for a level shift in the entry and exit rates among the 
two groups, as well as a third parameter, ߨଵ, that will denote the proportion of type 1 individuals in the 
population.24  
If employers are able to observe traits like motivation, family background or ability (which are not observed 
by the  econometrician) then we would expect that the group who have more desirable unobservable should 
be absorbed into employment more quickly and retain employment for longer (have higher entry rates and 
lower exit rates compared to the other group).  
Conversely, one could also imagine a situation where one group is more mobile than the other: where one 
group regularly moves in or out of employment (have high entry and exit rates), while another group is 
more likely to remain employed or non-employed (have low entry and exit rates). In this case, it is unlikely 
that the differences would be driven by productive characteristics (such as ability and motivation). Topel 
and Ward (1992) distinguished between “movers” and “stayers” when they discuss unobserved person 
specific traits that may affect mobility.  
Table 1.6 contains the estimates for a heterogeneous version of our constant exit and entry rate model25.  
 
                                                            
23 Persistence here implies that individuals will be of a specific type for the entire period that they are observed, but 
not necessarily for their entire life. 
24 Everyone who is not of type 1, will be of type 2. (ߨଶ ൌ 1 െ	ߨଵ) 
25 The standard errors are contained in table 1.A.7 in the appendix. The exhaustive version of this model, where we 
allow for covariates, is contained in table 1.A.8. 





     Table 1.6:  Maximum Likelihood Estimates  
 
 (Model 4a) 
Job Entry  
   Constant Type 1     0.038*** 
   Constant Type 2     0.437*** 
Job Exit  
   Constant Type 1     0.011*** 
   Constant Type 2     0.508*** 
Proportion of Type 1     0.709*** 
N 43013 
Log-likelihood -39447 
Allow for Misclassification No 
Allow for Observed Heterogeneity No 
Allow for Unobserved Heterogeneity Yes 
 
Two very different type of individuals emerge. Roughly 70% of the sample are of type 1 and roughly 30% 
are of type 2. Type 1 have a 96% probability of remaining non-employed and a 99% probability of remaining 
employed. Type 2 individuals, on the other hand, are very mobile. They have a 44% probability of 
transitioning into employment, and a 51% probability of transitioning out of employment. Their probability 
of employment therefore is less affected by their previous state – their employment state is close to being 
memory-less.  
The results are consistent with the “movers” and “stayers” concept that was proposed by Topel and Ward 
(1992), where one group faces higher transition rates than the other. As with our previous estimates, which 
only allowed for misclassification, most individuals appear to face lower transition rates than are commonly 
observed in traditional transition models. In Model 3a, where all the deviation from the Markov assumption 
is driven by misclassification, roughly two thirds of the observed movement in and out of employment was 
estimated to be due to misclassification. The finite mixture model suggests that most of the variation in 
employment within the finite mixture model is driven by a small group, consisting of about one third of 
the population, who continuously transition in and out of employment.   
Earlier we showed that each individual has a 71% prior probability of being of type 1 and a 29% prior of 
being of type 2. These prior probability denote the average probabilities over the entire sample – the 
unconditional probability of being of each type before look at any additional information. This probability 
of being of each type is however not constant over all observations. 
A more accurate probability of type can be obtained if we use the information we have data on. To posterior 
probability of being of each type for each individual we have to compare the likelihood value for each 
individual to be of each type. The posterior probability compares the likelihood of a being of type 1 and 
type 2 given a set of covariates we label ݔ௜ଵ … , ݔ௜்.   
Posterior class probability:   ܲሺ߰ ൌ ݆|ݔ௜ଵ … , ݔ௜்ሻ ൌ 	 టೕൈ௙ሺ௬|టୀ௝ሻ∑ ట೜ൈ௙ሺ௬|టୀ௤ሻ೜  





Once we have obtained the posterior probability of being of each type, we are able to compare these 
probabilities across observed covariates in an attempt to uncover whether type is determined by supply side 
conditions, heterogeneity or by measurement error. The results are reported in table A8 in the appendix.  
Interestingly the probability to be of each type does not change drastically by age or by having matric. This 
is somewhat surprising since the results earlier showed that the transition rates did vary by these covariates. 
We also compare the likelihood of being of each type across children, household-head and marriage (a set 
of household variables that are commonly believed to be correlated to labour supply), while all three 
variables were significant at a 10% level, none of the variables held any economic significance. Membership 
does not appear to be driven by labour supply.  
How loosely people are tied to the labour is closely related to their type.26. Individuals who earn less than 
the median wage are 8% and more likely to be in the second group, while individuals who are formally 
employed are 4% more likely to belong to the first group. Comparatively, individuals who report to be 
seeking employment when non-employed are 6% more likely to be of second group. Unfortunately, the 
level of misclassification is also higher among these set of individuals who operate at the margin – who 
have looser ties to employment.  
A proxy for measurement error was constructed by calculating the standard deviation in the reported level 
of education across waves. The variable finds some traction. Individuals who drastically misreport their 
education are 4% more likely to belong the second group who experiences more employment mobility.   
The descriptive results therefore suggest that most of the churning in employment is due to a relative small 
group of individuals who are (or at least report to be) continuously transitioning in and out of employment. 
This small group of individuals appear to be operating on the margin, where they are more likely to be 
informally employed in low paying occupations when employed and to be actively looking for work when 
non-employed.  
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we showed that classic employment transition, which is derived by looking at the reported 
transitioning between two successive periods, produce results that are at odds with multiple period 
transition estimates as well as the aggregate age-employment profile. In an attempt to figure out what could 
be driving these irregularities we developed our own maximum likelihood method which fits on an 
additional set of moments. Having more moments to fit on has the added bonus of allowing us to introduce 
more parameters to our model. In our analysis we are able to allow for differences in observable covariates, 
measurement error, and unobserved individuals specific heterogeneity.  
                                                            
26 The sample is limited to those who are reported to have been employed at least once since we require information 
on job specifications. 





Our results show that that the reported transition probabilities tend to overestimate employment mobility. 
Although we focused our analysis on black males, we are confident that this will also be true of for other 
race groups and for females.  
When we allow for misclassification alone, we find that up to two thirds of the variation in transition rates 
may be driven misclassification. Similarly, when we allow for unobserved heterogeneity, we find that most 
of the variation is driven by a small group of individuals who continuously transition in and out of 
employment. The entry and exit rates faced by most individuals are far lower than were originally reported. 
The original model predicted an entry rate of 17% and an exit rate of 14%. The finite mixture model and 
the misclassification model find that the true entry rate that are faced by most individuals would be closer 
to 4%, while the true exit rate faced by most individuals would be closer to 1 or 2%.  
Those individuals who are closest to the margin (have only recently lost or gained employment) appear to 
be most likely to lose or gain employment, while those further from the margin are less likely to transition 
in and out of employment.   






Appendix 1.A: Additional Tables 
 
Table 1.A.1:  Observations of Working-Aged Black Males per Wave 
 
  t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 t = 6 Total 
Observed only once 4,865 2,748 1,652 1,398 1,921 4,316 16,900 
Observed more than once 10,379 12,742 12,318 12,396 11,681 9,669 69,185 
Total 15,244 15,490 13,970 13,794 13,602 13,985 86,085 
Percentage attrition between 
waves   54.5% 56.7% 56.5% 57.3% 59.0%  
Percentage remaining from 
initial wave  54.5% 65.0% 76.0% 85.1% 91.6%  
 
Table 1.A.2:  Observations of Working-Aged White Males per Wave 
 
  t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 t = 6 Total 
Observed only once 577 291 212 197 288 576 2,141 
Observed more than once 1,066 1,564 1,460 1,485 1,459 1,192 8,226 
Total 1,643 1,855 1,672 1,682 1,747 1,768 10,367 
Percentage attrition between 
waves   59.8% 54.0% 60.2% 54.1% 56.4%  
Percentage remaining from 
initial wave  59.8% 66.2% 78.1% 85.5% 90.9%  
 
 
Table 1.A.3: Transitions in and out of Employment for Black Males by Age Group 
 
 
Aged 20 - 30  Aged 30 - 40  Aged 40 - 50  
From To  From To  From To  
  N E    N E    N E  
 N  85.9% 14.1%  N 75.5% 24.5%  N 77.6% 22.4%  
 E  29.1% 70.9%  E 13.4% 86.6%  E 11.8% 88.2%  
*Tabulated as average six month transition probabilities. 
 
Table 1.A.4: Transitions in and out of Employment for White Males by Age Group 
Aged 20 - 30  Aged 30 - 40  Aged 40 – 50  
From To  From To  From To  
  N E    N E    N E  
 N  69.9% 30.1%  N 50.0% 50.0%  N 59.3% 40.7%  
 E  8.3% 91.7%  E 2.0% 98.0%  E 2.9% 97.1%  
*Tabulated as average six month transition probabilities. 
 
Table 1.A.5: Entry Rate, Exit Rate and Steady State of Employment by Race and Age Group 
 
  Black   White 
  20-30 30-40 40-50 Overall   20-30 30-40 40-50 Overall 
Entry Rate 14.1% 24.5% 22.4% 17.6%  30.1% 50.0% 40.7% 35.6% 
Exit Rate 29.1% 13.4% 11.8% 16.8%   8.3% 2.0% 2.9% 3.7% 
Steady State 32.6% 64.6% 65.6% 51.1%   78.3% 96.2% 93.4% 90.6% 
 








Table 1.A.6:  Maximum Likelihood Estimates  
 
 
 (Model 2a) (Model 3a) (Model 4a) (Model 5a) 
Job Entry     
Constant1 0.104 0.041 0.038 0.031 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant2    0.437 0.318 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Job Exit     
Constant1 0.094 0.017 0.011 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant2    0.508 0.495 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Proportion of Type 1     0.709 0.651 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Misclassification1  0.067  0.019 
  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Misclassification 2   0.077  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.001) 
N 43013 43013 43013 43013 
Log-likelihood -41216 -39659 -39447 -39322 
Allow for Misclassification No No Yes Yes 
Allow for Observed Heterogeneity No No No No 
Allow for Unobserved Heterogeneity No Yes No Yes 
  








Table 1.A.7:  Maximum Likelihood Estimates  
 
 (Model 2b) (Model 3b) (Model 4b) (Model 5b) 
Job Entry     
Constant1 0.050 0.049 0.151 - 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - 
Age20 0.013 0.009 0.008 - 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - 
Age30 0.000 0.000 0.001 - 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - 
TimeGap < 1 0.130 0.143 0.138 - 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - 
TimeGap = ± 2 0.078 0.079 0.086 - 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - 
Matric 0.013 0.009 0.050 - 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - 
More than Matric 0.072 0.063 0.081 - 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - 
Constant2    0.017 - 
   (0.001) - 
Job Exit     
Constant1 0.234 0.237 0.204 - 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - 
Age20 -0.017 -0.018 0.000 - 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - 
Age30 0.000 0.000        0.001 - 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - 
Tenure < 1 0.254 0.238 0.251 - 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - 
Tenure = ± 2 0.091 0.082 0.070 - 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - 
Matric -0.028 -0.029 -0.076 - 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) - 
More than Matric -0.053 -0.049 -0.103 - 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) - 
Constant2    0.014 - 
   (0.001) - 
Proportion of Type 1     0.402 - 
   (0.001) - 
Misclassification1  0.024  - 
  (0.001)  - 
Misclassification 2   0.012  - 
  (0.001)  - 
N 43013 43013 43013 - 
Log-likelihood -38573 -38354 -38546 - 
Allow for Misclassification No No Yes Yes 
Allow for Observed Heterogeneity Yes Yes Yes Yes 












Table 1.A.8:  Posterior Class Probabilities 
   Observations P(Type 1) P(Type 2) 
Age       
   Between 20 and 30 20390 71.0% 29.0% 
   Between 30 and 40 13490 71.0% 29.0% 
   Older than 40 9132 70.6% 29.4% 
Education       
   Less than Matric 30943 70.6% 29.4% 
   More than Matric 11868 71.7% 28.3% 
Head         
   Not Household Head 21520 70.6% 29.4% 
   Household Head 21493 71.2% 28.8% 
Marital Status         
   Not Married 26105 70.4% 29.6% 
   Married 16908 71.8% 28.2% 
Children         
   No Children in Household 17797 70.7% 29.3% 
   Children in Household 25216 71.1% 28.9% 
Proxy for Misreporting       
   Standard Deviation of Education < 2 15794 71.30% 28.70% 
   Standard Deviation of Education > 2 4589 67.80% 32.20% 
Type of Employment       
   Informal 5822 63.74% 36.26% 
   Formal 15114 67.67% 32.33% 
Wage       
   Lower than Median 11556 63.49% 36.51% 
   Higher than Median 11556 71.22% 28.78% 
Actively Looked for Work    
   No 11906 68.90% 31.10% 
   Yes 11544 62.65% 37.35% 
 
  






Appendix 1.B: Cleaning ‘Tenure’ and ‘Time Gap’ 
Our model uses both the ‘tenure’ and ‘time gap’ variables. Having repeated observation allows us to test 
whether the values of these two variables are consistent across waves. Irregular responses were corrected 
when we were confident about what the actual response was supposed to be and dropped when we were 
not. Two rules were followed. 
Rule 1: “Tenure” cannot be higher than potential experience. 
 
The assumption was made that tenure needed to be smaller or equal to potential experience (the 
maximum amount of experience a worker would have accrued if he started school at age 6, passed 
all grades in the allotted time and started working thereafter). To prevent us from wrongly 
disqualifying some individuals who might have started school early or skipped grades, we set the 
maximum at 2 years higher than potential experience.  
 
Rule 2: Between two waves ‘tenure’ and ‘time gap’ can either reset to 0 or increase by half a year. 
 
Only one of two things can happen to tenure (and time gap) between waves; it can either increase 
by 6 months (when an individual stays in a job) or it is reset to zero (person quits or changes 
jobs). Since we have 5 transition periods between our 6 waves, there are 32 (2ହ) different 
permutations of how tenure (and ‘time gap’) could have evolved over the three years.  
 
Appendix 1.C: Linear Probability Model 
The linear probability model allows us to run a regression on the 1-period transition rates. In the two tables 
below we allowed the job entry and exit rates to vary by age27, education and by recent employment history.
Table 1.C.1: Linear Probability Model Estimates 
 
  (Model 1a) (Model 1b)   
Job Entry     
Constant 0.174*** 0.050***  
 (0.003) ** (0.006) **  
Age20  0.016***  
   (0.001) **  
Age30  -0.002****  
   (0.001) **  
TimeGap < 1  0.148***  
   (0.011) **  
TimeGap = ± 2  0.070***  
   (0.011) **  
Matric  0.036***  
   (0.007) **  
More than Matric  0.092***  
     (0.017) **   
N 15135 15135   
R2  0.000 0.047   
                                                            
27 Two sets of splines were added to the model to capture the non-linearity in age. One spline runs from age 20 to 
30, the other from age 30 to 50. The splines are easily interpretable and fit the data well. 
Table 1.C.2: Linear Probability Model Estimates 
 
  (Model 1a) (Model 1b)   
Job Exit     
Constant 0.141*** 0.275***  
 (0.003) ** (0.002) **  
Age20  -0.019****  
   (0.002) **  
Age30  -0.002******  
   (0.001) **  
Tenure < 1  0.228***  
   (0.008) **  
Tenure = ± 2  0.077***  
   (0.008) **  
Matric  -0.014*****  
   (0.007) **  
More than Matric  -0.092****  
    (0.010) **   
N 12746 12746   
R2  0.000 0.115   





The entry rates are estimated in table 1.C.1. Model 1a does not control on any covariates. The average entry 
rate is 17.4%. 
In model 1b the probabilities of entering employment is allowed to vary on a set of covariates. The results 
show that a 20 year old black male without any work experience or a matric has a 5% probability of moving 
into employment in the next 6 months. The probability of transitioning into employment increases 
dramatically between the age of 20 and 30. The probability does not shift greatly after 30. Individuals who 
have not had work within the last three years are least likely to transition into employment. Individuals who 
have worked within the last 3 years are 13 percentage points more likely to transition into employment than 
those who have not worked within the last 3 years. Having worked within the last years increases the 
probability by a further 6 percentage points. Educated individuals are most likely to transition into 
employment. Relative to not having matric, having matric increases the probability of becoming employed 
by 3.7 percentage points, while having more than matric increases the probability by a further 5.5 percentage 
points.  
The exit rates are contained in table 1.C.2. In model 1a we derive an average reported exit rate of 14.1%. 
In model 1b we see that the probability of exiting employment decreases drastically between the age of 20 
and 30. Beyond the age of 30 however age does not appear to have much of an effect. Having been in a 
position for a while drastically decreases the likelihood of becoming non-employed. As soon as someone 
has been in a position for more than a year, their likelihood of exiting within the next 6 months drops by 
15 percentage points. Individuals with higher education are significantly less likely to become non-
employed. 
Appendix 1.D: The Stationarity Assumption 
We restrict our sample to the subsample of black males that was observed in all 6 waves. The table below 
shows each of the five 1-period transition rates as well as the averaged 1-period transition rate. The values 
should be comparable if stationarity holds. 
     Table 1.D.1: Average Transition Rates between waves  
 
 ࢀ૚૛ ࢀ૛૜ ࢀ૜૝ ࢀ૝૞ ࢀ૞૟ Average
Job Entry Rate 22.8% 18.6% 22.9% 20.2% 23.0% 21.5% 
Job Exit Rate 9.4% 15.0% 13.7% 12.8% 16.2% 13.5% 
N 286 286 286 286 286 1430 
 
The transition rates are generally of a similar magnitude. We conclude that the assumption of stationarity 
between the different waves is a plausible one.  






Appendix 1.E: The Markov Assumption 
If the Markov condition holds, any multiple period transition matrix should be equivalent to the product 
of two shorter period matrices ( ௜ܶ௞ ് ௜ܶ௝ ௝ܶ௞). To test whether this condition holds we compare the 2-period 
observed transition matrices against what they would have been if we combined the two subsequent 1-
period transition matrices. If the Markov assumption holds and our model is correct, then these two 
approaches should produce comparable estimates.  
      Table 1.E.1:  Average Transition Rates between waves  
 
  ࢀ૚૜ ࢀ૛૝ ࢀ૜૞ ࢀ૝૟ Average 
Observed Entry Rate 25.2% 20.4% 25.4% 26.3% 24.4% 
Observed Exit Rate 14.5% 13.9% 14.9% 18.0% 15.3% 
 ࢀ૚૛ࢀ૛૜ ࢀ૛૜ࢀ૜૝ ࢀ૜૝ࢀ૝૞ ࢀ૝૞ࢀ૞૟ Average 
Implied Entry Rate 33.7% 34.7% 35.5% 35.3% 35.5% 
Implied Exit Rate 21.3% 23.2% 22.0% 24.0% 22.2% 
N 286 286 286 286 1144 
 
Generally, the 1-period transition matrices produce 2-period transition rates that are much higher than what 
were observed. Similarly, we can compare the 3-, 4- and 5-period transitions rates against what they should 
be if the Markov condition holds.  
      Table 1.E.2:  Average Transition Rates between waves 
 
  d = 1 d = 2 d = 3 d = 4 d = 5 
Observed Entry Rate 21.5% 24.4% 26.8% 26.3% 29.1% 
Observed Exit Rate 13.5% 15.3% 16.0% 15.3% 15.7% 
Implied Entry Rate 21.5% 35.5% 44.6% 50.5% 54.4% 
Implied Exit Rate 13.5% 22.2% 27.9% 31.6% 34.1% 
N 1430 1144 858 572 286 
 
These values differ greatly. The Markov condition does not appear to hold. In the absence of 
misclassification or heterogeneity, the multiple period transition rates are much lower than 1-period 
transition rates would lead us to believe.  
   






Appendix 1.F: The Initial State Assumption 
Not everyone joins the labour force at the same time. We compare the school enrolment rates for black 
and white males to see whether there is a difference in their school-leaving patterns. 
         
Figure 1.F.1: Probability of Being Enrolled by Age and Race 
 
The difference in enrolment likelihood by age is negligible. Roughly half of black males and white males 
leave school by age 20. To keep our model as simple as possible we will assume that everyone joins the 
labour market at age 20. 
 
Appendix 1.G: Identification 
The Markov and stationarity assumption allow us to identify misclassification and heterogeneity. Earlier we 
showed that the Markov assumption does not hold under a simpler specification (when we had 
homogeneity and no misclassification). The following identity failed to hold:  ௞ܶ ൌ ሺ ଵܶሻ௞ for any k.  
In our classical model, where we assume that the transition rates are constant, we only have two parameters. 
These two parameters are unable to fit all the moments that we incorporated into our model. Once we 
allow for heterogeneity and measurement error, we free up some parameters that are entrusted with fitting 
the additional moments.  
If we allow for misclassification we are able to restore these identities, since we have two more degrees of 
freedom to work with. To illustrate the point, we set ݇ ൌ 2 and rewrite the identity of earlier, this time 
allowing for misclassification matrices. 
 ሺܯିଵሻᇱ ଶܶ∗ሺܯିଵሻ ≅ ሾሺܯିଵሻᇱ ଵܶ∗ሺܯିଵሻሿଶ	    
 ଶܶ∗ ≅ ሺܯିଵሻሾ ଵܶ∗ሿଶܯሺܯିଵሻᇱ    
 
























Similarly, if we allow for heterogeneity, the three additional parameters allow us to restore the identities that 
were built into our likelihood function. Below we denote  ܶ ଵ,ଵ∗  as the 1-period transition matrix for someone 
of type 1 and ଵܶ,ଶ∗  as the 1-period transition matrix for someone of type 2.  ߨଵ and ߨଶ denote the proportion 
of type 1 and type 2 individuals. 
 ଶܶ∗ ≅ ߨଵൣ ଵܶ,ଵ∗ ൧2 ൅ ߨଶൣ ଵܶ,ଶ∗ ൧2 
Unfortunately, once we allow for both misclassification and heterogeneity in our model, identification 
struggles as the model becomes over-specified. For the sake of completeness we added the results for model 
5a (see table A8) that allows for misclassification and unobserved heterogeneity. Model 5b, which also 













Chapter 2:  
Using Dynamic Programming to Model Job 
Search and Reservation Wages  
 
The unemployment rate is high in South Africa, especially among the young. In this chapter we 
attempt to distinguish whether unemployment is predominantly driven by demand constraints or 
supply constraints – whether unemployment is due to low job arrival rates or high reservation wages. 
If we are willing to trust the self-reported responses in surveys, then reservation wages appear to be 
contributing to the unemployment problem. Unfortunately, these self-reported responses have been 
shown to be subjective and the reservation wage estimates derived from these self-reported upwardly 
bias. Job search theory provides us with an alternative. Rather than asking individuals what they 
think their reservation wages are we attempt to uncover what their reservation wages are based on 




The current unemployment rate is estimated at 25% if we follow the strict definition and 35% if we use the 
broad definition, which also includes those who have stopped actively looking for work (StatsSA, 2015a). 
Youth unemployment in South Africa is even higher. Unemployment is particularly severe among new 
entrants. The narrow unemployment rate among the young (between the ages of 15 and 34) is estimated at 
36.9% (StatsSA, 2015b).  
The increase in unemployment among the youth is generally believed to be due to an oversupply of labour 
relative to demand. Since the end of apartheid there has been a steady increase in labour force participation 
and a decline in the relative demand for unskilled labour (Burger & von Fintel, 2009). The surplus of 
unskilled labour caused by the increased participation has made it tougher for young entrants into the labour 
market to find work (Mlatsheni & Rospabe, 1999; Bhorat & Oosthuizen, 2007). According to Rankin and 





Roberts (2011), the higher levels of unemployment among the young could be due to higher reservation 
wages. The young may be less willing to accept low-paying jobs, since many of them are still receiving 
financial assistance from their households. According to job search literature, unemployment can also arise 
through imperfect information. If individuals have imperfect information about vacancies and future job 
offers this will add to the unemployment burden. Similarly, as both employees and employers have 
preferences, young entrants may take time to find a job that is suitable to their set of skills and tastes 
(McCall, 1970).  
In this chapter we will construct and estimate a discrete choice dynamic programming job search model 
that is more fitting to the South African labour market landscape than conventional OLS and sample 
selection models. In contrast to these commonly adopted models, our model allows for non-myopic 
decision-making under uncertainty and is capable of explaining unemployment. By modelling the process 
explicitly we hope to be able to uncover whether the slow absorption rates among the young is actually a 
choice – whether unemployment is driven by low job arrival rates and low reservation wages or high job 
arrival rates and high reservation wages. Thus far, South African literature has relied on self-reported 
reservation wages that are prone to over-reporting. The method we adopt provides us with an alternative. 
Rather than asking individuals what they think their reservation wages are, the chapter attempts to uncover 
reservation wages that are consistent with labour market behaviour.  This is, to our knowledge, the first 
paper that attempts to recover reservation wages through a theory-consistent job search model for an 
African country. 
In the following section we look at the previous South African attempts to link reservation wages and 
employment. We also review the international literature on job search, where structural models are used to 
recover plausible reservation wage estimates. In section 3 we formulate our job search model, by 
introducing the behavioural assumptions that guide the action of the optimising agents in our theoretical 
model. In section 4 we how we plan to go about to solve the model. In section 5 we introduce the data, 
show some descriptive results and proceed to solve the parameters. In section 6 we conclude.  
2. Previous Work 
2.1. South African Literature 
To our knowledge, there are five papers that have linked reservation wages to employment data in South 
Africa. Kingdon and Knight (2001) compares self-reported reservation wages to predicted wages for a 
group of unemployed individuals. According to the authors, the reservation wages are far higher than one 
would have expected. While it is possible that individuals may overestimate their earning potential, the 
authors believe that most of deviation is due to over-reporting. Rankin and Roberts (2011) also find 
evidence that reservation wages appear to be overestimated. The authors show that almost half of the 
unemployed have reservation wages that were higher than what individuals with similar observables are 





currently earning in the labour market. Nattrass and Walker (2005) compare the reported reservation wages 
to the predicted wages among a representative sample of Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain residents. Their 
findings suggest that workers have realistic wage expectations. Following a job-search approach, Levinsohn 
and Pugath (2010) use the self-reported reservation wages in the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) to examine 
the role of reservation wages on unemployment. According to their model job offers are frequent, but are 
low relative to reservation wages. The authors estimate that more than 70% of job offers are declined. 
According to Zoch (2014) individuals report differently when they are asked to report their lowest 
reservation wages compared to when they are asked whether they would accept specific reservation wages. 
Using CAPS data, the authors obtain an imputed reservation wage using a sequence of hypothetical job 
offer responses. The estimates they derive through this method are lower than the conventional reservation 
wage estimates. Their estimates also do better in predicting labour market outcomes.  
Importantly, all six of these papers rely on self-reported reservation wages. Generally these measures have 
been found to be biased upwards (Brown & Taylor, 2011). Respondents tend to report what they believe a 
fair wage for them would be rather than the lowest wage they would be willing to work for. Similarly, 
individuals may mistake the surveying process as a wage negotiation process and try to bargain for a wage 
that is higher than their true reservation wage (Petterson, 1997; Kingdon & Knight, 2001). It is therefore 
not uncommon to see respondents accept wages that are lower than their reported reservation wages 
(Krueger & Mueller, 2014).  
In our analysis we will follow a structural approach that does not rely on the self-reported reservation wages 
responses. Instead, our model tries to recover a reservation wage that is consistent with the actions and 
choices we observe in the labour market, most notably the employment and job search decisions.  
2.2. Job Search Literature  
The first sequential job search models were developed by McCall (1970), Mortensen (1970) and Gronau 
(1971). These models build on the earlier human capital model of Becker (1964). In his earlier work Becker 
(1964) argues that a move out of non-employment into employment will only be worthwhile if the move is 
profitable – if the future income increases attached to accepting a job exceed the direct costs of moving. 
Job search theory builds on this model, allowing individuals to weigh up the costs and benefits of holding 
out for a better job offer when deciding whether to accept a current job offer.  
The first wave of job search papers show that unemployment can be accurately modelled as a stochastic 
process. By relaxing the perfect knowledge assumption that guides neo-classical models, job search models 
are able to show how forward-looking individuals who would prefer to be employed may temporarily be 
out of work. Unemployment is introduced through the uncertainty and imperfect information regarding 
vacancies and future job offers.  





The basic sequential job search models allow for two states: employed and searching. Job offers arrive 
randomly. An unemployed person is assumed to receive a job offer, drawn from a specific distribution 
function, in each period with fixed probability. Wage offers are assumed to be i.i.d. and there is no recall – 
once a job offer is refused an individual is unable to change their mind. The earlier models assume that the 
time horizon is infinite and that once a job is accepted it is held forever. None of the original models allow 
for on-the-job search or transitions out of employment (McCall, 1970; Mortensen, 1970; Gronau, 1971). 
The crucial question within these earlier models was whether and when it would be worthwhile for an 
optimizing agent who is faced with a specific job offer to hold out for a better job offer. In deciding, an 
agent has to weigh up the possible future gains of a better job offer against the disutility of not working 
and the opportunity cost of not taking the offer. Generally, these early models were solved using a stopping 
rule - the minimum wage for which individuals would be willing to enter employment - a reservation wage28.  
A second wave of structural job search models followed, which relaxed some of the basic assumptions of 
the first set of job search models. The three assumptions that appear to have been most widely criticised 
are the constant reservation wage assumption (which assumes that the reservation wages are constant across 
individuals and over each individual’s life-span), the infinite time horizon assumption and the assumption 
that individuals are not allowed to change jobs once they are employed.  
Kiefer and Neumann (1979) examine the validity of the constant reservation wage (or stopping rule value) 
hypothesis within the original models. Following a group of comparable workers who were laid off when 
their plant closed down, they show that reservation wages vary greatly between individuals. Reservation 
wages are higher for workers with unemployment benefits and higher for those with greater earning 
potential. Reservation wages decrease the longer workers remain unemployed. Lastly, they find that 
reservation wages start high, drop to a minimum at age 26 and rise again thereafter. Jensen and Westergaard-
Nielsen (1987) follow a similar approach to that of Kiefer and Neumann (1979). Using a sample of new 
law graduates Jensen and Westergaard-Nielsen (1987) show that there was a global reservation wage under 
which none of the applicants were willing to accept work. They also find that the intensity of the job search 
is positively correlated to the job arrival rate and to the reservation wage. 
 
Flinn and Heckman (1982) developed a standard search model with an infinite time horizon, which they fit 
to a panel of young US males. According to their results, between 30% and 45% of individuals will be 
offered employment over a six month period and between 60% and 92% of those job offers will be 
accepted. Blau (1991) follows a group of white, male, high school graduates in the US. He finds that the 
arrival rate of job offers decreases with unemployment duration and estimate an acceptance rate that is 
closer to 100%. Unlike the classical models, Wolpin (1987) allows incorporates measurement error into his 
                                                            
28 Since models assume that lifetimes were infinite, the reservation wages of these earlier models were not dependent on age. 





model and allows for a finite rather than an infinite time-horizon. He also allows the probability of a job 
offer to vary depending on how long someone has been out of school: individuals have a 1.28% probability 
per week of receiving an offer, but the probability declines to 0.91% over time.   
Early job search models assumed that jobs were held forever, there was thus no reasons to allow for on-
the-job search. Recent papers have relaxed this assumption. Using a reduced form approach that controls 
for method of search, Blau and Robins (1990) show that the arrival rate of job offers was higher among the 
employed searching than the unemployed searching. Conversely, Holzer (1987) finds the opposite to be 
true. Controlling for some labour and demographic variables, he shows that the probability of receiving a 
job offer is higher for the unemployed that are searching than for the employed. Belzel (1996) uses a 
structural approach to look at relative efficiency of job search, more specifically, comparing the probability 
of receiving a job offer and the distribution of the job offers between unemployed search and employed 
search.  
Most job search models assume that the cost of searching is immediate and the benefits are delayed. 
Paserman (2008) shows that in the face of hyperbolic time-preferences agents will underinvest in job search 
activities. For those agents with a present bias, the cost associated with searching will be weighed more 
heavily relative to the expected future gains. As a result, these agents will be less inclined to search and 
search with less intensity than what would have been optimal if they were trying to maximize lifetime utility.  
3. A Dynamic Job Search Model 
A discrete choice dynamic programming model is used to mimic the transition between work, job search 
and household production for a group of black males.  
Each individual faces a finite decision horizon during their working life. For the sake of this model we will 
assume that the working age stretches between the age of 16 and 65, 16 being the minimum age at which 
one can legally be employed and 65 the minimum age at the time for which males would be eligible to 
receive old-age pensions29. To bring the model in line with the bi-annual data that will be introduced in the 
second portion of the paper each period will be defined as lasting exactly six months. This leaves each 
individual with a maximum of 100 discrete decision periods over which to maximize their discounted net 






29 Since 2008 the age of eligibility for males to receive the old age grant has been gradually reduced from 65 to 60 
(SASSA, 2008). The LFS data we will be using was collected between 2001 and 2004 when the age of eligibility for 
males was still 65. 





Unlike some other dynamic programming models (see Keane & Wolpin, 1997; Belzil & Hanzen, 2002), the 
educational attainment choice is considered to be predetermined, a topic that will be revisited in the next 
chapter, where education is allowed to be endogenously determined.30,31.  
For each period, an individual can pursue one of three alternatives: staying at home, actively looking for 






The instantaneous utility derived in each period will depend on the rewards (denoted as ݎௗ,௜௧) associated 
with each of the chosen activities.  
ݑ௜௧ ൌ ܫሺ݀௜௧ ൌ 1ሻݎଵ,௜௧ ൅ ܫሺ݀௧ ൌ 2ሻݎଶ,௜௧ ൅ ܫሺ݀௧ ൌ 3ሻݎଷ,௜௧																																																																													ሺ2ሻ 




൛ܫሺ݀௜௧ ൌ 1ሻݎଵ,௜௧ ൅ ܫሺ݀௜௧ ൌ 2ሻݎଶ,௜௧ ൅ ܫሺ݀௜௧ ൌ 3ሻݎଷ,௜௧ൟ																																																																											ሺ3ሻ 
Unlike the Mincerian model and Heckman model, we allow agents to be forward-looking rather than 
myopic32. Individuals in our model are willing to forfeit some utility in the short run if they believe that it 
will increase future utility.  
3.1. Home Production and Search Cost 
The average level of home production is denoted by ߛு . Home production signifies the utility attached to 
the outside option. The utility from home production is allowed to vary by age in the following non-linear 
manner:  
 
ݎଵ,௜௧ ൌ ߛு ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܣ݃݁ ൅ ߛଶܣ݃݁ଶ																																																																																																														ሺ4ሻ 
Individuals incur a cost in searching for work; this cost could be direct (e.g. travelling costs or phoning up 
potential employees) or indirect (e.g. less time for housework or leisure). The average level of utility when 
searching is allowed to differ from what it was under home production.  
The utility under active search is captured by the equation below, where  
                                                            
30 To derive potential experience we assume that everyone who attains less than a grade 11 education joins the labour 
market at age 16 and everyone who attains grade 11 or more finishes their education within the allotted time and joins 
the labour market the year thereafter. 
31 Once someone is done studying they are not allowed to return to school.  
32 Choosing to maximise present lifetime utility (equation 3) rather than instantaneous utility (equation 2). 





ݎଶ,௜௧ ൌ ߛு െ ߛௌ																																																																																																																																																				ሺ5ሻ 
The utility forfeited by searching is captured by ߛௌ, where ߛௌ is assumed to be i.i.d. normally distributed with 
mean ݑௌ and deviation ߪௌ33.  
Although our model does not strictly assume it, one would expect the instantaneous utility to be lower 
when searching. Therefore we would expect ݑௌ to be larger than 0. Similar to Paserman (2008) we assume 
that the cost to searching is immediate, while the benefits are delayed. Those individuals that self-select into 
searching will need to be willing to forego some utility now, in order to increase their probability of securing 
higher future remuneration. 
3.2. Reward for Working (Wage) 
The current period reward associated with employment follows the conventional Mincerian shape, which 
combines time spent in school and time spent working. The expected wage offer conditional on one’s level 
of education and experience can be expressed as follows 
ݎଷ,௜௧ ൌ ݓഥ௜ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ܽଵ݁݀ݑܿ௜௧ ൅ ܽଶ݁݀ݑܿ௜௧ଶ ൅ ܽଷ݁ݔ݌௜௧ ൅ ܽସ݁ݔ݌௜௧ଶ 																																																															ሺ6ሻ 
where ܽଵ and ܽଶ measure the effect of schooling and ܽଷ and ܽସ represent the effect of experience34.  
The true wage offer further depends on the remuneration draw.  
ݓ∗ ൌ ݓഥ௜ ൅ ߟ௜,௧																																																																																																																																																					ሺ7ሻ 
The remuneration draw, ߟ௜,௧ , is assumed to be i.i.d. normally distributed with mean zero and standard 
deviation ߪௗ . Throughout we assume that individuals are aware of the distribution from which their wage 
offers will be drawn, but are not aware of the realisation of any of these draws before they occur. These 
values are only revealed when the job offers are made.  
3.3. Job Offers  
Not everyone gets offered a job during every period. The frequency of job offers (also referred to as the 
job arrival rate) is allowed to differ depending on whether an individual has searched in the previous period 
or not. The arrival rate for non-searching individuals is denoted as ݄ு and the arrival rate for the searching 
non-employed as ݄ௌ. Although we do not explicitly restrict ݄ௌ to be higher than ݄ு, we would expect this 
to be the case - looking for work should increase the likelihood of being offered work.  
                                                            
33 Without the variation introduced through	ߛௌ, the model is unable to explain the high degree of transitioning between 
home production and searching that is present in the data. 
34 We will model potential rather than actual experience. The DCDP model approach allows one to model the prior 
and then fit on the latter; this approach will however complicate the model dramatically and require us to fit on 
simulated moments. For this reason we decided to follow the more conventional approach. 





Not all remuneration draws are accepted. After a job offer is made, individuals have to decide whether they 
want to accept the job offer or whether they want to remain non-employed. According to McCall (1970) 
prospective employees will keep on searching as long as the future benefits associated with waiting for a 
better remuneration draw outweigh the forfeited wage that one could currently be earning.  
If agents decide to take the job offer the remuneration draw gets ‘locked in’ and remains ‘locked in’ until 
an employee exits employment or accepts a job from another employer. The probability of exiting 
employment will be denoted by ݍ and is assumed to be constant across all individuals and all periods. 
3.4. On-the-Job Search  
The probability of receiving a new job offer when a worker is already employed is denoted by ݄ா. In our 
model we assume that employed workers will only accept a new job offer if the wage offer attached to that 
job offer exceeds their current job offer. The cost of searching while employed is assumed to be negligible. 
This assumption is made out of convenience rather than plausibility35. Allowing on-the-job search decreases 
the reservation wage, since workers no longer have to hold out for high paying jobs before joining the 
labour market36 (Cahuc & Zylbergerg, 2004).  
4. Estimation Issues 
4.1. Difference between Offered Wages and Observed Wages 
In our analysis we will be using the reported wages to recover a plausible distribution of wage offers. In 
identifying the wage offer distribution we need to be wary of the difference between the offered wages, the 
accepted wages and the observed wages. Selection drives a wedge between the first two, while measurement 
error drives a wedge between the last two.  
4.1.1. Measurement Error  
Job search models are more susceptible to measurement error than conventional wage regressions, since 
these models use the bottom tail of observed earnings distribution to identify reservation wages37. 
Throughout we will assume that logged wages are reported with classical measurement error. We set ݓ ൌ
ݓ∗ ൅ ߝ, where ݓ∗ is the true wage and ݓ is the observed wage. The error is assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean zero and standard deviation ߪఌ. In order to simplify the notation we follow the 
approach of Wolpin (1987) in setting ߠ ൌ ߝ ൅ ߟ. Here, ߠ represents the difference between the expected 
and reported wage, which is a function of the measurement error and the remuneration draw. Since both ߝ 
                                                            
35 Since we do not have data on on-the-job search, we are forced to assume that everyone partakes in on-the-job job-
search to a similar extent. 
36 The extent to which on-the-job search will affect initial reservation wages will depend on the difference between 
the job offer rates in the three states.  
37 The original models did not allow for measurement error or heterogeneity. In these models the reservation wage 
was required to be lower than the lowest observed wage. These models would be even more susceptible to outliers.  





and ߟ are normally distributed it follows that ߠ will be normally distributed with mean of zero and standard 
deviation38 ߪఏ ൌ ඥߪఌଶ ൅ ߪఎଶ.  
4.1.2. Selection Bias 
A second reason why observed wages may differ from offered wages is due to positive selection into 
employment. Intuitively, we would expect agents, who abide to their reservation wages, to accept high 
offers and reject low offers. Therefore, the average accepted wage should be higher than the average offered 
wage39 (Flinn & Heckman, 1982). 
 
The relationship between the expected accepted wage offers, ܧሺݓሻ, and the expected wage offers, ݔߚ, can 
be recovered if we are willing to make some assumptions about the relationship between unobservables in 
the selection and wage equations. The expected observed wage can be written as  
 ܧሺݓሻ ൌ ݔߚ ൅ ݌ߪఌ ൥
థ൬ೣഁషೝೢ೔഑ഇ ൰
஍൬ೣഁషೝೢ೔഑ഇ ൰
൩   
The cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution is denoted by Φ and the density function 
is denoted by ߶. ݌ ൌ ఙഄఙഇ  denotes the correlation between the two errors. In relative terms, ݌ denotes the 
impact of the errors in the selection decision on the observed wage. The term in squared brackets denotes 
the selection correction term, commonly referred to as the inverse Mill’s ratio (Heckman, 1979).  
4.2. Recovering Reservation Wages 
Individuals face two decisions. The first decision is whether or not to actively look for work when non-
employed40. The second decision is whether or not to accept a job offer when one is made.  
The reservation wage for individual ݅ at period ݐ is the wage at which the individual would be indifferent 
between accepting and rejecting a job offer. Reservation wages are useful for our modelling purposes since 
they enable us to trace out the optimal employment choices for different individuals through their working 
lives.  
Solving the optimal decision path requires agents to be capable of making decisions under uncertainty. 
Agents are not aware of what their future shocks will be, but are assumed to have perfect knowledge with 
regard to the probability distribution from which these future shocks will be drawn. Agents in our model 
incorporate all this information in their decision-making process. Finding the optimal path is complicated 
further by the fact that current decisions have implications for future rewards and choices. Due to these 
                                                            
38 Technically the standard deviation is ߪఏ ൌ ටߪఌଶ ൅ ߪߟଶ െ 2ߪఌߟ	 where ߪఌߟ denotes covariance between the two error 
terms. Throughout we will however assume that the measurement error and the remuneration draws are uncorrelated 
and that ߪఌߟ ൌ 0.  
39 Due to censoring at the lower end, the remuneration draws for observed wages is likely to be skewed to the left. 
40 Although our model allows for on-the-job search, we will assume that on-the-job search is automatic. 





complexities econometricians make use of discrete choice dynamic programming (DCDP). DCDP models 
have the desirable attribute of being both complicated and flexible at the same time. DCDP models are 
intricate enough to allow a worker to weigh up all the future paths and consider all future shocks that may 
occur (their likelihood of occurring and how those would impact future returns) when they have to decide 
on the optimal current choice. Yet, these models are flexible enough to allow workers to renege on their 
optimal path when shocks get revealed in the future41. 
To trace out the optimal decision path we introduce the state space Ω௧. The state space contains all the 
relevant information from the past that could influence the current-period decision ݀௧. The model is 
assumed to evolve in Markovian manner with a one-period memory. The current state is determined by 
education, experience, the previous state and the remuneration draw42  
Education is assumed to be constant and potential experience evolves in a predictable manner. The previous 
period’s state determines whether the individual starts the period as employed or not. It also affects the job 
arrival rates, since job offer arrival rates differ depending on whether the individual have searched the 
previous period43. 
In deciding their optimal path, individuals compare the net discounted lifetime utility of the options 
available to them. We define ܸሺΩ௔, ܽሻ	as the value function at period a. It provides the maximum expected 
present value of lifetime utility at age ܽ, given the state space Ω௔ and the discount factor ߚ. 
ܸሺΩ௔, ܽሻ ൌ maxሼௗሽ ܧ ൥෍ߚ௧ିଵ
ଵ଴଴
௧ୀ௔
ൣܫሺ݀௧ ൌ 1ሻݎଵ,௧ ൅ ܫሺ݀௧ ൌ 2ሻݎଶ,௧ ൅ ܫሺ݀௧ ൌ 3ሻݎଷ,௧൧|Ω௧൩																																									ሺ8ሻ 
In its current form the expansion of decisions faced by our agents follows the specifications of a finite 
Bellman equation44. Consequently, the value function can be rewritten as the highest of the 3 alternative 
value functions, where each of the subsequent value functions corresponds with one of three choices 
contained in our decision space.  
ܸሺΩ௔, ܽሻ ൌ maxሼௗሽ ሾ ଵܸሺΩ௔, ܽሻ, ଶܸሺΩ௔, ܽሻ, ଷܸሺΩ௔, ܽሻሿ																																																																																				ሺ9ሻ 
Since each of these value functions ( ଵܸ, ଶܸ	ܽ݊݀	 ଷܸ) obey the Bellman principles, they can each be rewritten 
as the sum of their respective reward plus the discounted sum of the value function for the following period.  
                                                            
41 In the presence of shocks what was previously envisioned to be the optimal decision path might turn out to be an 
inferior strategy once an array of shocks is realised. 
42 Past realisations of the two productivity shocks (ߝ௧௪ and ߝ௧௛) are not included since their realisations are assumed to 
be serially independent of future shocks.  
43 The remuneration draw is only important if an individual accepts a job – if the individual is employed. 
44 See Rust (1992) for a complete discussion of the principles that need to be satisfied in order to use a Finite Markov 
Bellman model. 





௜ܸሺΩ௔, ܽሻ ൌ ݎ௜,௔ ൅ ߚܧሾܸሺΩ௔ାଵ, ܽ ൅ 1ሻ|Ω௔, ݀௔ ൌ ݅ሿ																																																																																	ሺ10ሻ 
Following this logic, the initial value function can be expanded all the way to the last period where ݐ ൌ 100. 
At this terminal period all errors would have been revealed and the optimal decision under each of the 
possible states can be recovered. Once we know the optimal set of choices for the state space for the final 
period we are able to use equation 10 to calculate what the optimal choice would be at ݐ ൌ 99. This process 
is repeated until we arrive at ݐ ൌ 1. Using the backward-recursion approach, we are to trace out the optimal 
non-employed reservation wage as well as the maximum value of ߛௌ for which someone would be willing 
to search. Both these values are allowed to vary by education, experience and time.  
4.3. The Likelihood Function 
Once we have obtained the reservation wage values that determine the optimal decision path for each agent 
under any set of parameters, we are able to model the likelihood function. The likelihood function will 
allow us to tell how well the model fits the data. In our model, the likelihood function captures the 
probability of transitioning between states45.  
4.3.1. Remaining Non-Employed 
The likelihood of remaining non-employed can be modelled as follows. 
ܮ ൌ ൫1 െ ௝݄൯ ൅ ௝݄Φ ቀ௥௪೔ఙೠ ቁ   where ௝݄ ൌ ൜
݄ு		if	݀௧ିଵ ൌ 0
݄ௌ			if	݀௧ିଵ ൌ 1	 
The first term, ൫1 െ ௝݄൯,	denotes the probability of not receiving a job offer and the second term denotes 
the probability of receiving and turning down an offer. ௝݄, the probability of receiving an offer, is allowed 
to differ depending on whether someone had searched during the previous period. Φቀ௥௪೔ఙೠ ቁ denotes the 
probability of rejecting an offer.  
4.3.2. Transitioning into Employment  
The likelihood of transitioning into employment and earning a wage ݓ௧. 









ఙഇ ቁ     where ௝݄ ൌ ൜
݄ு		if	݀௧ିଵ ൌ 0
݄ௌ			if	݀௧ିଵ ൌ 1	 
Again, ௝݄ , denotes the probability of receiving a job offer. The term in the square brackets denotes the 
probability of accepting the offer46. The final term denotes the probability of observing the specific wage 
offer.  
                                                            
45 We will be exploiting the panel dimension in the LFS data, utilising data on employment, job search, age, education, 
tenure and wages. 
46 The cumulative density function within the square brackets shows that the probability of accepting a job offer is 
not a function of the wage offer, the reservation wage, the individual’s characteristics and the correlation between the 
errors in the employment equation and the errors in the wage equation. 





4.3.3. Transitioning into a New Job 
Our model allows for on-the-job search. The likelihood of transitioning from a job that reportedly pays 
ݓ௧ିଵ to one that reportedly pays  ݓ௧ is  









Employed individuals have a ݄ா probability of receiving a new job offer. The term in the square brackets 
denotes the probability of accepting the job offer. However, unlike before, the reservation wage is now a 
function of the reported current wage (which is observed by the econometrician) and not the expected 
reservation wage (which was recovered through dynamic programming)47.  
4.3.4. Keeping the Same Job  
The likelihood of retaining a job and transitioning from a reported wage of ݓ௧ିଵ to ݓ௧ is 











The term on the left captures the probability of remaining in the current job48. The term on the right 
captures the likelihood of observing the wage, ݓ௧. Individuals with higher remuneration draws will be more 
likely to remain in their current position49. The difference in the unobserved portion of the wage between 
the two periods is driven by measurement error.  
4.3.5. Transitioning Out of Employment  
At any time, any employed individual has probability ݍ of moving out of employment. The probability of 
moving out of employment is exogenously determined.  
4.3.6. Searching for Employment  
The likelihood among the non-employed of actively looking for employment is: 
 ܮ ൌ Φቀ௥௪೔ೄି௨ೄఙೄ ቁ																																																																																										 
Similar to the reservation wage, the minimum cost at which a non-employed worker would be willing to 
look for employment is backed out in a recursive manner. The value is denoted as ݎݓ௜ௌ and varies by 
education, experience and age. Once we have derived ݎݓ௜ௌ the probability of search can be computed 
through the cumulative distribution function since the search cost is normally distributed.  
                                                            
47 Workers who hold jobs with lower remuneration draws will be more likely to transition into other jobs. 
48 Everyone excluding those who were fired and who accept a new job remain in their old jobs. 
49 The expected wage will be equal to the previous wage plus 1 period worth of experience. 





For each individual, their overall likelihood will be the product of each pair of successive waves we were 





In order to simplify the optimization process the likelihood is logged.  
4.4. Identification 
Unlike cross-sectional models, that are only able to tell us about the level of unemployment, job search 
models have the potential of telling us whether unemployment is voluntary or not. Theoretically, these 
models are capable of distinguishing between labour markets with high arrival and rejection rates (high 
reservation wages) and labour markets with low arrival and rejection rates (low reservation wages). The 
identification of these models rely on the structural assumptions and the richness of the data50.  
In our homogenous model we assume that all individuals face the same job offer rates and remuneration 
draws. The homogenous model has 16 parameters that need to be recovered51: The parameters of the wage 
distribution (ܽ଴, ܽଵ, ܽଶ, ܽଷ, ܽସ), as well as the standard deviation for the remuneration draw and measurement 
error (ߪ௨, ߪ௠௘), the parameters for household production and search cost (ߛ଴, ߛଵ, ߛଶ, ݑௌ, ߪௌ) and the 
paramaters that determine the job arrival and exit rates (݄ு, ݄ௌ, ݄ா, ݍ). In order to identify the parameters, 
each of the parameters needs to have a distinctly different effect on the set of moments on which one plans 
to fit the model. For this reason identification requires a rich set of moments (Paserman 2008).   
Unlike the conventional Mincerian model, that ignores non-employed, the job search model assumes that 
the attributes that determine wages also play a large role in determining employment. In this regard the 
coefficients in the wage regression are determined in a similar manner to those in the Heckman (1979) 
selection model52. In our model, household production is allowed to vary non-linearly over age. These two 
additional parameters allow the employment profile and wage profile to deviate from one another.  
Wages are allowed to deviate from expected wages. In the absence of panel data we would not have been 
able to tell whether the variation is driven by the variation in the remuneration draws or by measurement 
error. Having repeated observations, however, allows us to distinguish between the part of the error in the 
wage that is persistent and the part that is idiosyncratic. Put simply, a large persistent variation from the 
                                                            
50 Flinn and Heckman (1982) showed that in the absence of richer data the identification of job arrival rates, job refusal 
rates and the reservation wages rests on the distributional assumptions of the untruncated wage offer.  
51 In the heterogeneous model the wage intercept and job offer rates are allowed to differ between the two types. The 
model requires an additional 3 parameters to be solved. 
52 The Heckman model allows the coefficient in the second stage (wage equation) to be influenced by the relationship 
between the same set of characteristics and take up (employment) in the first stage. In the Heckman selection model 
individuals are considered to be myopic (ߚ ൌ 0). 





expected wage offer would be evidence of a large remuneration draw effect, while a large idiosyncratic 
variation would be evidence of large measurement error effect53.   
The reservation wages and home production values are not directly observable. Job search models rely on 
a strong set of structural assumptions to identify the reservation wage and home production parameters. 
These assumptions allow us to use distribution of the observed wages to trace out the reservation wages 
and the expected utility under home production. 
Once the reservation wages have been recovered and the distribution of job offers is known, we are able 
to use the structural model to estimate the proportion of jobs offers that would have been refused and 
accepted. The job arrival rate is then chosen so as to let the proportion of non-employed individuals who 
transition into employment correspond to the proportion in the data. The discount parameter is set to an 
annual discount rate of 5%54, 55  
In four of the six waves in our panel, the non-employed were asked whether they had turned down any job 
offers during the previous six months. We use this question as a robustness check to see whether the 
reservation wages that we recover from the distributional assumptions alone are adequate.  
In the heterogeneous model we allow the wage intercept (the average offered wage) and job offer rates to 
differ between the two types. We also allow the proportion of individuals that are estimated to belong to 
each of the two types to vary. The finite mixture model (FMM) that we adopt requires an additional 3 
parameters to be solved. Since we assume that individuals are unable to change their type, we are able to 
draw on the longitudinal information in our data to investigate whether different individuals face different 
labour market condition. The FMM allows us to see whether the same set of individuals who receive more 
job offers also receive higher wage offers.  
5. Empirical Analysis  
5.1. Data 
Data is taken from six consecutive bi-annual Labour Force Surveys; the first was captured in the second 
half of 2001 and the last was captured in the first half of 2004. The sample is limited to working aged black 
males who were observed at least once in two consecutive waves. Using the rotating panel within the 
surveys, 22922 individuals were uniquely identified. The survey contains information on schooling, age, as 
well as employment status: whether individuals were working, seeking work or inactive. The survey also 
                                                            
53 The average change in wages among those who did not switch jobs contributes further to the identification of the 
experience parameters (ܽଶ, ܽଷ), while the variation from the expected trend helps to identify measurement error.   
54 The choice of the discount rate is by large arbitrary. Moore & Viscusi (1990) found that the estimated discount rates 
that are derived from labour data ranges between 1% 14%. We chose 5% since it lies comfortably within this range.  
55 A bi-annual discount rate of 2.53% ൫1 െ √1 െ 0.05൯. 





contains further information about wages and tenure among those individuals who reported as being 
employed.  
5.2. Descriptive Statistics 
The choice between working, staying at home or actively seeking employment is central to our discussion 
throughout. The following graph shows how the likelihood of being in each state fluctuates over one’s 
working-age. 
    
Figure 2.1: Choice Distribution by Age 
 
According to figure 2.1, very few of those individuals who are younger than 21 (and not studying56) are 
actively employed. Most are either inactive or searching for work. The probability of being employed 
increases steadily by age. The likelihood of being employed if a person is not enrolled is roughly 10% among 
20 year olds, and roughly 70% among 40 year olds. Similarly, the likelihood of being at home (non-employed 
and non-searching) decreases from 70% to 20% over the same age range. The probability of being an active 
job seeker remains relatively stable, at around 20%, between the ages of 20 and 40. From 40 onwards there 
is a sharp decline in both the probability of being employed and the probability of seeking employment. It 
is unclear whether the decrease is driven by early retirement or discouragement.  
The likelihood of being in either of the three states also differs by educational attainment. 
                                                            
56 Our model ignores all those individuals that are considered to be full-time students. According to figure 3.1 school 





















       
 
Figure 2.2: Choice Distribution by Education Level 
 
Up until grade 12 education appears to have a very small effect on employability. Beyond matric, the 
probability of being employed increases, while the probability of being at home or searching dwindles. 
Interestingly, the probability to be actively searching for employment is highest among those with moderate 
levels of education. 
In our formal model we are interested in the level of churning between the three decision states and the 
factors that give rise to these changes. Table 2.1 shows the average transition rates between two waves 
among the three states for the subsample of black males who were observed in two consecutive periods57, 
58.    
      Table 2.1: Transition between States 
 
  Future State 










59% 24% 17% 100% 
(6065) (2458) (1728) (10251) 
Seeking 
25% 52% 23% 100% 
(1995) (4144) (1885) (8445) 
Working 
8% 9% 83% 100% 
(1582) (1843) (16860) (20285) 
Total 
25% 22% 53% 100% 
(9642) (8445) (20473) (38560) 
 
                                                            
57 Only those individuals for whom we had consecutive observations are included in this table.  Some people were 
not observed in consecutive periods, while others were observed multiple times. 













Years of Education        





Individuals are most likely to stay in the state they are in. Persistence is highest among the employed: 83% 
of those who were employed in the previous period remained employed, while 59% of those who were at 
home were also at home in the next period. Transition is the highest among the actively seeking. An 
individual that was actively looking for employment 6 months ago has a 52% chance of still searching, a 
25% chance of having quit searching but remaining non-employed, and a 23% chance of becoming 
employed.  
Among the non-employed, those who are actively looking for employment are more likely to become 
employed. The difference is, however, not as large as one would have expected. Those who are actively 
looking for employment had a 23% chance of being employed the next period, while those who are not 
looking have a 17% chance of finding work. From these descriptives it appears as though actively seeking 
work only increases the likelihood of becoming employed within the next 6 months by 6 percentage points 
or roughly 40%. However, drawing a causal interpretation from these tentative results is problematic since 
it is unclear whether the group that are searching and the group that are non-searching are composed of 
comparable individuals. For instance, if the searching are more educated than the non-searching (as 
suggested in figure 3), this would bias the returns to searching upwards.  
In four of the six waves, the non-employed were asked whether they had turned down any job offers during 
the previous six months. While this provides us with a valuable source of information we are wary that 
these self-reported measures may be bias. In the case of job offers one would expect that the self-reported 
estimates are susceptible to underreporting. Like, Levinsohn and Pugath (2010) we are concerned that some 
of the job offers that people reject might be implicit. For this reason we decided not to incorporate these 
moment into our model of choice, but to rather include it as a robustness check.  
The table below shows the proportion of respondents who report to have declined work within the last 6 
months. 





The proportion is low. Only 1.2% of black males who remained non-employed reported to have received 
and turned down a job offer during the previous 6 months. Interestingly, the proportion of individuals who 
received and declined job offers were roughly two times higher among the group who were actively looking 
for employment over the last six months, compared to those who were not actively looking for 















employment. While it is possible that some of the difference is driven by variation in the rejection rates it 
is also likely that a large portion of the difference could be due to differences in job arrival rates. 
The descriptive results show that individuals who actively look for employment are more likely to transition 
into employment and also more likely to decline employment relative to those individuals who are not 
actively looking for employment. Combined, these two measures provide us with a rough indication of 
what the job arrival rate could be for both groups. Some crude back of the envelope calculations suggest 
that the job arrival rate for those who actively search for work is around 25% and the job arrival rates for 
those who do not actively search is around 18%.  
5.3. Fitting the Data to the Model 
Following a maximum likelihood approach, we set out to find the set of parameters that are most likely to 
have produced the moments observed in the South African labour market. At each iteration the likelihood 
function compares the actual probabilities of real world outcomes from the data to the predicted moments 
from our model, until it finds the set of parameters that are deemed to be most adequate. The optimal set 
of parameters are derived using the Powell-algorithm and non-linear-simplex-and-simulated-annealing-
algorithm. The Powell-algorithm is the more efficient of the two algorithms and does well in finding local 
maximums, but is sensitive to discontinuities in the likelihood estimate59 (Brent, 1973). Conversely, the non-
linear-simplex-and-simulate-annealing-algorithm is slower, but more cautious of accidentally converging to 
a local rather than a global maximum60 (Cardoso et al., 1996).  
5.4. Homogenous Model 
The conventional Mincerian regression results are reported in column 1, while column 2 and 3 contain the 
set of parameters that best fit the dynamic job search model that we have developed in this paper. Model 
2a uses the distributional assumptions alone to fit the reservation wages, while model 2b also fits the self-                           
reported rejection data. In our analysis we will focus on model 2a. All the results contained in table 3 are 
for a sample of working-aged black males in South Africa. 












Wage    
  Constant 0.499*** 0.285*** 0.616*** 
  Education -0.045*** 0.050*** 0.027*** 
  Education Squared 0.014*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 
  Experience 0.082*** 0.106*** 0.079*** 
  Experience Squared  -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  S.D. of Remuneration Draw  1.159*** 1.048*** 
  S.D. of Measurement Error   0.780*** 0.777*** 
    
                                                            
59 The matlab file was written by Argimiro R. Secchi and can be downloaded from: 
http://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/15072-unconstrained-optimization-using-powell/content/powell.m  
60 Repeated testing, by the author, has shown that this method is less sensitive to the choice of initial values. 





Household Production    
  Constant    2.241*** 1.940*** 
  Age  -0.117*** -0.120*** 
  Age Squared   0.014*** 0.015*** 
  Search Cost   0.719*** 0.891*** 
  S.D. of Search Cost   0.309*** 0.311*** 
    
Offer Probability       
   Default Arrival Rate   0.149*** 0.122*** 
   Searching Multiplier   1.785*** 1.950*** 
   Employed Multiplier   0.646*** 0.754*** 
   Job Exit Rate   0.180*** 0.182*** 
  N 18823 22922 22922 
  R2 0.314   
  Log Likelihood  -63029.4 -63913.1 
          Note: * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level 
 
5.4.1. Wages  
All prices were set to 2010 values. The average hourly wage among the subsample of black males in our 
sample who were employed was R2.57, which translates to a median monthly income of roughly R3000. 
Throughout we allow the expected wage offer to be influenced by education and experience. Education 
was introduced quadratically, since the returns to schooling are believed to be convex in South Africa 
(Keswell & Poswell, 2004). The returns to education in the structural model are slightly lower and less 
convex than in the OLS model (see figure 2.A.2 in the appendix). The expected wage-experience-profile 
follows the conventional inverse U-relationship (see figure 2.A.3 in the appendix). The expected wage 
profiles follows a similar shape to that found by Imai and Keane (2004) for the US, who used structural 
models to evaluate the role of human capital accumulation over the life-cycle path.  
5.4.2. Household Utility and Reservation wages 
The reservation wage represents the minimum logged hourly rate at which someone will accept 
employment, while the household utility denotes the utility attached to the outside option. Neither 
reservation wages nor home utility are directly observed. Instead, in our model, we attempt to uncover what 
the reservation wages and household utility could be, based on labour market behaviour.  
In the figure below we show how the estimated utility under home production and the reservation wage 
evolve over the life-cycle61.  
                                                            
61 The curve was constructed for a group of black males with 8 years of education. The average level of education 
for this sample is 8.2 years. 





   
Figure 2.3: Home production utility and the reservation wage over age for an 
individual with 8 years of education. 
 
 
The reservation wage follows a similar path as the home utility curve. This should not be surprising. Under 
a myopic models the reservation wage and the outside options are considered to be the same thing. In our 
model, unlike conventional models, agents are allowed to be forward-looking. Therefore, agents in our 
model may turn down job offers even if the wages exceed their current household utility.  
Figure 2.3 shows that the largest deviation between the reservation wage and home utility occurs where the 
expected wage is at its highest round age 40. Conversely, we find that as individuals get closer to the end of 
their working life (and run out of additional periods over which to optimize), their willingness to hold out 
for higher wages diminishes and the reservation wage converges to the utility under home production. For 
the final period, when there are no further periods over which to optimize, the employment choice 
simplifies to a myopic decision, since individuals only have to compare their offered wage for that period 
to their expected utility under home production.  
Like Kiefer and Neumann (1979) we also recovered a U-shaped reservation wage curve. The utility under 
home production starts high, reaches a minimum at age 42 and rises thereafter. The logged hourly 
reservation wage for the non-employed ranges between 0.105 and 0.992. The equivalent monthly values 
range between R215 and R522, respectively62. The reservation wage is lowest for 44 year old individuals 
with 0 years of education and highest for 25 year old individuals with 16 years of education and no 
experience. These estimated values are far smaller than previous estimates have suggested63.  
 
                                                            
62 Transformed: ݁଴.ଵ଴ହ ൈ 4.3 ൈ 45 ൌ R215; ݁଴.ଽଽଶ ൈ 4.3 ൈ 45 ൌ R522 
63 Using the National Income and Dynamics Study (NIDS) data, we derive a median self-reported reservation wage 





















The logged hourly utility to home production ranges between -0.191 and 0.806. This equates to a monthly 
value of roughly R160 and R435, respectively64.  
Interestingly, Rankin and Roberts (2011), who used self-reported reservation wages for a group of young 
black individuals in South Africa, also uncovered a negative relationship between age and reservation wages 
between the ages of 20 and 30. According to them, young people start off with inflated expectations about 
their own earnings potential. As individuals update their expectations about their own ability, their 
reservation wages come down to more reasonable levels. In our model individuals are assumed to be aware 
of their earnings potential. Instead, in our model, the drop in reservation wages is driven by a decrease in 
the utility under home production (or a decrease in the distaste for working) over that age range. One would 
expect that the pressure on young males to leave the household or to find a job and to contribute to the 
income pool should increase as they grow older.   
5.4.3. Job Arrivals and Refusals 
The job arrival rate is allowed to differ depending on whether an individual was non-employed and did not 
search, was non-employed and searched or was employed. The job acceptance rate, on the other hand, 
depends on the reservation wage, which in turn depends on an individual’s age and level of education.  
The figure below shows how the job offer rate and average acceptance rates differ depending on an 
individual’s previous state65.  
 
        
Figure 2.4: Job arrival and acceptance rate by state 
 
Individuals who were non-employed and did not actively look for work have a 15% chance of being offered 
employment over a six month period, while those who did look for work had a 27% chance of being offered 
employment. Active search increases the probability of obtaining a job offer by 78% (13 percentage points). 
                                                            
64 Transformed: ݁ି଴.ଵଽଵ ൈ 4.3 ൈ 45 ൌ R160; ݁଴.଼଴଺ ൈ 4.3 ൈ 45 ൌ R435	(work 45 hours in a week and 4.3 weeks in a month) 
65 The rejection rates vary depending on age and education. The results in figure 2.4 represent the average rejection 








At Home Seeking Working
Reject
Accept





The search cost follows a log-normal distribution a median monthly rand value of R465 per month66. On 
average, only 10% of the non-employed in the model who were offered work turned it down. The degree 
of selection is relatively low. The sub-sample of numeration draws that were accepted (by the non-
employed) is therefore not much different from the distribution of all the numeration draws.   
The model also allows for on-the-job search. 10% of employed individuals are estimated to receive a job 
offer each period. Interestingly, the probability of receiving a job offer is lower when employed than when 
non-employed, regardless of search. Our simulated (using the parameters that we obtained from model 2a) 
results showed that slightly more than half of the on-the-job job-offers that were received were declined. 
This makes sense. The employed will only change jobs if they receive a better job offer than their current 
one. If there were no selection into employment and individuals were only allowed to changes jobs once 
we would have expected the acceptance rate to be 50%, but since there is a minor degree of positive 
selection into employment we expect the current distribution of wages to be slightly higher than the average 
wage draw and the acceptance rate to be slightly lower than 50%. The estimated reservation wages as well 
as the estimated job arrival rates and rejection rates are lower in our model than in the other South Africa 
studies (Kingdon & Knight, 2001; Rankin & Roberts, 2011).  
The model predicts an exit rate of roughly 18%.  
5.5. Heterogeneous Model 
The baseline model does not account for unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity can arise in 
several places – through the wage distributions, through the job arrival or exit rates, or even through the 
utility attached to the outside option or through the disutility attached to active search. According to Wolpin 
(1987), the choice as to where to introduce heterogeneity is a largely discretionary, yet necessary, decision, 
since the model would not be identifiable if all the parameters are allowed to vary by type.  
A finite mixture model (FMM) is constructed. In our model we allow for two types of workers, type 1 and 
type 2. The two types differ with respect to the arrival rate of their wage offer as well as their wage 
distribution. We loosely refer to these unobserved characteristics that may shift the wage distribution and 
arrival rate as ability, but it could easily be seen as school quality, motivation, or anything else the model 
does not currently account for.  
In identifying type, we will examine whether some one group of individuals receive job offers at a more 
frequent underlying rate than another group of individuals and whether one group receives higher 
remuneration draws than the other group of individuals (after already controlling for education and 
experience). Having repeated observations for the same individuals allow us to exploit the longitudinal 
                                                            
66 The median is reported rather than the average cost, since the term follows a log-normal distribution. 





dimension of our data For the sake of our model, we will be assuming that individuals are unable to change 
type – they remain of the same type throughout the survey67.  
Two finite mixture models were estimated. Model 3a uses the distributional assumptions alone to fit the 
reservation wages, while model 3b also fits on the self-reported rejection data. Both models improve their 
fit when we allow for a second type, supporting the claim that there might be some unobserved 
heterogeneity in the model. In our analysis we will focus on model 3a, the first of the two heterogonous 
models.  









Wage   
  Constant (Type 1) 0.083*** 0.067*** 
  Constant (Type 2)   -0.813*** 0.249*** 
  Education -0.019*** 0.003*** 
  Education Squared 0.009*** 0.006*** 
  Experience 0.149*** 0.096*** 
  Experience Squared  -0.003*** -0.003*** 
  S.D. of Remuneration Draw 1.109*** 1.023*** 
  S.D. of Measurement Error  0.780*** 0.778*** 
   
Costs   
  Constant  2.148*** 1.419*** 
  Age -0.117*** -0.095*** 
  Age Squared  0.001*** 0.001*** 
  Cost of Searching  0.223*** 0.248*** 
  Cost of Searching Shock  0.097*** 0.075*** 
   
Arrival Rate of Job Offers     
   Default Arrival Rate (Type 1) 0.257** 0.200*** 
   Default Arrival Rate (Type 2)  0.134*** 0.111*** 
   Searching Multiplier  1.230*** 1.242*** 
   Employed Multiplier  0.501*** 0.618*** 
   Job Exit Rate 0.179*** 0.181*** 
   Proportion 0.490*** 0.446*** 
  N 22922 22922 
  Log Likelihood   -62553.8 -63490.7 
   Note: * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level 
Roughly half of individuals in our finite mixture model are considered to be of type 1 and roughly half are 
considered to be of type 2. Type 1 individuals face more favourable labour market prospects. Type 1 
individuals are two times more likely to receive a job offer than type 2 individuals and receive job the offers 
they do receive are, on average, higher than the offers that type 2 individuals receive. Conceptually, we 
could imagine that type 1 individuals possess more desirable unobservable traits than type 2 individuals, 
which may make them more productive employees.  
  
                                                            
67 The relative advantage to searching and being employed relative to being non-employed and non-searching is 
assumed to be constant across types.  
 





The graph below compares the expected wages, household utility and reservation wages for the two types. 
  
Figure 2.5: The expected wages, household utility and reservation wages by type. 
The graph was drawn for two individuals with 8 years of education. 
 
Figure 2.5 shows the gap between the expected wage offers for type 1 and type 2 individuals. Despite having 
the same household utility, type 1 and type 2 individuals face very different reservation wages. Type 1 
individuals are more inclined to turn down low job offers than type 2 individuals, since type 1 individuals 
know that they face a more favourable job offer rate and wage draw than type 2 individuals. The probability 
of receiving a more lucrative job offer in the near future is therefore far higher for this group68.  
Interestingly, we see that the benefit and cost to search decreases when we allow for heterogeneity. In 
model 3a, active search increases the probability of receiving a job offer by 23%. This is far less than what 
was estimated under the homogenous model (see model 2a), where searching increases the probability of 
receiving a job offer almost 80%. The expected median monthly disutility from searching decreased from 
roughly R400 to R240 when we allowed for unobservable heterogeneity.  
According to our results much of the increase in the transitioning out of non-employment that we perceive 
to be through active search is actually through positive selection. Type 1 individuals are more likely to self-
select into active search, since for them the relative gains to search are larger. While the percentage change 
in the job offer rate is the same for both types, the increase is from a larger base for type 1 individuals. 
Searching increases the probability of a job offer by 6 percentage points for type 1 individuals and 3 
percentage points for type 2 individuals. The gains of receiving a job offer are also higher for type 1 
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A structural job search model was developed and estimated. The structural model relies on a rich set of 
assumptions to help explain how utility maximizing working-aged agents may operate in the face of 
uncertainty. Parameters were recovered for the wage coefficients, the distribution of measurement error, 
the remuneration draw, the outside option and the cost of search, and the job arrival and exit rates.  
Reservations wages were backed out of the model and allowed to vary by education and over one’s working 
life. Unlike other authors we rely on the behaviour of labour market participants rather than on their self-
reported responses to recover the reservation wage. The median reservation wages for non-employed black 
males are estimated at roughly R400 per month when we do not fit on the reported rejection rate and at 
roughly R300 when we do. These reservation wage values are far lower than been previously reported. Our 
results reconfirm the earlier suspicion of Kingdon and Knight (2001) and Rankin and Roberts (2011) that 
reservation wages are over-reported. Like Rankin and Roberts (2011) we also uncovered a negative 
relationship between age and reservation wages between the ages of 20 and 30, despite using a very different 
technique. Unlike Rankin and Roberts (2011) our model assumes that individuals are aware of their 
expected earnings potential and that the decline in reservation wages is not due to a revision of these 
expectations. Instead, in our model, the drop in reservation wages is driven by a decrease in the utility under 
home production (or a decrease in the distaste for working) over that age range. This decrease in the utility 
of home production with age for young males is likely to be a function of their bargaining position within 
the household. One would expect that the pressure on young males to find a job and to contribute to the 
income pool should increase as they grow older.   
Our model suggests that much of the increase in job arrival rates that we see from searching is through 
selection. Actively looking for work has a much smaller effect on employment than the descriptive results 
would suggest. The low proportion of job refusals suggests that the main constraint to employment is not 
reservation wages, but rather a shortage of job offers.  














Figure 2.A.2: Returns to education profile.  
















































Figure 2.A.3: Returns to experience profile.  














































Wage    
  Constant  0.499 0.285 0.616 
 (0.037) (0.033) (0.030) 
  Education -0.045 0.050 0.027 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
  Education Squared 0.014 0.006 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Experience 0.082 0.106 0.079 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Experience Squared  -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  S.D. of Remuneration Draw  1.159 1.048 
  (0.030) (0.022) 
  S.D. of Measurement Error   0.780 0.777 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
  
Costs    
  Constant   2.241 1.940 
  (0.044) (0.047) 
  Age  -0.117 -0.120 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
  Age Squared    ( × 100)  0.014 0.015 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
  Age Quadratic ( × 10000)    
    
  Age Quartic     ( × 1000000)    
    
  Cost of Searching   0.719 0.891 
  (0.025) (0.025) 
  Cost of Searching Shock   0.309 0.311 
  (0.016) (0.013) 
  
Arrival Rate of Job Offers      
   Arrival Rate   0.149 0.122 
  (0.006) (0.003) 
   Searching Multiplier   1.785 1.950 
  (0.043) (0.039) 
   Employed Multiplier   0.646 0.754 
  (0.033) (0.035) 
   Job Exit   0.180 0.182 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
  N 18823 22922 22922 
  R2 0.314   
  Log Likelihood  -63029.4 -63913.1 
 
   














Wage   
  Constant (Type 1) 0.083 0.067 
 (0.017) (0.022) 
  Constant (Type 2)   -0.813 0.249 
 (0.188) (0.005) 
  Education -0.019 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.001) 
  Education Squared 0.009 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
  Experience 0.149 0.096 
 (0.028) (0.003) 
  Experience Squared  -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.001) 
  S.D. of Remuneration Draw 1.109 1.023 
 (0.038) (0.016) 
  S.D. of Measurement Error  0.780 0.778 
 (0.033) (0.007) 
   
Costs   
  Constant  2.148 1.419 
 (0.041) (0.068) 
  Age -0.117 -0.095 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
  Age Squared  0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
  Cost of Searching  0.223 0.248 
 (0.017) (0.014) 
  Cost of Searching Shock  0.097 0.075 
 (0.194) (0.158) 
   
Arrival Rate of Job Offers     
   Arrival Rate (Type 1) 0.257 0.200 
 (0.116) (0.045) 
   Arrival Rate (Type 2)  0.134 0.111 
 (0.019) (0.009) 
   Searching Multiplier  1.230 1.242 
 (0.213) (0.179) 
   Employed Multiplier  0.501 0.618 
 (0.017) (0.008) 
   Job Exit  0.179 0.181 
 (0.013) (0.008) 
   Proportion 0.490 0.446 
 (0.019) (0.016) 
  N 22922 22922 
  R2   











Chapter 3:  
The Role of  Unobserved Ability on Educational 
Attainment and Labour Market Outcomes 
 
Educational attainment is not random. Individuals who stay in school longer and attain more years 
of education are different from those individuals who drop out earlier. If these attributes are 
correlated to labour market outcomes, they could bias our estimates on the returns to education.  
While we are able to control for the selection bias on observables we are unable to control for the 
portion of the bias that is introduced through the selection on unobservable individual heterogeneity.   
One way in dealing with the endogeneity of education is through the experimentalist approach which 
attempts to introduce an exogenous source of variation into the model. In our model we do the 
opposite. Instead of eliminating the endogenous portion of the variation in education that is 
correlated with the unobservables, we attempt to estimate the extent of the bias directly by explicitly 
modelling the educational process that gave rise to the bias.  
 
1. Introduction 
Few South Africans finish high school and even fewer continue on to tertiary education. The crowding at 
low levels of education is somewhat surprising since the returns to education in South Africa are believed 
to be high and convex, while the cost of schooling is low. The convexity in the returns to education suggests 
that the gains to an additional year of schooling is increasing – every additional year of schooling increases 
one’s expected wage by more than the year that preceded it. Following this logic, in the absence of any 
constraints and assuming the costs are constant, it would be illogical for a student who finished the previous 
year of schooling to not further their studies.  
While some individuals may be unaware of the high returns to education, it is doubtful that there would be 
a systematic tendency to undervalue the returns to schooling, and more specifically to undervalue the 
returns at the top end relative to the bottom. Instead, it is commonly acknowledged that these estimates 
may be susceptible to selection bias. If more capable, more productive, more driven individuals select into 
higher levels of education, it will bias conventional OLS estimates of education returns upwards.  





Theoretically, the instrumental variable approach is capable of recovering the true returns to education, by 
introducing an exogenous source of variation into the model. This approach, however, requires one to have 
access to a valid instrument that is correlated to education, but not to the unobserved correlates that could 
bias education. Ironically, most of the instrumental variable models that have attempted to correct for ability 
bias have recovered estimates with higher, rather than lower, returns to education (Card, 1999).  
Instead we develop a dynamic programming model that mimics the schooling decision faced by young 
black males in South Africa. Educational attainment is modelled as a sequential process, where utility 
maximizing agents have to weigh up the cost and benefits of remaining enrolled under uncertainty. Agents 
do so by comparing the discounted expected future utility of both choices. Unobserved ability is introduced 
through a finite mixture model, where we allow individuals to have different schooling and labour market 
abilities. In our paper we will assume that individuals are aware of the distribution of ability in the population 
and how ability affects schooling and labour outcomes. They are assumed to know the returns to ability, 
but are not fully aware of their own ability type. Similar to econometricians, agents learn about their ability 
as they progress through the schooling system, updating their expectations of their ability at the end of each 
year. 
In the following section we look at the South African literature on the returns to education, and more 
specifically the attempts that have been made to address the endogeneity that may be introduced through 
ability bias. We also look at international attempts at using structural modelling to correct for the 
endogeneity that is induced through ability bias. In section 3 we formulate the sequential schooling model, 
by introducing the behavioural assumptions that guide the action of the optimising student as they progress 
through the schooling system. In section 4 we show how optimising individuals in our model use the limited 
information about their expected probability of passing and their expected gains to passing to inform their 
decision to remain enrolled. In section 5 we introduce the data, show some descriptive results, before 
continuing to solve our parameters. In section 6 we compare the schooling and labour market prospects of 
high and low ability students under the current schooling system and show how these outcomes would be 
affected if there was less noise in the distinction between who fails and passes in black schools. Section 7 
concludes.  
2. Previous Work 
2.1. Ability Bias 
The Mincer model compares wages across age profiles and different levels of schooling (Mincer, 1974). 
The model does well in capturing the underlying correlation between the covariates. Inferring causality, 
however, requires that individuals be identical on all attributes apart from education. This assumption – 
that individuals with different levels of education share the same unobservables – is commonly referred to 
as the exogeneity, orthogonality or homogeneity assumption.  





The validity of the exogeneity assumption has been questioned from two sides. Conceptually, Rosen (1977) 
argues that if the identifying assumption is valid and all individuals are truly homogenous, then there would 
be no reason for individuals to not all have the same level of schooling. Unlike Rosen, Becker (1967) 
believes that people are inherently different and that the optimal level of capital investment will differ by 
individual. He maintains that the human capital investment would be lower for students with lower innate 
ability and with limited access to funding (since these individuals are forced to draw on more expensive 
sources of financing). Self-selection into education on such unobserved attributes will bias the returns to 
education, since we are not able to simply compare the average wages across different educational levels 
any more. Despite these reservations, most labour economists have persisted with the Mincerian model. 
Most of the classic models, like the Mincerian model, assume that the schooling decision is exogenous. 
Conventional wisdom, however, suggests that individuals with greater unobservable labour market 
attributes may select into higher levels of education. In the presence of such heterogeneity, simple 
comparisons or multivariate regressions will deliver biased results. Econometricians cannot just compare 
wage and employment outcomes between those with higher and lower levels of education, since those who 
select into higher and lower levels may also differ with regard to other attributes that could impact labour 
outcomes. Often in the literature, researchers try to circumvent these endogeneity concerns about ability 
by adding a cognitive measure of ability to the set of controls. Schultz (1988) found that controlling ability 
reduced the returns to education estimate, but only by about 10% in the US. Unfortunately, even with the 
most elaborate set of controls, there are still likely to be some unobservable attributes that could impact 
both education and labour outcomes.  
The discussion about the extent of ability bias within the returns to education is analogous to the more 
general discussion about whether education actually enhances productivity or whether it merely serves as a 
signal of innate ability. According to the human capital theory education helps to increase an individual 
capabilities and skills. Proponents of this theory therefore believe that there is a causal link between an 
education, increased productivity and increased returns in the labour market. 
According to the sorting hypothesis the primary objective of education is not to accumulate human capital, 
but rather to signal to potential workers that an individual possesses desired unobserved characteristics. 
Generally it is believed that more abled individuals self-select into higher levels of education. In which case, 
these desirable unobserved attributes are positively correlated to education. In an imperfect market, where 
employers are unable to readily observe all the productive characteristics of potential employees, employers 
are able to infer productivity from education. (Arrow, 1973; Stiglitz, 1975).  
Both the human capital theory and the sorting hypothesis predict that there would be a positive correlation 
between education and labour market outcomes – that the returns to education would be positive. In the 
absence of richer data, these two theories deliver observationally equivalent outcomes. Both 
Psacharopoulos (1979) and Wolpin (1977) have devised methods to distinguish between the validity of 





these two theories. Psacharopoulos (1979) compares the returns to education between the public and 
private sector, while Wolpin (1977) compares the returns among the employed and self-employed. The key 
identifying assumption in both these methods are that sorting takes place in one group and not the other. 
Applying these methods to South African data, Koch and Ntege (2006) found that education appears to 
contribute to earnings through both the proposed channels. Education increases productivity and serves as 
a signal. 
2.2. Instrumental Variable Approach 
The instrumental variable approach provides a potential solution to the problem of causal inference, one 
that avoids the necessity to control on all possible unobservables. Theoretically, the instrumental variable 
approach allows one to recover the true returns to education, by introducing an exogenous source of 
variation into the model. The IV method, however, hinges on the existence of a valid instrument – a 
covariate that affects schooling but is not correlated with any of the unobservable attributes that may affect 
labour outcomes. Much of the focus in the recent literature has been in finding eccentric policy rules that 
can act as “natural experiments”. Somewhat surprisingly, studies like that of Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) 
found estimates that were 30% or more higher than the OLS estimates. This is at odds with what one would 
have expected, since it implies that the original models might have been biased downwards rather than 
upwards.  
Hypothetically it is possible that the increase in the returns to education under the IV approach could be 
due to heterogeneous marginal effects or measurement error corrections. Returns to education would 
increase rather than decrease if the group that is induced into schooling by the instrument have higher 
returns than the rest of the population. Similarly, the instrument may have neutralised measurement error, 
which was biasing the initial results downwards. A more feasible explanation for the counterintuitive results 
may be that the instruments were not valid, in which case the IV method may be introducing ability bias 
into the estimates rather than removing it. (Card, 1999). 
2.3. Structural Models 
Keane and Wolpin (1997) use a discrete choice dynamic programming (DCDP) model to explain schooling 
and employment decisions in the US by tracking the labour market outcomes of a sub-sample of young 
males from the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Study. While they do not technically model the 
schooling for earlier grades (it only follows students from age 16 onwards), it does allow for differences in 
initial schooling endowments. Unlike any previous studies they allow the returns to schooling to differ by 
occupation and the choice of schooling and occupation to be endogenous – determined by the optimizing 
individual.  
Belzil and Hansen (2002) use a dynamic programming to determine whether the return to schooling in 
United States are convex or concave. The authors adopt a finite mixture model which allow for 6 types of 





individuals. In their model they introduce unobserved individual-level heterogeneity by letting the schooling 
ability and market ability vary by type. Their results shows that the correlation between unobserved market 
and schooling ability is positive and large - the correlation between the ability in school and the ability in 
the labour market is estimated to be 0.95. This finding is consistent with the classical assumption of ability 
bias, which is commonly believed to inflate the returns to schooling estimates.    
Attanasio et al. (2012) use the data from a randomized conditional cash transfer policy named PROGRESA 
to investigate the impact of conditional cash transfers on school enrolment among the poor in Mexico. The 
authors use a structural model, to interpret the impact of the program. They conclude that the conditional 
cash transfers were more successful in improving high school enrolment, than improving primary school 
enrolment.   
Magnac and Thesmar (2002) look at the change in schooling attainment in France between 1980 and 199369. 
The authors argue that the increase in educational attainment could either be due to increased returns in 
education or increase probability of employment, reduced cost of education (both objective or subjective) 
or a reduction in the probability of failing (an increase in the success ration). Using survey data that has 
information on educational history and on employment, the authors estimate what the optimal educational 
level would be using a structural model that uses an optimal stopping rule. Interestingly, Magnac and 
Thesmar (2002) find that the largest determinate of the increase in educational attainment in France during 
the period under study was due to the decrease in the relative difficulty of attaining education.  
2.4. South African Literature 
Most of the South African literature on returns to education is descriptive in nature, adopting either ordinary 
least squares or quantile regressions to estimate the return to education. The prevailing consensus is that an 
additional year of schooling increases one’s earnings at a varying rate. The returns to education are low 
initially, moderate during high school and high from grade 11 onwards. Mwabu and Schultz (1996) estimate 
the returns to primary schooling at 8%, the returns to secondary schooling at 16% and the returns to tertiary 
schooling at 24%. Increasing returns to education, have been found in multiple datasets and studies (Moll, 
1996; Mwabu & Schultz, 1996; Keswell & Poswell, 2004; Anderson et al. 2001).  
Only three authors have attempted to correct for the possible ability bias in South African education 
estimates. Moll (1998) finds that including a proxy for cognitive ability does not dramatically change the 
returns to education estimate or the convexity of the original model. Hertz (2003) corrects for some of the 
omitted variable bias by running a within-family fixed effects model. Unlike Moll (1998), Hertz (2003) finds 
that the OLS results were inflated. The estimated returns to education falls from 12%, as was measured 
using the ordinary least squared estimate, to roughly 5% when he only allows for within-family variation.   
                                                            
69 As discussed by Belzil (2006).  





Similarly, Burger & van der Berg (2011) used a quasi-structural model to show how the differences in 
schooling performance may impact educational returns. The authors demonstrate that a large portion of 
the differences in the returns to earnings and the returns to education between race groups can be explained 
by the differences in expected matric performances between race groups, which in turn, is a function of 
schooling quality and latent ability.  
Interestingly, the non-linearity in the returns to education has strong implications on the educational choice, 
since it affects the option value of an additional year of schooling. Burger and Teal (2013) show that forward 
looking students would be willing to endure lower initial returns to schooling if it provides them with the 
option of accessing higher returns at higher levels of education. The authors show that under convex returns 
the choice to remain enrolled does not only revolve around the gains of the next year, but also the possible 
gain of the years to follow. 
Lam et al. (2011) found that a self-administered numeracy score was a strong predictor of passing grade 12 
exam for all races, but only a strong predictor of passing lower grades (grade 8 to 11) for white and coloured 
students. The numeracy test was only a weak predictor of passing lower grades for black learners. They 
conclude that there is a larger stochastic component in black schools.  
3. Dynamic School Participation Model 
3.1. Model Structure 
We use a discrete choice dynamic programming model to mimic the participation decisions faced by school-
going individuals as they proceed through school.  
Individuals enter the model at age 670, the age at which children are supposed to start schooling. Each year 
students have the option of remaining enrolled or dropping out71. For the sake of simplicity we assume that 
once individuals leave the education system they do so permanently and are unable to re-enter the schooling 
system thereafter. Similarly, we will also assume that students can only study up until the age of 30. After 
the age of 30 they get forced into the labour market. This leaves each individual with a maximum of 24 
discrete decision periods over which to choose the optimal action that would maximize their discounted 
net present lifetime utility.  
Lifetime utility, denoted as ௜ܷ, is the discounted additive sum of the utility one derives over one’s lifetime. 
Individuals are assumed to work up to the age of ௜ܶ .  
                                                            
70 This assumption is not critical, since we do not fit on age in our model.  
71 This school choice could also be taken by parents. As long as the parents act in the best interest of their children 
the model will remain unaffected. 









In the above equation ݑ௜௧ denotes the instantaneous utility for individual ݅ at period ݐ and ߚ denotes the 
discounting factor – how much a person weighs the future relative to the present. ߚ is assumed to be fixed 
not only over time but also across individuals. 
In each period, each school-going individual needs to decide whether to continue their studies or not. The 
choice set, ݀௜௧, that these individuals face is denoted as follows:  
݀௜௧ ൌ ൜0	ݏݐݑ݀ݕ						1	݀ݎ݋݌	݋ݑݐ	 
The two choices are mutually exclusive; an individual can only pursue one of the two options in any one 
period. In our model we will assume that everyone who is enrolled is enrolled full-time72.  
 
The instantaneous utility, ݑ௜௧,	 at any specific period will depend on whether an individual is enrolled or 
not. We denote the instantaneous utility while still in school as ݑ௦ and the instantaneous utility when 
someone is out of school as ݑ௪. 
 
  ݑ௜௧ ൌ ܫሺ݀௜௧ ൌ 0ሻݑ௦ ൅ ܫሺ݀௜௧ ൌ 1ሻݑ௪              																																																																																															ሺ2ሻ 
 
The discounted lifetime utility can be obtained by substituting equation (2) into equation (1): 
௜ܷ ൌ ෍ ߚ௧ିଵ
்೔ି଺
௧ୀଵ
ሼܫሺ݀௜௧ ൌ 0ሻݑ௦ ൅ ܫሺ݀௧ ൌ 1ሻݑ௪ሽ																																																																																											ሺ3ሻ 
We will discuss the relative rewards under each of the alternatives in turn.   
 
3.2. The Utility of Work and the Returns to Schooling 
The actual utility derived outside of school will depend on whether someone finds employment and on 
what they earn if they do. Both the employment probability and the expected wage are likely to be affected 
by schooling, experience and age. To keep the model as simple as possible we will assume that education, 
experience and ability affect both these labour market outcomes in a similar manner. 
We define ݉௜௧∗ , as an individual’s latent labour market productivity. Both wages and employment are 
assumed to be a function of ݉௜௧∗ . We allow the variable to be affected by the three determinants through 
the following relationship.   
                                                            
72 This is different from Eckstein and Wolpin (1999). In their paper, students are allowed to do work part-time. They 
find that financially constrained students are able to alleviate the high financial burden of tertiary education by working 
part-time and during holidays. 





  ݉௜௧∗ ൌ ߙ0 ൅ ߙ1݁݀ݑܿ௜௧ ൅ ߙ2݁݀ݑܿ௜௧ଶ ൅ ܽ3݁ݔ݌݅ݐ ൅ ܽ4݁ݔ݌݅ݐ2 ൅ ߥ௜௠																																																																ሺ4ሻ 
Here, ߙଵ and ߙଶ captures the effect of schooling and ߙଷ and ߙସ the effect of experience73. The ability draw, 
ߥ௜௠, captures the unobserved heterogeneity in skills endowment. The ability draw, ߥ௜௠, is assumed to be 
person specific, but time-invariant. The ability draw follows a standard normal distribution.  
Both wages and employment are assumed to be a function of ݉௜௧∗ . The following two equations describe 
the logged wage rate, ݓ௜௧, and the employment probit function74: 
  ݓ௜௧ ൌ ݉௜௧∗ ൅ ߝ௜௧௪																																																																																																																																																		ሺ5ሻ 
  ݁݉݌݈௜௧ ൌ 1ሺ݉௜௧∗ ൅ ߝ௜௧ா ൒ ߬ሻ																																																																																																																													ሺ6ሻ				  
Here, ߝ௜௧ா  captures the idiosyncratic productivity shock in employment, while ߝ௜௧௪ captures the idiosyncratic 
productivity shock in wages. The error terms are assumed to be i.i.d. normally distributed with mean zero 
and standard deviation of ߪఌ௪	and ߪఌா , respectively. The threshold parameter ߬ allows employment to 
deviate from 50%.  
The expected instantaneous utility for someone who has joined the labour market can now be formulated 
in terms of the probability of being employed and the subsequent expected payoffs and the probability and 
utility under non-employment. 
 ܧሺݑ௪ሻ ൌ ܲሺܧ݉݌݈௜௧ሻܧሺݓ௜௧ሻ ൅ ൫1 െ ܲሺܧ݉݌݈௜௧ሻ൯ݑ௛																																																																																		ሺ7ሻ 
Agents are assumed to have rational expectations about their future labour market prospects75. Like 
Attanasio et al. (2012), we will be making use of a terminal value function (TVF). This represents the 
expected discounted present value of lifetime future earnings if someone was to leave the schooling system.  




Similar to the reservation wage in the previous chapter, the TVF is calculated recursively.  
3.3. The Utility of Attending School  
The overall expected instantaneous utility to schooling is denoted by ݑௌ, which encapsulates both the 
monetary and non-monetary utility to schooling. We allow the cost to schooling, ߢ௜, to vary depending on 
                                                            
73 The education-squared term is introduced to capture the convexity in the returns to education found in South Africa 
and other developing countries. 
74 Individuals in our model are not allowed to choose between employment and non-employment. Our model is 
agnostic with regard to whether non-employment is a demand or supply side constraint.  
75 While our model does not explicitly model the choices agents face once they exit the schooling system (and enter 
the labour market), it does use the actual employment and wage data to ensure that the expectations in our model 
coincide with the actual outcomes.  





whether students are in school or in higher education76. The non-monetary gains, ݑௌ∗, are assumed to be 
constant across each year of schooling and across individuals.  
 
The overall instantaneous utility when studying is allowed to vary as follows: 
 ݑௌ ൌ ൜	ݑௌ
∗ െ ߢଵ			݂݅	݅݊	ݏ݄ܿ݋݋݈																											
ݑௌ∗ െ ߢଶ			݂݅	݅݊	ݐ݁ݎݐ݅ܽݎݕ	݅݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊																																																																 
 
The non-monetary utility of schooling, ݑௌ∗, is assumed to be i.i.d. normally distributed with mean ݑതௌ∗ and 
standard deviation of ߪఌௌ. 
 
 
3.4. Grade Progression 
Grade attainment is not guaranteed. An additional year of studying does not automatically lead to an 
additional year of education. As in real life, individuals will only accrue the benefits of a year of studying if 
they pass77,  
The probability of passing depends on schooling ability (ߥ௜௦), an idiosyncratic shock (ߝ௜௧௦ ) that is loosely 
referred to as “school noise”, and the relative difficulty the grade the student is currently enrolled in (ߣ௜).  
Passing is denoted by ݌ܽݏݏ௜ and expressed in the following form: 
 
 ݌ܽݏݏ௜ሺߥ௜௦, ݁݀ݑܿ௜ሻ ൌ 1൫ߥ௜௦ ൅ ߝ௜௧௦ ൐ ߣ௜ሺ݁݀ݑܿ௜ሻ൯																																																																																						ሺ9ሻ				 
 
Given that the error, ߝ௜௧௦ , is distributed normally the probability of passing can be modelled as follows78: 
 
 ܲ൫݌ܽݏݏ௜ሺߥ௜௦, ݁݀ݑܿ௜ሻ൯ ൌ Φሺఔ೔
ೞିఒ೔ሺ௘ௗ௨௖೔ሻ
ߪߝݏ ሻ																																																																																																	ሺ10ሻ 
The difficulty parameter, ߣ௜, is allowed to differ between the latter and earlier phases of schooling as well 
as between normal schooling and higher education. 





The idiosyncratic error, ߝ௜௧௦ , is assumed to be i.i.d. normally distributed with mean 0 and deviation ߪఌ௦. We 
will refer to ߪఌ௦ as the noise parameter79. We allow ߪఌ௦ to vary between the grades prior to matric, and the 
years following and including matric, since we believe that the standardised senior certificate exam provides 
students with a more reliable signal of their performance.   
                                                            
76 In our model we assume that the monetary disutility to schooling, ߢ௜, captures the school fees, the school clothes 
and the travel cost to schooling. In Figure A2 in the appendix we show that the cost to schooling increases once 
individuals enroll into higher education. 
77 Belzil and Hansen (2002) assume that a year of studying and a year of education are the same thing. Anderson et al. 
(2001) find that black students progressed through school at a rate of 0.8 grades per year.   
78 The grade you attempt to pass will be the one that follows your immediate education level.  
79 In Item Response Theory (IRT) this is called the discrimination parameter, since it determines the model’s ability 
to discriminate between higher and lower ability individuals.  





 ߪఌ௦ ൌ ൜	ߪఌ௦
௦ 			݂݋ݎ	ݏ݋݉݁݋݊݁	ܾ݁ݐݓ݁݁݊	݃ݎܽ݀݁	1	ܽ݊݀	݃ݎܽ݀݁	11																						
ߪఌ௦௠			݂݋ݎ	ݏ݋݉݁݋݊݁	݅݊		݃ݎܽ݀݁	12	݋ݎ	ݐ݁ݎݐ݅ܽݎݕ	݅݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑ݅݋݊																																																																 
According to Lam et al. (2011) the strength of the feedback mechanism is not homogenous over all schools. 
They find that the stochastic component, that we refer to as ‘noise’ is larger in previously black schools 
than in previously white and coloured schools. Since apartheid there has been an extensive shift in resources 
towards predominantly black schools, to bring the spending on those schools in-line with former white 
schools. Despite this shift there has been no real convergence in the performance or observable change in 
quality within previously black schools (van der Berg, 2007). 
The noise distorts the link between ability and achievement and weakens the quality of the information 
provided through this feedback mechanism. Consequently, those students who are in schools with noisy 
signals would be less informed about their true ability and likelihood of passing future grades when they 
have to decide whether to remain enrolled or to drop out.  
3.5. Uncertainty and Information Updating 
In our homogenous model all students have the same ability and are aware of their ability. Student therefore 
do not require any updating of their true ability. In the heterogeneous model, however, we allow students 
to have different schooling and labour market ability draws. Students in our model have imperfect 
information regarding these abilities. Students start off not knowing anything about their ability draw, but 
are able to update their expectations about their ability draw as they progress through school.  
3.5.1. Updating Expectation about Schooling Ability 
Throughout we will assume that students know the difficulty of each grade as well as the distribution from 
which their schooling ability and idiosyncratic shocks are drawn. Students are also assumed to be aware of 
the relationship between these factors and passing (as described in equation 9). Applying this knowledge, 
rational students are able to make use of their academic history to assess their true ability and probability 
of passing future grades. 
The expected probability of passing, conditional on one’s expectation regarding one’s own ability is 
represented by:  
 ܲሾܲܽݏݏ௜ሺ݁݀ݑܿሻሿ ൌ 1ሺܧሺߥ௜௦|݁݀ݑܿ, ݎ݁݌݁ܽݐݏሻ ൅ ߝ௜௧௦ ൐ ߣ௜ሺ݁݀ݑܿ௜ሻሻ																																																								ሺ11ሻ				  
As students proceed through school they are able to update their expectation of their own ability, ߥ௜௦. If 
they pass they will update their expectations of their ability upwards. If they fail they will update their 
expectations downwards. This is analogous to Bayesian updating (West, 1993), where the updated posterior 
probability is a function of the prior probability distribution and the information gained from either passing 
or failing the following year. The magnitude of these adjustments will depend on the likelihood of the event 
– if someone fails an earlier grade it will be more informative than if they fail a higher grade. Similarly, the 





information contained in a pass and fail will be less informative about ability if idiosyncratic components 
within the schooling system are large80.  
At each grade, each type has a fixed probability of passing. A Bernoulli distribution is constructed to obtain 
the probability of a sequence of observed pass and fails conditional on type. For instance, the probability 
of observing a certain sequence of repeats and fails over the first 9 or fewer years (which are considered to 
be of a comparable difficulty) can be modelled as follows81.  
  ܲሺ݂݈ܽ݅ݏ ൌ ݔሻ ൌ ቀܰݔቁ ቂ1െ ܲቀ݌ܽݏݏ݅ሺ݁݀ݑܿሻቁቃ
ݔ ቂܲ ቀ݌ܽݏݏ݅ሺ݁݀ݑܿሻቁቃ
ܰെݔ 																																															ሺ12ሻ	 
where N denotes the number of years that an individual has been enrolled in that phase of 
schooling,		ܲ ቀ݌ܽݏݏ݅ሺ݁݀ݑܿሻቁ denotes the probability of passing and ݔ denotes the number of fails a specific 
student has accumulated.  
3.5.2. Updating Expectation about Market Ability 
Rational agents are able to use knowledge about their expected schooling ability to infer what their expected 
market ability would be. Students are assumed to be aware of the underlying relationship between school 
and market ability. Drawing on this information, any updates about schooling ability can also help inform 
expectations about labour market ability.  
The expected terminal value function (TVF) can be rewritten as a function an individual’s education, but 
also the number of times an individual has repeated.   
  ܧሺܸ௪ሻ ൌ ݂ሺܧሺߥ௜௪|ܴ݁݌݁ܽݐݏ௜ሻ, ܧ݀ݑܿ௜, ܣ݃݁௜ሻ																																																																																												ሺ13ሻ	 
  	 
4. Estimation Issues 
4.1. Bellman Equation 
Current decisions have implications for future rewards and choices. In deciding the optimal path agents 
need to be aware of not only the current payoffs but also the future consequences of their current actions. 
Uncertainties and expectations play a crucial role in how these future returns are factored into current 
decisions82.  
                                                            
80 According to Lam et al. (2011) this signal is weaker in former black schools than in former white or coloured 
schools. 
81 A different Bernoulli distribution that only counts the occurrences within that next phase of schooling where the 
likelihood of passing (an occurrence) is different. 
82 Agents in our model are ignorant about what their future shocks will be, but have knowledge with regard to the 
probability distribution from which these future shocks will be drawn. What was previously envisioned to be the 
optimal decision path might turn out to be an inferior strategy once an array of shocks are realised. 





In order to keep track of the sequential decisions faced by the individual we introduce the state space, 
denoted as Ω௧, that contains all the relevant information from the past that could influence the current-
period decision ݀௧. The current state Ω௧ ൌ ሺ݀௜௧ିଵ	, ݁݀௜௧, ݎ݁݌௜௧ሻ is determined by a combination of current 
endowments (education and times repeated already) as well as an indication of whether a person is still 
enrolled or not (݀௜௧ିଵ	).  
The maximum expected present value of lifetime utility at period ݐ, given the state space Ω௔ and the discount 
factor, is defined as follows.  
௔ܸሺΩܽ, ݐሻ ൌ maxሼௗሽ ܧ ቎෍ ߚ௧ିଵ
்೔
௧ୀ௧బ
ሾܫሺ݀௧ ൌ 0ሻݑ௦ ൅ ܫሺ݀௧ ൌ 1ሻݑ௪ሿ|Ωݐ቏																																																									ሺ14ሻ 
The choice above follows the specifications of a finite Bellman equation83. The value function above is 
equal to the higher of the two alternative value functions in our decision space – the value if a person 
chooses to remain enrolled and the value if he or she drops out.  
௧ܸሺΩݐ, ݏݐሻ ൌ maxሼௗሽ ሾ ௧ܸ௦ሺΩݐሻ, ௧ܸ௪ሺΩݐሻሿ																																																																																																															ሺ15ሻ 
Since both of these value functions also obey the Bellman principles, they can each be rewritten as the sum 
of the respective instantaneous returns under both choices plus the discounted sum of another value 
function from the next period. The state space faced in the following period differs depending on what 
decision an individual makes at present (whether they set ݀௧ ൌ 0 or 1).  
The value of studying for someone who has ݏ௜ years of schooling at age ݐ is  
 ௧ܸ௦ሺΩ௧, ݏ௧ሻ ൌ ݑ௦ ൅ ߚ ቀ݌ܽݏݏ௜ሺݏ௧ሻ ௧ܸሺΩ௧, ݏ௧ ൅ 1ሻ ൅ ൫1 െ ݌ܽݏݏ௜ሺݏ௧ሻ൯ ௧ܸሺΩ௧, ݏ௧ሻቁ																																																					ሺ16ሻ 
where ௧ܸሺΩ௧, ݏ௧ሻ ൌ ܧܯܽݔሾ ௧ܸାଵ௦ ሺΩ௧, ݏ௧ሻ, ௧ܸାଵ௪ ሺΩ௧, ݏ௧ሻሿ 
The value of work for someone who has ݏ௜ years of schooling at age ݐ is  
௧ܸ௪ሺΩݐ, ݏ௜௧ሻ ൌ ݑ௪ ൅ ߚ ௧ܸାଵ௪ ሺΩݐ, ݏ௜௧ሻ																																																																																																															ሺ17ሻ 
The difference between ݑ௦ and ݑ௪ reflects the current cost of schooling relative to the current payoff of 
working, while the difference between the two second terms in equation 16 and equation 17 describes the 
expected future payoffs under both options. In equation 16 we see that if students pass they get to pick 
between ௧ܸାଵ௦ ሺΩ௧, ݏ௧ ൅ 1ሻ and ௧ܸାଵ௪ ሺΩ௧, ݏ௧ ൅ 1ሻ in the next period, while if they fail they are forced to pick 
between ௧ܸାଵ௦ ሺΩ௧, ݏ௧ሻ and ௧ܸାଵ௪ ሺΩ௧, ݏ௧ሻ. There are no further choices in equation 17, since individuals in our 
model are not allowed to re-enter the schooling system once they drop out.  
                                                            
83 See Rust (1992) for a complete discussion of the principles that need to be satisfied in order to use a Finite Markov 
Bellman model 





The model is solved recursively. Agents in our model first ask themselves whether, depending on a range 
of characteristics and factors, it would be worthwhile to go on to do a PhD if they had already acquired a 
master’s degree. Once that choice has been accurately modelled, we go on to model the decision to enrol 
for a master’s if one had completed a bachelor’s degree. This process is repeated backwards up until the 
first year of education.  
The recursive manner in which the model is solved allows agents to consider not only the direct benefit of 
the following year but also the option value of an additional year of education. Burger and Teal (2013) show 
that not all the gains to an additional year of education are through the marginal benefit of the next year 
alone. Due to the convexity in the returns to education, individuals may be willing to endure lower returns 
on earlier grades if it provides them access to later grades that have higher returns. Similarly, being in the 
schooling system provides individuals with more information about their true ability. Agents in our model 
take both these option values into consideration when they choose whether to remain enrolled.  
4.2. Identification  
Great caution should be taken when constructing structural models to ensure that there is enough variation 
to estimate each of the individual parameters – that the model is not over-specified.  
The homogenous model has 15 parameters that need to be recovered: The parameters of the wage 
distribution (ߙ଴, ߙଵ, ߙଶ, ߙଷ, ߙସ), as well as the standard deviation for the idiosyncratic shocks in the wage 
function and the standard deviation and threshold parameter for the employment equation (ߪఌ೔೟ಶ , ߪఌ೔೟ೈ, ߬), 
the expected utility under home production, the expected utility under standard and higher education and 
the standard deviation of the utility of schooling (ݑ௛, ݑௌ∗ െ ߢଵ, ݑௌ∗ െ ߢଶ, ߪߝܵ), and the three difficulty 
parameters (ߣଵ, ߣଶ, ߣଷ)84.  
In the heterogeneous model we allow the labour market and schooling outcomes to be correlated to 
unobserved traits. The finite mixture model (FMM) we use distinguishes between two latent classes. 
Structurally, this requires us solve a further four parameters: the relative noise ratio (ߪఌ௦௦ /ߪఌ௦௠), a schooling 
ability parameter, a market ability parameter and an estimate of the relative proportion of the groups.    
The parameters in the wage and employment equation are identified in a similar manner as in the 
conventional Mincerian wage equation and Probit employment equation. Having repeated labour market 
observations for the same set of individuals allows us to ascertain how much of the variation around the 
expected wage and expected probability of employment is random (driven by ߝ௜௧௪ሻ and how much is 
persistent over time (driven by ߥ௜௪)85. 
                                                            
84 In the homogenous model, where we do not have any schooling ability variation, the noise parameters are irrelevant.  
85 In our homogenous model, where ߥ௜௪ ൌ 0, we assume that all the variation in employment and wages relative to 
the expected wages and expected probability of employment is random – driven by ߝ௜௧௪. 





Ideally we would have wanted to identify ݑௌ, ߢଵ	and ߢଶ. Unfortunately in our model we do not have enough 
exogenous variation to uniquely identify the non-monetary and monetary cost to each grade. Instead we 
identify ݑௌ െ ߢଵ  and ݑௌ െ ߢଶ86.  
In our model, whether someone passes or fails a grade is determined by their own ability, the difficulty of 
the grade and some noise. The approach followed in modelling the role of each of these determinants is 
similar to the Item Response Theory (IRT) techniques that have been commonly used in psychology and 
education testing since the sixties (Rasch, 1980). Generally speaking, if many people repeat the same grade 
then that grade is considered to be difficult (high ߣ௜). Conversely, if the same individuals either repeatedly 
pass or fail then that would be evidence of a strong ability (ߥ௜௪ሻ effect87. If we see different people failing 
different grades that would signal that there is a strong noise (ߝ௜௧௦ ሻ effect.  
4.3. The Likelihood Function 
In order to derive the structural estimates that best fit our data, we require a likelihood function. The 
likelihood function tell us how probable our model is to have generated the observed moments in our data.  





During any period an individual can only be enrolled as a student or be in the labour market. The likelihood 
for those who are enrolled describes the probability of passing and dropping out, while the likelihood for 









The model above is augmented to allow for heterogeneity. The finite mixture model allows us to introduce 
persistent individual heterogeneity. In our model we will allow schooling ability (ߥ௜௦) and market ability (ߥ௜௠) 
to differ by type. Each type is assumed to occur with probability ݌௞. The above model needs to be modified 
slightly when we set up the finite mixture model, in which case the overall likelihood becomes the weighted 
sum of the likelihoods of each of the ܭ types.  
                                                            
86 In our data we do have information on the costs to normal and tertiary schooling. Potentially, if we are willing to 
believe these self-reported figures we would able to ‘pin down’ what ݑௌ could be.  
87 In our homogenous model ߥ௜௦ ൌ 0. All the variation in school progression is therefore driven by grade difficulty and 
noise.  
88 As before, Ω௜௧ denotes the entire set of variables known to the individual at period ݐ that can affect preferences and 
expectations. Generally	Ω௜௧ ൌ ሺݎ݁݌௜௧ିଵ, ݁݀௜௧ିଵ, ݀௜௧ିଵ	ሻ, but for new entrants Ω௜௧ ൌ ሺ0,0,0ሻ.  









where ݌௞ represents the population proportion and ܮ௞ represents the likelihood of type ݇.  
Heckman and Singer (1984) propose that amount of types, ܭ, be increased incrementally until increasing ܭ 
has no more impact on the likelihood ܮ. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010), however, warn that if ܭ is set larger 
than its true value then the model will not be identified. The computational cost also becomes a constraint 
with multiple types. Increasing ܭ not only increases the parameter space that needs to be solved, it also 
increases the number of iterations to solve. For this reason most finite mixture models only allow for two 
or three types. 
5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1. Data 
The National Income Dynamics Survey is a bi-annual survey that was conducted between 2008 and 2012 
(SALDRU, 2015a-c). The survey follows the same set of individuals for three waves. Although we will be 
making use of the panel dimension of the survey, the largest portion of our school information in our panel 
is derived from the retrospective questions about schooling that were asked during the first survey89. The 
baseline questionnaire contained a list of questions on repetitions that allowed us to construct a historical 
account of how each individual proceeded through school. If individuals are still in school in the 2nd and 
3rd waves of NIDS then the subsequent waves provide us with further schooling information. If student 
are however out of school, then the 2nd and 3rd waves provide us with additional data on employment and 
observed wages. Since the retrospective questions about schooling were only asked to those individuals 
who were aged between 6 and 30 during the first survey we decided to restrict our sample to only contain 
black males from that age cohort.  
5.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Among a subsample of black males aged between 25 and 35 the distribution of education looks as follows: 
     Table 3.1:  Distribution of Educational Attainment 
 
   Probability 
 Primary School or Less 18.3% 
 Commenced High School 45.2% 
 Finished High School 26.0% 
 Commenced Tertiary Education 10.5% 
 Total 100% 
   
Most young black males in our sample did attend some high school, but only 37% of the cohort went on 
to finish high school and only 10.5% went on to further their studies beyond school. The low school 
                                                            
89 Individuals between the ages of 15 and 30 were asked whether they had repeated any grades and if they had, 
which grades these were.  





completion rate is especially surprising given that the cost of schooling is relatively low (and sometimes 
free90) and the returns are judged to be high and convex. The opportunity cost of employment for this 
group is also low. In chapter 1 we showed that black males are unlikely to be immediately absorbed into 
employment upon leaving school.  
Although we will not be making use of the self-reported reasons for dropping out in our analysis, it is still 
worthwhile to have a look at these responses. The following table summarises the most common responses 
among young black males who dropped out prior to finishing high school (i.e. matric). 
     Table 3.2:  Reported Reasons for Not Finishing High School  
 
   Males 
 Worked 14% 
 Looked for Work 30% 
 Too Expensive 29% 
 Poor Marks 4% 
 Other 23% 
 Total 100% 
   
Nearly half of the black males that drop out before finishing school claim to have done so because of labour 
market opportunities (either employment or the prospect of employment), while more than a quarter of 
the students claimed to have dropped out because school was too expensive. Only 4% of students report 
to have dropped out due to their own poor ability or poor marks91.  




Figure 3.1:  Probability of being enrolled among black males 
 
                                                            
90 Schools that are judged to be serving students from the bottom three quintiles in South Africa are no longer 
allowed to charge schools fees.  
91 Interestingly, 46% of the females that dropped out before finishing school claim to have done so due to pregnancy 
or birth. This is partly why we restricted our analysis to black males, since the educational attainment choice for 
females is intrinsically connected to the fertility decision.  





Between the ages of 6 and 15 almost 100% of the population appears to be enrolled. This is not surprising, 
since attendance is supposed to be compulsory for all students between the ages of 7 and 15 (SASA, 1996). 
Between the ages of 15 and 18 we see that enrolment drops by roughly 25%. Most of these students would 
not have attempted the final school leavers’ examinations. Over the following three years, from age 18 to 
age 21, we see an even sharper decline – enrolment drops by roughly 50 percentage points. Most of those 
students who are still enrolled after the age of 21 would be busy with tertiary schooling.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Probability of having repeated among black males who are currently studying 
 
Repeating is prevalent among black males, especially among older students who have been in the schooling 
system for longer periods. Among those who are still enrolled, the likelihood of repeating increases up until 
the age of 20, whereafter it decreases again. There are two conflicting forces at play here. As a cohort ages, 
the probability of failing increases. However, there is also a selection process since we are not looking at 
the entire cohort across all the ages. Students who stay on to complete tertiary education are probably of 
higher academic ability and less likely to have repeated any grades while in school92.  
Grade repetition does not only vary among individuals, it also varies between grades. The following table 
compares the matric pass rate to that of the three grades that preceded it.  
     Table 3.3:  Probability of Passing by Prior Repeats 
  




 Having Never Repeated 88.3% 74.5%
 Having Repeated Once 82.2% 57.6%
 Having Repeated Twice 75.4% 52.5%
 Having Repeated Three or more times 60.0% 51.9%
 Unconditional Probability  82.9% 64.5%
      
                                                            
92 The spikes that are observed at higher age levels is due to the decreased sample size, which in turn was caused by 




















The table shows that the average unconditional probability of passing grades 9, 10 or 11 is 83%, while the 
unconditional probability of passing grade 12 is 65%. These reported matric pass rates in our data compare 
favourably to the average black matric pass rate of recent years, which was estimated at 62.9% in 2010 
(SAIRR, 2012).  
If we condition on a student’s academic record up to that point (whether they have failed and how often), 
we get a more accurate estimate of a student’s probability of passing the next grade. Someone who has not 
failed before has an 88% chance of passing grade 9, 10 and 11. The likelihood drops to 82% if they have 
failed once, 75% if they have failed twice, and 60% if they have failed more than two times. Those who 
have not repeated any grades up to grade 12 have a 75% chance of passing matric. The probability drops 
to between 50% and 60% if an individual has repeated93.  
Repeats are also correlated to labour market outcomes. The table below shows the expected probability of 
employment and the average hourly wage among a set of black males with exactly 12 years of education, 
conditional on the number of times they repeated while in school94.  
     Table 3.4:  Labour Market Prospects by Repeats 
  
   Empl Wage  
 Having Never Repeated 61.5% 28.36 
 Having Repeated Once 53.1% 20.96 
 Having Repeated Twice 46.5% 17.67 
 Having Repeated Three or more times 31.6%   8.71 
 Unconditional Wage 55.1% 23.77 
      
On average, black males who have repeated are less likely to be employed and more likely to earn lower 
wages when employed than those who have not repeated. Similarly, black males who have only repeated 
once face better labour market prospects than those who have repeated multiple times. In our structural 
model, we assume that repetition in itself does not affect earnings and employability, but simply reveals that 
someone may be of a lower labour ability – with a weaker labour market draw. This hypothesis will be 
tested in our finite mixture model. 
5.3. Fitting the Data to the Model 
Following a maximum likelihood approach, we proceed to find the set of parameters that are most likely 
to have produced the education and labour market outcomes that we observe in the data. For each iteration, 
the likelihood function compares the actual outcomes from the data to the predicted moments from our 
model, until our numerical optimization algorithm finds the set of parameters that are deemed to be most 
adequate.  
                                                            
93 The actual matric pass rate would have been lower if weaker students had not failed or dropped out along the way.  
94 The results were obtained from table A2 in the appendix.   





The sample contains black males aged between 6 and 35. Unfortunately, the retrospective portion of our 
panel, from where most of the educational data is derived, does not contain any data on pass or fails, but 
only on repetitions. The distinction between failing and repeating is trivial at lower grades, where most 
people who fail remain enrolled and become repeaters. The distinction is however problematic at higher 
grades, since we are unable to distinguish between those students who failed a grade and dropped out and 
those students who decided to drop out straight after finishing the previous grade.  
As with the job-search model, the optimal set of parameters were derived using the Powell and Fminsmpsa 
algorithm. Both these algorithms were obtained from the iFit library in Matlab (Farhi, 2011; Farhi et al., 
2013).  
5.4. Results 
The following table contains the set of parameters of the DCDP model that best fit the observed data for 
our sample of black males. Model 1 represents the original OLS estimates. Model 2 is a DCDP Model, 
where all individuals are assumed to have identical ability draws. The DCDP model is expanded further to 
allow for unobserved heterogeneity in model 3.  













 (Model 3) 
 Wage/Employment    
   Constant 1.120******** -1.588***** -1.592***** 
   Education -0.083******** -0.122******** -0.125******** 
   Education Squared x 100    0.013******** 0.013******** 0.008******** 
   Age 0.036******** 0.276******** 0.275******** 
   Age Squared x 100 -0.007******** -0.005******** -0.004******** 
   S.D. of Wage Shock   0.902******** 0.833******** 
   S.D. of Employment Shock   4.593******** 4.981******** 
   Employment Threshold  2.269******** 1.422******** 
    
 Non-Working Utility   
   Utility at home    -0.580******** -1.378******** 
   Utility at school     1.172******** 0.145******** 
   Utility at tertiary institution    -1.566******** -1.684******** 
   S.D. of School Shock  9.739******** 4.551******** 
    
 Passing   
   Difficulty parameter for Gr1-9   -1.411******** -3.794******** 
   Difficulty parameter for Gr10-11  -1.006******** -2.039******** 
   Difficulty parameter for Gr12+  0.085******** -0.041******** 
   Relative Noise Ratio (ߪఌ௦௦ /ߪఌ௦௠)      2.642******** 
     
 Ability    
   Proportion Type 1    0.157******** 
   Schooling Ability Type 1   1.392******** 
   Market Ability Type 1     0.906******** 
   N 1617        22408 22408 
   R2 0.166   
   Log Likelihood  -22300.4 -22420.5 
           Note: * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level 
 





The returns to education are convex – every additional year of education is worth more than the one that 
preceded it. In the figure below we show how the returns to education vary over the different years of 
attainment for the three different models95. 
 
Figure 3.3: Returns to education profile96.  
 
The returns are highest and most convex in the descriptive OLS model (model 1). The returns are lower 
and less convex for model 2. Model 2 assumes homogeneity. The reduction in the returns between model 
1 and 2 is therefore not driven by the difference in the educational attainment between types, but rather by 
the general educational enrolment decisions. The returns to education are the flattest for Model 3, where 
we introduce heterogeneity and attempt to correct for ability bias.   
The instantaneous utility of being at home is slightly lower in this model than in the previous chapter. The 
overall instantaneous utility was lower during higher education than during schooling. Theoretically we 
assume that individuals gain the same non-monetary utility out of both, but that the cost of schooling would 
be higher for higher education. Individuals in our dataset were also asked about the cost of schooling. The 
median self-reported annual cost to an ordinary year of schooling was reported to be R400, while the 
median cost of a year of tertiary schooling was roughly R10000 (see figure A2 in the appendix). 
  
                                                            
95 The OLS regression results that we obtain from model 1 was fitted to the subsample of employed males for who 
we had wage data. Not many individuals in our sample were employed. This is partly why we chose to let the education 
and age effect employment and wages in the same manner, since it allows us to use both employment and wage 
outcomes to model the returns to education.  





























The difficulty estimates for the three phases differ greatly. Our results show that it becomes incrementally 
tougher to pass a grade as we proceed through the schooling system. The probability of passing grade 1 
through 9 is estimated at 97% in the homogenous model. The probability drops to 78% for grade 10 and 
grade 11, and to 45% for matric and higher education.   
The finite mixture allows us to recover the proportions, and market and schooling ability values for each 
type. The estimated probabilities of each type and their corresponding school and market abilities are given 
in the table below97. 
In the homogenous model everyone was of the same ability and the probability of passing a specific grade. 
In the heterogeneous model we allow for two different ability types and allow the probability of passing a 
grade to vary by type. Conceptually, if we see that previous fails have a large impact on future fails this 
would be evidence of a significant level of heterogeneity in schooling ability. Individuals were also allowed 
to vary in their labour market abilities. Using the repeated waves we are able to exploit employment and 
wage outcomes to see whether an individual is doing surprisingly poorly or surprisingly well conditional on 
his level of education and experience. These two sets of ability draws are then compared to see whether 
they are correlated – whether there is an ability bias.   
      Table 3.6:  Distribution of School and Market Ability  
 
 Probability School Ability Market Ability 
Type 1 15.7% 1.391 0.906   
Type 2 84.3% -0.260 -0.169  
Overall 100.0% 0.000 0.000 
 
A positive correlation was uncovered. The person types who have the highest schooling ability draws also 
have the highest market ability. The results are similar to that of Belzil and Hansen (2002), who also find a 
positive correlation between schooling and market ability. Figure 3.A.3 in the appendix illustrates the 
positive relationship more explicitly. The results are consistent with the premise of ability bias, where 
individuals with greater unobservable labour market attributes may select into higher levels of education.  
In the presence of ability bias conventional OLS regressions that attempt to recover the returns would be 
bias, since some of the positive correlation between education and wages would work through ability rather 
than education. This also explains why the returns to education were lower than was originally predicted in 
the descriptive OLS model.  
   
                                                            
97 The proportion of type 2 individuals as well as their respective school and ability draws can be backed out once 
we know the proportion of type 1 individuals, and the school and ability draws for type 1 individuals.   





6. Simulations  
6.1. Prospects among Young Black Males 
Using the parameters from the finite mixture model (model 3) we proceed to simulate the transitions from 
childhood to early adulthood for the different ability types.  
The table compares the average level of education, the average number of fails and the average years 
enrolled between the two types: 
     Table 3.7:  Education, Years of Schooling and Repetitions by Type  
 
 Years Passed  Years Failed Years Enrolled 
Type 1 10.44 0.52 10.96 
Type 2 9.81 1.29 11.10 
Overall 9.91 1.16 11.08 
 
 
These simulations provide us with an insight as to how students progress through school, when they drop 
out and how quickly they get absorbed into the labour market. The following two figures show the expected 
likelihood of studying and working during a black male’s early life. Each year, an individual can either be 
enrolled or not. Individuals who were enrolled were either classified as “Pass” if they studied and passed 
that year or as “Fail” if they studied and failed that year. Similarly non-enrolled individuals were classified 
as “Work” if they were employed or as “Home” if they were not.  
 
 
























Figure 3.5: Activities by age for type 2 individuals. 
 
The differences are subtle. Generally the two groups drop out at a similar rate and at similar ages. Type 1 
individuals have a 2.5% chance of failing an early grade, compared to type 2 individuals who have 8.7% 
probability of failing an early grade. The probability of failing jumps to almost 10% for type 1 individuals 
and almost 25% for type 2 individuals when they reach grade 10. The jump is not that dramatic on either 
of the figures, since not all students make it to grade 10 and even less in the allotted years. Type 1 individuals 
have a 6.6% probability of failing matric, compared to type 2 individuals who have a 56% probability of 
failing matric.  
By age 25 we see that nearly 65% of type 1 individuals are employed. At the same age, roughly 55% of type 
2 individuals have found employment. This gap in employment likelihood among the two types remains 
fairly constant from age 25 onwards.  
6.2. Reducing the Noise in the Schooling System 
Lam et al. (2011) point out that the additional noise in the feedback signal that students have about their 
performance in formerly black schools distorts the link between ability and achievement. Our model 
provides a theoretical landscape wherein we are able to explicitly test this hypothesis. We proceed to shock 
the feedback mechanism to see how it will affect different ability types. In the original model the grades 
before matric had a standard deviation that was 2.64 times higher than matric. In the simulated model we 
set the standard deviation of the earlier grades equal to the standard deviation of matric.  
Our simulations show that when the idiosyncratic error within the schooling system is set to the same level 
as matric it will effect educational attainment through two channels. Firstly, it will affect the progression 
through schools directly by affecting the probability of passing. Secondly, it will strengthen the feedback 






















6.2.1 The Direct Effect: The Probability of Passing 
The figures below illustrate how the actual probabilities of passing each grade will be altered if the noise in 
the earlier grades were the same as in matric. In our simulation we set ߝ௜௧ௌ ൌ ߝ௜௧ெ98. Figure 5a shows the 
relationship between ability and passing each grade in the original model. Figure 5b shows the relationship 
between ability and passing for the simulated model, where the noise is decreased.    
 
          
              Figure 3.6.a: Actual probability of passing                     Figure 3.6.b: Simulated probability of passing  
 
The slope of each grade curve is determined by the ‘noise’ parameter, while the position is determined by 
the difficulty parameters. The dashed lines indicate the ability levels of both types. The probability of 
passing, for each type and under both scenarios, can be obtained from the intersect where the curved and 
dashed lines meet.  
Figure 5a shows the results for our baseline model, where we used the parameters from model 3. Type 1 
individuals have a 2.5% chance of failing early grades, a 9.5% chance of failing grade 10 or 11 and a 6.7% 
chance of failing thereafter. Despite grade 10 and 11 being easier than grade 12, type 1 individuals have a 
higher probability of passing the latter. This is because the noise is larger for the earlier grades.  
Figure 5b was constructed using the simulated for the scenario where the noise of earlier grades is reduced 
to the matric level. Type 1 individuals have less than 1% probability of failing early grades, a 1.4% probability 
of failing grade 10 and 11 and a 6.6% probability of failing a year thereafter. Type 1 students will be less 
likely to fail when the noise in the schooling system is decreased. Type 2 individuals have an 8.7% chance 
of failing an early grade, a 24.5% chance of failing grade 10 or 11 and a 56% of failing grade thereafter. 
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Under the simulation these probabilities increase to 11%, 29% and 56%, respectively. Thus, type 2 students 
will be more likely to fail if the noise is decreased.  
6.2.2. The Indirect Effect: The Information Revelation 
 
The indirect effect works through information updating. As the level of noise in the feedback mechanism 
reduces, the signal becomes less distorted and passes and fails become a more informative signal of 
underlying schooling ability. The figure below compares the speed at which students learn about their true 
abilities under the two scenarios99. In the “baseline” we keep the noise element to early grades at its 
estimated level, while in the “simulation” we reduce the noise to the matric level.   
 
Figure 3.7: Probability of being type 1 conditional on never having failed 
 
Updating at early grades is slow. For the early grades the failure rate is low and the noise is high. 
Consequently, we find that most students pass, and learn very little about their ability. Due to the noise in 
the schooling system, it is often not the least able students who end up failing. The signal becomes more 
informative at higher grades, where grades are more difficult and the signal is less distorted. When we 
reduce the noise, both type 1 and type 2 students are quicker to recognise their true type.  
6.2.3 The Total Effect: The Change in Education 
If schools are less noisy, weaker students will be more likely to fail, while better students will be more likely 
to pass. Put simply, when the noise in the schooling system decreases, good students will learn that they are 
good students more quickly, but will also be more likely to pass relative to weaker students than in a noisier 
school system. Similarly, weaker students will be quicker to learn about their true type, but will also be more 
disadvantaged in that they will be less likely to ‘sneak through’ grades than before. Both effects work in the 
same direction. 
                                                            





















The figure below shows the combined effect of reducing the noise component. In the simulated model the 
standard deviation of the earlier grades was set to be equal to be noise in matric.  
   
Figure 3.8.a: Distribution of education 
in baseline model 
Figure 3.8.b: Distribution of education in 
simulated model 
 
Reducing the noise within earlier grades causes an increase in the gap in educational attainment between 
the two ability types. On average, type 1 individuals will attain more education, while type 2 individuals will 
attain less education than is the current situation.  
The table below compares the years in schooling and educational attainment for each ability type.  











The simulated results are compared to original results in the baseline model. Compared to the baseline 
scenario, type 1 individuals spend slightly less time in school, but attain more education since they are less 
likely to fail than before. Their average level of education increases from 10.44 to 10.56. Type 2 individual 
spend less time in school and spend more time failing grades. They average level of education among type 
2 individuals decreased from 9.8 years to 9.3 years. Our simulated results suggest that the gap in schooling 
between the two groups will double from just more than half a year of education to more than a whole year 
if the level of noise in the schooling system is reduced.  
Conceptually a reduction of the noise within schools that will allow people to make more informed 







































  Baseline  Simulation 
   Passed  Failed Enrolled  Passed Failed Enrolled
Type 1 10.44 0.52 10.96  10.56 0.09 10.65 
Type 2 9.81 1.29 11.10  9.32 1.49 10.82 
Overall 9.91 1.16 11.08  9.52 1.27 10.79 





However, from a policy perspective this seems unfortunate that any policy aimed at reducing noise (like 




In this chapter we attempt to formulate a structural model that is capable of explaining the sequence of 
schooling decision faced by utility maximizing agents in the face of uncertainties regarding future shocks 
and their own true ability. Individuals were allowed to be heterogeneous in their labour and schooling 
ability. Using dynamic programming we derive the set of parameter that best reflects the actual school and 
labour market outcomes for a group of young black males.  
The strong behavioural assumptions and the structure of our data allowed us to test whether labour market 
and schooling ability are in fact correlated. We find a strong positive correlation between the school and 
market ability, leading us to reject the exogeneity assumption. Our results are consistent with the existence 
of a positive ability bias, where more able students proceed through school more quickly, attain more 
schooling, find work earlier and earn higher wages, while less equipped students proceed through school 
more slowly, attain less schooling, take longer to find work and earn lower wages.  
Having solved the structural parameters of our model we proceeded to test how low and high ability 
individuals would react to a decrease in the idiosyncratic component within earlier grades – how they would 
have fared if there was less noise in their schools. Our simulated results show that high ability students 
would have been less likely to fail and would have learned and obtained even more education, whereas low 
ability students would have been more likely to fail and would have obtained less schooling. The ability bias 
would, therefore, have been higher if the level of noise in the schooling system was lower.  
 
 






Appendix 3.A: Additional Figures and Tables 
 





      














































            
























  Type 1
  Type 2

















  Constant 0.829 0.883 0.645 0.745 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.027) (0.040) 
  Repeat = 1  -0.061  -0.168 
  (0.023)  (0.064) 
  Repeat = 2  -0.128  -0.220 
  (0.030)  (0.085) 
  Repeat ≥ 3   -0.283  -0.226 
  (0.043)  (0.099) 
  N 1435 1405 301 296 
  R2 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.041 
    
 
Table 3.A.2:  Expected Wages and Probability of Employment Conditional on Repetition History 
 





  Constant 0.551 0.615 2.956 2.660 
 (0.027) (0.039) (0.023) (0.063) 
  Repeat = 1  -0.084  -0.247 
  (0.061)  (0.138) 
  Repeat = 2  -0.150  -0.458 
  (0.085)  (0.197) 
  Repeat ≥ 3   -0.299  -0.693 
  (0.120)  (0.381) 
  N 336 336 211 211 
  R2 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.034 
    






























 (Model 3) 
 Wage/Employment    
   Constant 1.120 -1.5883 -1.592 
  (0.830) (0.067) (0.058) 
   Education -0.083 -0.122 -0.125 
  (0.037) (0.005) (0.003) 
   Education Squared x 100 0.013 0.013 0.008 
  (0.002)   (0.001) (0.001) 
   Age 0.036 0.276 0.275 
  (0.065) (0.001) (0.001) 
   Age Squared x 100 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
   S.D. of Wage Shock   0.902 0.833 
   (0.018) (0.019) 
   S.D. of Employment Shock   4.593 4.981 
      (0.916) (0.838) 
   Employment Threshold  2.269 1.422 
     (0.215) (0.323) 
     
 Non-Working Utility    
   Utility at home    -0.580 -1.378 
   (0.326) (0.238) 
   Utility at school     1.172 0.145 
     (0.227) (0.148) 
   Utility at tertiary institution    1.566 -1.684 
   (0.596) (0.473) 
   S.D. of School Shock  9.739 4.551 
     (1.010) (0.628) 
     
 Passing    
   Difficulty parameter for Gr1-9   -1.411 -3.794 
      (0.009) (0.013) 
   Difficulty parameter for Gr10-11  -1.006 -2.039 
     (0.029) (0.320) 
   Difficulty parameter for Gr12+   0.085 -0.041 
     (0.028) (0.050) 
   Relative Noise Ratio (ߪఌ௦௦ /ߪఌ௦௠)      2.642 
    (0.404) 
     
 Ability    
   Proportion Type 1    0.157 
    (0.017) 
   Schooling Ability Type 1   1.392 
    (0.155) 
   Market Ability Type 1     0.906 
    (0.056) 
   N 1617 22408 22408 
   R2 0.166   









Appendix 3.B: Choosing whether to sit Matric 
The choice to stay in school and attempt to sit the final school leaver’s examination is a vital question within 
the South African schooling system. Unlike previous grades, the final exam is nationally monitored. Our 
model finds, like Lamb et al.’s research (2011), that the noise component is smaller in matric than for 
previous grades. Passing grade 12 therefore provides both students and future employers with a stronger 
signal of actual ability than earlier grades do. 
To illustrate how our model works, we consider the enrolment choice for matric from the perspective of a 
student who has just finished grade 11.   
Type 1 students have a 93.5% chance of passing matric, while type 2 students have only a 43.6% probability 
of passing matric. Unfortunately, students only have partial knowledge with regard to which one of these 
ability types they belong. Rational students are able to use their knowledge about their expected ability type 
to calculate their expected probability of passing. 




Without any additional information, students will assume probability weights, in which case the expected 
probability of passing matric would be 47.6%.  
In our model, however, students are able to use their academic history to update their expectations about 
their type. The equation can be rewritten in terms of one’s educational history.  




A student who has completed grade 11 without ever failing a grade will have a 60% chance of passing 
matric the first time. The probability of passing will be lower if a student had failed a previous grade and 
even lower if a students had failed more than once100 If a student had only failed once and that was in an 
early (easier) grade, the likelihood of passing matric will be 51%, while if such a student had failed only 
once, but that failure was in either grade 10 or grade 11, the probability of passing matric will be 54%.  
In our model we assume that because the matric exam is standardized, the exam will be less noisy. Students 
are therefore likely to learn more about their own ability from sitting the matric exam than they would from 
sitting a normal non-standardized exam. In our simulated model, only 30% of those students who failed 
the matric exam decided to come back to attempt it again. To the author’s knowledge this model is the only 
one that is capable of explaining how rational individuals who found it worthwhile to write the matric exam 
the year before will opt out in the current year following failure the year before.    
                                                            
100 Having failed an easier grade provides more information on a student’s ability than having failed a tough grade, as 
it signals that one is more likely to be of a weaker draw. 






A reading of the current literature may lead one to deduce that the labour market is mobile and that 
reservation wages are exuberant in South Africa, which suggests that most of the unemployed would be 
able to find work if they were willing to work for lower wage offers. Multivariate regressions also show that 
the returns to education are high and convex. It is however important to remember that these methods are 
descriptive in nature, they merely convey the observed relationship between covariates. Before one is able 
to make any causal inferences from these reduced form estimates one needs to make sure that the measured 
effect is not biased and that the estimate has an economic interpretation. This, in turn, requires one to 
address the endogeneity concerns that are inherent to most of these estimates and to derive a theoretical 
model that is capable of giving meaning to such estimates.  
In this thesis, I contribute to the literature, by choosing three such descriptive results and exposing the 
inconsistencies that undermine their interpretation. In all three chapters, I look at the conventional 
estimates, discuss why I think they may be biased and then proceed to find more reliable estimates that are 
more equipped to explain the behavioural outcome that are observed in the data.  
In chapter one, I show that the naïve 1-period employment transition estimates that are commonly used to 
describe employment mobility are inconsistent with the observed age-employment profile and with other 
multiple-periods transition estimates. In chapter two, I show that self-reported reservation wages are prone 
to over-optimism – individuals report reservation wages are that are higher than their expected earnings 
and are seen accepting jobs that pay less than their reported reservation wages. In chapter three, I investigate 
whether the returns to education are truly as high as and convex as ordinary least squares model report 
them to be or whether the returns are biased by ability bias.  
In my analysis I make use of both structural and reduced form models that are better suited to the South 
African labour market landscape – allowing for unemployment and unobserved individual-specific 
heterogeneity. Theoretical models rarely simplify to linear relationships that are recoverable through 
conventional ordinary least squares regression. The models that I employ are no exception in this regard. 
In all three chapter I make use of maximum likelihood, with customised likelihood functions, to recover 
the set of parameters that were most likely to have produced the data, given the behavioural assumption 
about how optimizing individuals should behave. The economic theory that is imposed on our models 
allows one to interpret the results in a causal manner. 
In the first chapter, I show that the transitions rates that I derive from classic transitions matrices are too 
high. If the probably to transition into employment is truly as high as the reported estimates claim, then 
young individuals would transition into employment at a much quicker rate than what is currently observed. 
It is unclear whether the divergence is driven by misclassification error or unobserved individual-specific 





heterogeneity, but what one can say with confidence is that conventional transition rates do not provide an 
accurate estimate of the employment transition probabilities that are faced by all the individuals in the 
labour market. Most black males experience far lower job entry and exit rates than are generally reported. 
The results show that the probability of transitioning into employment among young black males within a 
six month period may be as low as 4%. 
In chapter two, I show that current reservation wages are not consistent with the transition and wage data. 
I look at the transition between period and the observed wage distribution to derive a plausible wage offer 
and job offer distribution. The results suggest that unemployment is driven by low job arrival rates rather 
than high reservation wages. Only 10% of the job offers that the non-employed are offered get declined. 
The job refusal rate that I recover is much lower than that of Levinsohn and Pugatch (2010). According to 
their results 71% of job offers get declined among young inhabitants in Cape Town.  
Descriptive results show that those individuals that partake in active search are more likely to transition 
into employment. The job-search model in chapter two shows that most of the difference in job offer rates 
among the searching and non-searching non-employed is due to the positive selection into searching by 
the more able and more educated. The results that I obtain show that individuals with more desired 
attributes are more likely to select into employment since the gains to search are higher for them – the 
incremental change in their job offer rate is higher and the expected wage offers that they will receive is 
higher.  
In chapter three, I show that the returns to education estimates are not aligned with the educational 
attainment figures. Descriptive results suggest that the returns to education in South Africa are high and 
convex. Yet, most people appear to drop out of school right before the largest increases are about to occur. 
This behavior would be difficult to rationalize from the perspective of rational, well-informed agents that 
are not liquidity constrained. I find that a large part of the difference in wages is attributed to ability 
differences. Education increases the likelihood of finding employment and the expected returns, but not as 
drastically as descriptive regressions would have us believe. The estimates that I obtain when I control for 
ability bias are much lower than the reduced form estimates. 
Lam et al. (2001) showed that the feedback mechanism is blunt within previously black schools and that 
the link between hard work (or ability) and achievement in those schools are often distorted. In my 
structural model I show how able students who operate within these school are unlikely to be aware of their 
true potential and that these students will drop out earlier than they would have if they were aware of their 
true ability.  
One of the advantages of the structural approach is that it provides us with deep structural parameters. 
Unlike the reduced form estimates, these estimates are not subject to the Lucas critique. These estimates 
thus allows one to predict how rational optimizing individuals will respond to never before seen policy 





changes or economic shocks. I show that if the noise within earlier grades was reduced then students would 
be better informed about their true ability. The simulated results also suggests that more capable students 
would be more likely to stay in school for longer and attain more education. 
 
   






AGUIRREGABIRIA, V., MIRA, P., 2010. Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models: A Survey.  Journal of 
Econometric, 156(1), 38-67. 
ANDERSON, K., CASE, A., LAM, D., 2001. Social Dynamics. Causes and Consequences of Schooling 
Outcomes in South Africa: Evidence from Survey Data. Social Dynamics, 27(1), 1-23. 
ARROW, K.., 1973. Higher Education as a Filter.  Journal of Public Economics, 2, 193-216. 
ATTANASIO, O., MEGHIER, C., SANTIAGO, C., 2012. Structural Model and a Randomized Experiment to 
Evaluate PROGRESA. Review of Economic Studies, 79(1), 37-66. 
BALLEN, J., FREEMAN, R., 1986. Transitions between Employment and Nonemployment. In R. Freeman 
and H. Holzer, eds., The Black Youth Employment Crisis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.   
BANERJEE, A., GALIANI, S., LEVINSOHN, J., MCLAREN, Z., WOOLARD, I., 2006. Why has Unemployment 
Risen in the New South Africa? The Economics of Transition, 16(4), 715–40. 
BECKER, G.S., 1964. Human Capital. New York: Columbia University Press. 
BECKER, G.S., 1967. Human Capital and the Personal Distribution of Income: An Analytical Approach: 
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Institute of Public Administration. 
BELZIL, C., HANSEN, J., 2002. Unobserved Ability and the Return to Schooling. Econometrica, 70(5), 2075-
2091.  
BELZIL, C., 1996. Efficiencies and Comparative Advantage in Job Search. Journal of Labor Economics, 14(1), 
154-173. 
BHORAT, H., OOSTHUIZEN, M., 2007. Young People and the Labour Market. Africa Insight, 37(3), 388-403. 
BIEMER, P.P., BUSHERY, J.M., 2000. On the Validity of Markov Latent Class Analysis for Estimating 
Classification Error in Labor Force Data. Survey Methodology, 26(2), 139-152. 
BLAU, D.M., 1991. Search for Nonwage Job Characteristics: A Test of the Reservation Wage Hypothesis. 
Journal of Labor Economics, 9(2), 186-205. 
BLAU, D.M., ROBIN, P.K., 1990. Job Search Outcomes for the Employed and Unemployed. Journal of 
Political Economy, 98(3), 637-655. 





BOUND, J., BROWN C., MATHIOWETZ, N., 1999. Measurement Error in Survey Data. In Handbook 
of Econometrics, vol. 5., Heckman, J., Leamer, E., (ed.). Amsterdam: North Holland 
BRENT, R.P., 1973. Algorithms for Minimization without Derivatives, Prentice-Hall, Englewood, New 
Jersey. 
BROWN, S., TAYLOR, K., 2013. Reservation wage, market wages and Unemployment: Analysis of Individual 
Level Panel Data. Economic Modelling, 28(3), 1317-27. 
BURGER, R.P., TEAL, F., 2013. Measuring the Option Value of Education. Stellenbosch Economic Working 
Papers, 15/13. 
BURGER, R.P., VON FINTEL, D., 2006. Rising Unemployment in South Africa Labour Market: A Dynamic 
Analysis Using Birth Cohort Panels. Stellenbosch Economic Working Papers, 24/09. 
CAHUC, P., ZYLBERG, A., 2004. Labour Economics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
CARD, D., 1999. The Causal Effect of Schooling on Earnings. In Handbook of Labor Economics , 
Ashenfelter, O., Card, D., (ed.). Amsterdam: North Holland 
CARDOSO, M.F., SALCEDO, R.L., DE AZEVEDO, S.F., 1996. The Simplex-Simulated Annealing Approach 
to Continuous Non-Linear Optimization. Computers and Chemical Engineering, 20(9), 1065-1080. 
CICHELLO, P.L., FIEDS, G.S., LEIBBRANDT, M. 2005. Earnings and Employment Dynamics for Africans 
in Post-Apartheid South Africa: A Panel Study of KwaZulu-Natal. Journal of African Economics, 14(2), 
143-190.  
CICHELLO, P.L., LEIBBRANDT, M., WOOLARD, I., 2014. Winners and Losers: South African Labour-
Market Dynamics between 2008 and 2010. Development Southern Africa, 31(1), 65-84.  
CHUA, T.C., FULLER, W.A., 1987. A Model for Multinomial Response Error Applied to Labor Flows.  
Journal of American Statistical Association, 82(397), 46-51. 
CLARK, K.B., SUMMERS, L., 1979. Labour Market Dynamics and Unemployment: A Reconsideration. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 13-60.  
DINKELMAN, T., 2004. How Household Context Affects Search Outcomes of the Unemployed in 
KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa: A Panel Data Analysis. South African Journal of Economics, 72(3), 484-521.  
ECKSTEIN, Z., WOLPIN, K.I., 1999. Why Youths Drop Out of High School: The Impact of Preferences, 
Opportunities, and Abilities. Econometrica, 67(6), 1295-1339. 





FARHI, E., 2011. The iFit Data Analysis Library: ILL, Computing for Science.                      
[ on-line: http://ifit.mccode.org  ] 
FARHI, E., DEBAB, Y., 2013. iFit: A New Data Analysis Framework. Applications for Data Reduction and 
Optimization of Neutron Scattering Instrument Simulations with McStas. Journal of Neutron Research, 
17(1), 5-18. 
FLINN, C., HECKMAN, J., 1982. New Methods for Analyzing Structural Models of Labor Force Dynamics. 
Journal of Econometrics, 18(1), 115-168. 
GRONAU, R., 1971. Information and Frictional Unemployment. The American Economic Review. 61(3), 290-
301. 
HECKMAN, J.J., 1979. Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econometrica. 46, 1: 153-161 
HECKMAN, J.J., 2010. Building Bridges between Structural and Program Evaluation Approaches to 
Evaluating Policy. Journal of Economic Literature, 48(2), 356-398. 
HECKMAN, J.J., SINGER, B., 1984. Econometric Duration Analysis. Journal of Econometrics, 24(1984), 63-132. 
HERTZ, T., 2003. Upward Bias in the Estimated Returns to Education: Evidence from South Africa. 
American Economic Review, 93(4), 1354-1368. 
IMAI, S., KEANE, M.P., 2004. Intertemporal Labor Supply and Human Capital Accumulation. International 
Economic Review. 45(2), 601-641. 
JENSEN, R., 2010. The (Perceived) Returns to Education and the Demand for Schooling. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. 152(2), 515-548. 
JENSEN, P., WESTERGAARD-NIELSEN, N., 1987. A Search Model Applied to the Transition from 
Education to Work. Review of Economic Studies. 54(3), 461-472. 
KOCH, S.F, NTEGE, S.S., 1987. Potential Screening in South Africa’s Labour Market. SARB Conference 2006, 
143-150.  
 KEANE, M.P., 2010. Structural vs. Atheoretic Approaches to Econometrics. Journal of Econometrics, 156(1), 
3-20. 
KEANE, M.P., WOLPIN, K.I., 1997. The Career Decisions of Young Men. Journal of Political Economy, 105(3), 
473-522. 





KESWELL, M., POSSWELL, L., 2004. Returns to education in South Africa: A retrospective sensitivity 
analysis of the available evidence. The South African Journal of Economics. 72(4), 834-860.  
KIEFER, N.M, NEUMANN, G.R., 1979. An Emperical Job-Search Model, with a Test of the Constant 
Reservation-Wage Hypothesis. Journal of Political Economy 87(1), 89-107.  
KINGDON, G.G., KNIGHT, J., 2001. What Have We Learned About Unemployment from Microdatasets 
in South Africa? Social Dynamics, 27(1), 79-95. 
KRUEGER, A.B., MUELLER, A.I, 2014. A Contribution to the Empirics of Reservation Wages. National 
Bureau of Economic Research. working paper 19870. 
LAM, D., ARDINGTON, C., LEIBBRANDT, M., 2011. Schooling as a Lottery: Racial Differences in School 
Advancement in Urban South Africa. Journal of Development Economics. 95(2), 121-136. 
LAM, D., LEIBBRANDT, M., MLATSHENI, C., 2008. Education and Youth Unemployment in South Africa. 
A Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit Working Paper Number 22. Cape Town: 
SALDRU, University of Cape Town. 
LANGEHEINE, R., 1988. Manifest and Latent Markov Chain Models for Categorical Panel Data. Journal of 
Educational Statistics, 13(4), 299-312. 
LEVINSOHN, J., PUGATCH, T. 2010. The Role of Reservation Wages in Youth Unemployment in Cape 
Town, South Africa: A Structural Approach. Unpublished, University of Michigan. 
LEWBEL, A., 2000. Identification of the Binary Choice Model with Misclassification.  Econometric Theory, 
16(4), 603-609. 
MAGNAC, T., ROBIN, J.M., 1994. An Econometric Analysis of Labour Market Transitions Using Discrete 
and Tenure Data. Labour Economics, 1(3), 327-346.  
MAGNAC, T., VISSER, M., 1999. Transition Models with Measurement Errors. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 81(3), 466-474. 
MAGNAC, T., THESMAR, D., 2002. Analyse économique des politiques éducatives: l’augmentation de la 
scolarisation en France de 1982 à 1993. Annales d’Économique et de Statistique, 66, 1-35. 
MCCALL, J.J., 1970. Economics of Information and Job Search. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 84(1), 113-
126. 





MEYER, B.D., 1988. Classification-Error Models and Labor-Market Dynamics. Journal of Business and 
Economic Statistics, 6(3), 385-390. 
MINCER, J., 1974. Schooling, Experience and Earnings. New York: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
MLATSHENI, C., ROSPABE, S., 2002. Why is Youth Unemployment so High and Unequally Spread in South 
Africa? DPRU Working Paper No. 02/65. 
MOORE, J.M., VISCUSI, W.K., 1990. Models for Estimating Discount Rates for Long-Term Health Risks 
Using Labor Market Data. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 3, 381-401. 
MORTENSEN, D.T., 1970. Job Search, the Duration of Unemployment, and the Phillips Curve. American 
Economic Review. 60(5), 505-517. 
MOLL, P., 1996. The Collapse of Primary Schooling Returns in South Africa 1960-90. Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 58(1), 185-209. 
MOLL, P., 1998. Primary Schooling, Cognitive Skills and Wage in South Africa, Economica, 65(?), 263-84. 
MURPHY, K.M., WELCH, F., 1990. Empirical Age-Earnings Profiles. Journal of Labor Economics. 8(2), 202-
228. 
MWABU, G., SCHULTZ, T.P., 1996. Education Returns across Quantiles of the Wage Function: Alternative 
Explanations for Returns to Education by Race in South Africa. American Economic Review, May 1996 
(Papers and Proceedings), 86(2), 335–39. 
NATTRASS, N., WALKER, R., 2005. Unemployment and Reservation Wages in Working-Class Cape Town. 
South African Journal of Economics. 73(3), 498-509. 
PASERMAN, M.D., 2008. Job Search and Hyperbolic Discounting: Structural Estimation and Policy 
Evaluation. Economic Journal, 118(531), 1418-52. 
PETTERSON, S.M., 1997. Are Young Black Men Really Less Willing to Work? American Economic Review, 
62(4), 605-613. 
PFEFFEMANN, D., SKINNER, C., HUMPHREYS, K., 1988. The Estimation of Gross Flows in the Presence 
of Measurement Error Using Auxiliary Variables. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics in 
Society), 161(1), 13-32. 





PORTEBA, J.M., SUMMERS, L.H., 1984. Response Variation in the CPS: Caveats for the Unemployment 
Analyst. Monthly Labor Review, 107, 37-42.  
PORTEBA, J.M., SUMMERS, L.H., 1986. Reporting Errors and Labor Market Dynamics. Econometrica, 54(6), 
1319-1338.  
PSACHAROPOULOS, G., 1979. On the Weak versus the Strong Version of Screening Hypothesis. Economic 
Letters. 4, 181-145. 
RANKIN, N.A., ROBERTS, G., 2011. Youth Unemployment, Firm Size and Reservation Wages. South African 
Journal of Economics. 79(2), 128-145. 
RANCHOD, V., DINKELMAN, T., 2008. Labor Market Transitions in South Africa: What can We Learn 
from Matched Labor Force Survey Data? Southern Africa Labor and Development Research Unit Working 
Paper, No. 14.  
RASCH, G., 1980. Probabilistic Models for Some Intelligence and Attainment Tests. Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press. (Original work published in 1960) 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA., 1996. The South African Schools Act. Act No 84 of 1996. Pretoria: 
Government Printers. 
ROSEN, S., 1977. Human Capital: A Survey of Empirical Research. In Research in Labour Economics: An annual 
Compilation of Research, Ehrenberg, R.G., (ed.). Greenwich: Jai Press, vol 1, 3- 40. 
RUST, J., 1992. Do People Behave According to Bellman’s Principles of Optimality? Stanford, CA: Hoover 
Institution Working Paper no. E-92-10. 
SALDRU (SOUTH AFRICA LABOUR AND DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH UNIT), 2015a. National Income 
Dynamics Study 2008, Wave 1 (dataset). Version 5.3. Cape Town: Southern Africa Labour and 
Development Research Unit (producer), 2015. Cape Town: DataFirst (distributor) 
 
SALDRU (SOUTH AFRICA LABOUR AND DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH UNIT), 2015b. National Income 
Dynamics Study 2010-2011, Wave 2 (dataset). Version 2.3. Cape Town: Southern Africa Labour and 
Development Research Unit (producer), 2015. Cape Town: DataFirst (distributor) 
SALDRU (SOUTH AFRICA LABOUR AND DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH UNIT), 2015c. National Income 
Dynamics Study 2012, Wave 3 (dataset). Version 1.3. Cape Town: Southern Africa Labour and 
Development Research Unit (producer), 2015. Cape Town: DataFirst (distributor) 





SAIRR (SOUTH AFRICA INSTITURE OF RACE RELATIONS), 2012. South African Institute of Race Relations 
survey 2010-2011.                                                                                                                      
 [ on-line: http://irr.org.za/reports-and-publications/south-africa-survey/south-africa-survey-online-2010-2011/education ] 
 
SASA (SOUTH AFRICAN SCHOOLS ACT), 1996. Act No. 84 of 1996. Government Gazette. No 17579. Pretoria: 
Government Printers.                                                                                                                     
 [ on-line: http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Act84of1996.pdf ] 
SASSA (SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL SECURITY AGENCY), 2008. Annual Statistical Report on Social Grants.                          
 [ on-line: http://www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/knowledge-centre/annual-reports ] 
SINGH, A.C., RAO., J.N.K., 1995. On the Adjustment of Gross Flow Estimates for Classification Error 
with Application to Data from the Canadian Labour Force Survey. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 90, 478-488.  
STATS SA (STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA), 2006. The South African Labour Force Panel Study – 
Methodology Document. National Statistics System Division (NSSD), Statistics South Africa.  
STATS SA (STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA), 2015a. Quarterly Labour Force Survey: Quarter 2: 2015, Statistical 
Release, P0211  
[ on-line: http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2015.pdf ] 
 
STATS SA (STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA), 2015b. National and Provincial Labour Market: Youth: Q1: 2008  
- Q1: 2015, Statistical Release, P0211.4.2  
[ on-line: http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P02114.2/P02114.22015.pdf ] 
STIGLITZ, J.E., 1975. The Theory of “Screening” Education, and the Distribution of Income. The American 
Economic Review, 65(3), 283-300. 
TOPEL, R.H., WARD, M.P. 1992. Job Mobility and the Careers of Young Men. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 107(2), 439-479.  
VAN DER BERG, S., 2007. Apartheid's Enduring Legacy: Inequalities in Education. Apartheid’s Enduring 
Legacy: Inequalities in Education, 16(5), 849-880. 
WEST, M., 1993. Mixtures Models, Monte Carlo, Bayesian Updating and Dynamic Models. Computer Science 
and Statistics, 24, 325-333. 
WOLFE, R., CARLIN, J.B., PATTON, G.C., 2003. Transitions in an Imperfectly Observed Binary Variable: 
Depressive Symptomatology in Adolescents. Statistics in Medicine, 22(3), 427-440. 





WOLPIN, K.I., 1977. Education and Screening. American Economic Review, 67(5), 949-958. 
WOLPIN, K.I., 1987. Estimating a Structural Search Model: The Transition from School to Work. 
Econometrica, 1987(4), 801-817. 
ZOCH, A., 2014. How Reliable are Responses to Survey Questions About Reservation Wages? CSAE 
Conference Paper, Oxford, 2014. 
 [ on-line: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=CSAE2014&paper_id=896 ] 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
